Craig, Providence, and Calvinism

Dr. William Lane Craig lists five objections against a Calvinistic conception of providence in the book above. Craig's five objections can be summarized as follows:

1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures (indications of a robust doctrine of human freedom).
2. Calvinism is self-refuting.
3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin.
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience is illusory.

1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures.

Craig merely asserts Calvinism is contrary to the plain teachings of Scripture. He does not exegete any text to argue the supposed exegetical shortcomings of Calvinism. Craig claims Calvinism undermines all scriptural texts that affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency."I fail to see how Calvinism cannot affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency," if God (analogically) determines them.

2. Calvinism is self-refuting.

Simply to say one believes Calvinism given the truth of Calvinism seems trivial. But Craig sees this as self-refuting. Since a person is determined to believe in determinism, (somehow) this determined belief is not acquired rationally, but why not? Craig is assuming latently by this objection Calvinism entails causal determinism. But there is no obvious reason why it must. In fact, many Calvinists would adopt an analogical understanding of determinism whereby God determines C by X and man determines C by Y. On such a view divine causation is not taken as univocal, but, rather analogical.

3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin. 

“…God is the first efficient cause of everything, but evil has come, not from His first act, but by a second act, an act of creatures.

God is the author of the author of sin, He cannot be the author of sin itself, for sin is the result of a rebellion against God. 

If God is not the author of sin, at least He must be charged with being responsible for sin…A little reflection on the subject will show the contradiction involved in charging God with responsibility. Let us ask one question: Responsible to whom, or to what?...Obviously  if we are talking about the Almighty, He already is the highest power there is. Therefore, when God decreed this type of universe where Christ was to die for the sins of all who believe, God was responsible to none but Himself.” [1]

“God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though He is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever God does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that He does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit. Righteousness is what God does…God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids Him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.” [2]

“(1) Necessarily, if God exists he is all-good.

 (2) God exists and ordains whatsoever comes to pass.

 (3) Necessarily, if A is a human action then A is causally determined.

 (4) There are morally evil human actions.

 (5) Either God is the morally culpable author of the morally evil actions or human beings are   their sole morally culpable authors.

 (6) (1) and the first disjunct of (5) are formally inconsistent.

 (7)(1),(3) and the second disjunct of (5) are not formally inconsistent.

 (8)Any agent who freely and knowingly sets up a deterministic process with a certain outcome must be responsible for that outcome.

 (9) Wherever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.

 (10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.

    

…moreover, it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evil is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act in not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”[3]

“Since our moral duties are grounded in the divine commands, they are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since he does not issue commands to himself.

If God does not fulfill moral duties then what content can be given to the claim he is good? Here Kant’s distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule has proved helpful. God may act naturally in ways which for us would be rule following and so constitutive of goodness in the sense of fulfilling our moral duties, so that God can be said similarly to be good in an analogical way….God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of his own character.” [4]

             
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
Instead of rehearsing the, already mentioned, alternative to causal determinism in favor of compatibilism, I'd like to focus on Craig's offered alternative. He would say libertarian freedom is the only view that rightly upholds human freedom. On such view a subject is free if the subject makes a choice without any sufficient or necessary causal conditions. Any given person, with the options of X or Y, to be free should have the ability to choose between the two (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices). But how is such a view any more plausible? Given the fact that a person can choose between X or Y (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices) amounts to the person being indifferent. Why then should an indifferent person chose one thing over another? I think Craig wants to say, simply because the agent reasoned to will one choice over another. It seems to me, then, this freedom of indifference make a person's choice utterly arbitrary. Reason being that any given reason why a person should choose X, an identical reason can be given to choose Y. [5]

5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience are illusory. 

Quite the contrary, if analogical determinism is true. But for the sake of argument, even if causal determinism is true,  it would not entail human experience is illusory given the fact that on such a view there really is secondary causes. And therefore, people are not rightly construed as puppets in the hands of God; instead they're agents that possess knowledge, volition, purpose, and deliberation. 

[1] Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303.
[2]Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269.
[3]Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.
[4]Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview.Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
[5] I take this point from the insights of Bruce Ware, John Frame, and Ronald Nash. 

Theological Ambiguity

There are many biblical doctrines articulated with ambiguous language which breeds misunderstanding.

I hope to clarify a few of these doctrinal misunderstandings. 

1. God is Triune
Christians explain the Biblical teaching that God is one eternal being who is simultaneously three persons. Yet many Christians speak as though the three persons are separate in nature. Biblical Christianity, however, sharply defines the persons as distinct but not separate. The essence of God is neither divided nor separated. Thus Christians are just plainly mistaken when they define the Trinity with the word 'separate.' This is not merely a semantical quibble here, it is foundational to distinguish trinitarian monotheism from polytheistic tritheism. Therefore, an informed Christian will properly define the doctrine of the Trinity as one eternal being (neither divided nor separated in nature) who is simultaneously three persons, namely, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In other words, God is one what and three who's. More discussion of this topic is in my post here.       

2. Divine Attributes

Christians often say God is all-powerful and all-present. From the sounds of it, Christians seem to be saying, God can do absolutely anything and He is present even in the depths of hell. So these attributes need to be carefully but briefly defined. Christians' believe God is all-powerful in the sense that He can do whatever He wills; and what He wills is consistent with His nature. This implies there are things God cannot do that have no affect on His omnipotence. For example, God cannot create a married bachelor since such a thing would contradict His rational nature. Moreover, such a thing is not any thing at all but merely a contradiction of terms. So creating a married bachelor amounts to creating nothing. But of course God could have refrained from creating.

 God is all-present in the sense that He is cognoscente of all things in virtue of causally ordaining and sustaining all things. This means God is not spatially located everywhere, but rather, God is "causally present everywhere" since He controls all things.


3. Sin

Sin is a general term that refers to anything that does not conform to God's revealed: nature, purposes, or commandments in the states of beings, motives, or actions. With this definition in view it shows sin is essentially spiritual and not merely physical. In the case of humans, when Adam sinned, all mankind became sinners by imputation, inheritance, and imitation. To explore, further, how we might characterize man's condition, please review my posts here and here.  

4. Indwelling of the Holy Spirit

It is said Christians are indwelled and filled with the Holy Spirit. This simply means Christians are controlled and empowered by the Holy Spirit. Thus there is not two spirits (i.e the Holy Spirit and the human soul) indwelling the physical body of any given believer. 

    

Questions for Theists

I stumbled upon this article by Jeffery Lowder at the Secular Outpost Blog here.

I figured I'd start answering some of the questions. I will try to answer them from a Clarkian perspective (on my other blog here).

The question “Why is there something rather than nothing” presupposes “nothing” as being the normal state of affairs. Why believe that? Why can’t we flip the question on its head? In other words, why can’t it be the case that the normal state of affairs is for things to actually exist and nothingness itself would be weird.


When it is said, “things actually exist” in what manner do they exist? Do they exist contingently or necessarily? I do not believe there is any possible world, or state of affairs in which nothing could exist, since God is a necessary being, He exists in all possible worlds and states of affairs. But for the naturalist, he must affirm the necessary existence of the, parts or whole, universe or multi-verse.    


Given that the universe has a finite age, why did the universe begin with time rather than in time?


If time were infinite, then, there would be an actual infinite series of events. Events can simply be moments of time or temporal parts; in any case, an actual infinite series of events are impossible. Since an actual infinite series of events would require an infinite series of events to elapse before this present moment. But if an actual infinite series of events occur before this present event, then this present event will never occur. With the existence of this present moment we properly conclude that time, like space and matter, is finite.  


But if we assume time is eternal then are we not thereby committed to the eternality of space and matter? But this still pushes the fundamental question back further. Is time contingent or necessary?  We obviously can imagine a state of timelessness so time cannot be thought of as necessary.


Christians can account for time either way. Presentists can either affirm time necessarily is an attribute of God or part of contingent creation. Eternalists argue God eternally created time, hence it’s a contingent property. In what way does the naturalist account for time?   


Why is so much of our universe intelligible without any appeal to supernatural agency? Why does the history of science contains numerous examples of naturalistic explanations replacing supernatural ones and no examples of supernatural explanations replacing naturalistic ones?


Intelligibility presupposes God. Presuppositionalists have been pointing this out for years. The very laws of logic, mathematics, knowledge, consciousness, induction, intentionality and freedom all have been taken as examples of the general principle that human thought and experience presupposes God. Science assumes God exists from the very start so it is unnecessary for the discipline to explain things in terms of God’s direct providence. Instead, it is to explain things in terms of God’s indirect providence as secondary causes.

Why is the physical universe so unimaginably large?


It is to bring glory to God. It is ostensive to God’s majesty.

If you believe that visual beauty is evidence of God, why isn’t the universe saturated with auditory, tactile, or other non-visual types of sensory beauty?

Who says it doesn’t? Many sensations in themselves are forms of beauty. Maybe the film Equilibrium illustrates this point well. Moreover, it does not logically follow that if God created beauty in the world God must create the whole world beautiful. Nor does such a view take into account God’s purposes.  
 
If you believe the universe is fine-tuned for intelligent life, why isn’t our universe teeming with life, including life much more impressive than human life?


Who is to say it isn’t? Impressive by whom? This wasn’t God’s chief end in creation.

Why would God use biological evolution as a method for creation? 

Who said he did? But even if we grant that he did, He could have sufficient reasons for doing so.  
 
Why would God desire to create embodied moral agents, as opposed to unembodied minds (such as souls, spirits, or ghosts)?


God wanted to create humans to accomplish His will.

Why is the human mind dependent on the physical brain?


We have brains we use to think. Much like a musician uses an instrument to play music. It makes us physical. But we are not merely physical we are also spiritual. Five reasons can be given for this. First, our brains are affected by our thoughts. Second, if we think of a physical object, say, like a toaster, and a neurosurgeon opens up our brains, there would be no object in it.  Third, our brains change but our minds do not. Forth, the only people that have access to their own thoughts are themselves. People have to ask what others are thinking. There is no way to know what a person is thinking without asking her. Fifth, we can think “about” things. We can think about what we want. So if the mind is merely the brain then there is no freedom. Actions, thoughts, and beliefs (including the belief that the mind is the brain) are a byproduct of chemical processes in the brain.     


Did Australopithecus have a soul? What about homo habilis? Homo erectus? Neanderthals? Why or why not? (HT: Keith Parsons)


If they didn’t they were robots.


How do souls interact with physical matter? Do you have any answer that is not tantamount to “I don’t know?” (HT: Keith Parsons)


Well, before I can adequately answer the question I must ask, how does a person lift his arm? Is it chemicals in the brain that force him/her to lift it? Or is it simply, the person chooses to lift his arm? If you grant the possibility that a person can lift his arm by simply willing it, I see no logical reason to not think also God could create humans with souls that can command their bodies to perform actions. What is the natural mechanism that allows the body and mind to interact? This question rides on a category mistake. But why even think there must be a mechanism for them to interact? If a mechanism must be given, which I don’t see why logically it must, certainly if God sustains the universe, He can sustain the interaction between the body and soul. Perhaps Parson’s wants to know precisely how God sustains both. God has not revealed this, nor is it clear we could even understand with our limited finite minds. But God’s providence is a sufficient general explanation for how the body and mind interact. Parson’s begs the question if he thinks my account is insufficient, since it does not fit his naturalistic criteria of what, he thinks, is an adequate explanation.          
 
If you believe humans have free will, why would humans have free will if God exists? Why are we able to exercise free will in some situations but not others?


It depends on what is meant by “free will”? If by it one means the ability to choose what one most desires, then yes, we have freedom. It is the kind of freedom that is compatible with God’s providence. We can exercise freedom in some cases and not others because we are sinful in a fallen world.  


Why are pain and pleasure so connected to the biological goals of survival and reproduction, but morally random?

Biological goals? If naturalism is true there is no goals in nature. It is all random chance. Pain and pleasure can have different moral statuses based on the commandments of God.


Is there some greater good that logically requires (or logically requires risking) that suffering be used to motivate animals to pursue the biological goal of self-preservation?

Are animals and humans intrinsically valuable? Do they have moral worth? God created us intrinsically valuable with instincts such as self-preservation.


Does some moral end make it desierable for suffering to continue even when it serves no biological purpose? 

Biological purpose? Notice you are borrowing teleological language. If God has a morally sufficient reason, which I believe he does, it is reasonable to think there is. 
 
Why do only a fraction of living things, including the majority of sentient beings, thrive? In other words, why do very few living things have an adequate supply of food and water, are able to reproduce, avoid predators, and remain  healthy? Why would God create a world in which all sentient  beings savagely compete with one another for survival? Why do an even smaller fraction of organisms thrive for most of their lives? Why do almost no organisms thrive for all of their lives? 
Why is there social evil, i.e., instances of pain or suffering that results from the game-theoretic interactions of many individuals? 


Why does God allow horrific suffering (and relatively little glorious pleasure)?


Why does horrific suffering often destroy a person, at least psychologically, and prevent them from growing morally, spiritually, and intellectually?


See my post God, why is there evil?

Why does the the relatively new discipline of cognitive science of religion support the claim that we have a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), which causes human beings to naturally form beliefs about invisible agents? Considering HADD’s poor track record of producing true beliefs about invisible agents in general, why should we trust it when it produces a belief about one invisible agent, the God of theism?

This is fallacious. It begs the question, makes a hasty generalization, and fails to discredit the belief in question on the grounds of its origin. 

Why should we believe that, of the innumerable deities worshipped by human beings over the ages, yours is the one that really exists?  Why believe in Yahweh rather than Zeus, Odin, Marduk, Ishtar, Osiris, Quetzalcoatl, Madame Pele, Ahura-Mazda, etc., etc., etc.? (HT: Keith Parsons)

Well, there are no good reasons for me to believe in Zeus, Odin, Marduk, Ishtar, Osiris, Quetzalcoatl, Madame Pele, or Ahura-Mazda. However, I have good reasons to believe Christianity is true (e.g. common objections). Furthermore, to ask such a question is to falsely make a hasty generalization.
    

Free-WIll Defense and Original Sin

W. Paul Franks argues that a broad robust free-will defense of Christian theism against the problem of evil requires abandoning original sin or significantly rethinking it.

Franks argues that if an agent cannot choose his own will, then he is not blameworthy for actions that flow from it.

One cannot be held accountable for what could be but only for what will be the case. In other words, one is not held responsible for possible actions he or she  would commit in different circumstances; rather, one is responsible only for those actions he or she will commit. 

Franks thinks the traditional formulation of original sin as inheritance, imputation and imitation should be revised lest God be implicated as the source of sin and evil.  He suggests possible revisions are to remove inheretence and replace imputation with association. On his model humans would be guilty by association. When Adam sinned God associated all humans with him. Thus we all are guilty by association.  The implications of such a view is to neglect exegesis. First, guilt by association is based on a hasty generalization. It is often called the fallacy of association. But more importantly, it assumes, as does imputation, that God set the laws,  commandments, and punishments for mankind prior to Adam's sin. Second, it drastically affects justification. If Adam's guilt is not imputated then nor is Christ's righteousness imputed. Then how do men stand righteous before God? By association? Third, such a robust revision is  unnecessary with other possible models available to account for sin and evil. Forth, guilt by association does not remove the knotty problem of sin and evil.  How is sin universal? Why are all humans by nature children of wrath?

Check out my post here  

Faith Before Reason?

I believe faith is the foundation for reason. Since one cannot reason apart from prior affirming by faith that reason reliably gives one truth. In other words, a faith commitment must be made for reason before one can reason.  If one denies this position, then he/she must show reason is the foundation for faith. However,  if this is the case,  then one cannot assume reason gives one truth.  Since such an assumption is a faith commitment. If one does not by faith assume the validity of reason one is left in skepticism. Nevertheless, some may still insist that one cannot make a commitment without first affirming reason to distinguish between faith and reason. I think such a criticism looses sight of the issue. It confuses between semantics and ontology. But even if I am wrong here, the problem still remains that the very thing in question is if one can affirm anything without a prior faith commitment. I wonder if my concerns can be put in a syllogism? Perhaps these will do?   

Modus tollens

1. If reason precedes faith then reason is affirmed by reason and not faith. 

2. Reason cannot be affirmed by reason (since it is viciously circular).

3. Therefore, reason cannot precede faith.

Disjunctive

1. Either faith precedes reason, or reason precedes faith (This is based on the law of contradiction). 
2. Reason cannot precede faith (The very thing in question is if reason can be trusted without faith)
3. Therefore, faith precedes reason.

Yes, I draw this conclusion with reason, by faith, in the Triune God of Scripture.

Now some have tried to dodge the conclusion I have drawn by denying premise (2) in the first argument. They say it is not circular. I don't see how it isn't. It clearly begs the question. Maybe reason is taken as an axiom, like in Geometry, but then it is unprovable. Or maybe reason is just assumed arbitrarily. In either case, I don't see how my conclusion can be avoided. 

Check out:

http://youtu.be/1JjiClztcwQ

Calvinism and the first sin

Check this new article out by James Anderson here.

Things to think about when you read Anderson's article.

“…God is the first efficient cause of everything, but evil has come, not from His first act, but by a second act, an act of creatures.

God is the author of the author of sin, He cannot be the author of sin itself, for sin is the result of a rebellion against God. 

If God is not the author of sin, at least He must be charged with being responsible for sin…A little reflection on the subject will show the contradiction involved in charging God with responsibility. Let us ask one question: Responsible to whom, or to what?...Obviously  if we are talking about the Almighty, He already is the highest power there is. Therefore, when God decreed this type of universe where Christ was to die for the sins of all who believe, God was responsible to none but Himself.” 

Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303.

“God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though He is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever God does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that He does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit. Righteousness is what God does…God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids Him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.”

Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269.

“(1) Necessarily, if God exist he is all-good.

(2) God exists and ordains whatsoever comes to pass.

(3) Necessarily, if A is a human action then A is causally determined.

(4) There are morally evil human actions.

(5) Either God is the morally culpable author of the morally evil actions or human beings are their sole morally culpable authors.

(6) (1) and the first disjunct of (5) are formally inconsistent.

(7)(1),(3) and the second disjunct of (5) are not formally inconsistent.

(8)Any agent who freely and knowingly sets up a deterministic process with a certain outcome must be responsible for that outcome.

(9) Whatever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.

(10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.

    

…moreover, it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evile is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act in not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”

Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.

“Since our moral duties are grounded in the divine commands, they are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since he does not issue commands to himself.

If God does not fulfill moral duties then what content can be given to the claim he is good? Here Kant’s distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule has proved helpful. God may act naturally in ways which for us would be rule following and so constitutive of goodness in the sense of fulfilling our moral duties, so that God can be said similarly to be good in an analogical way….God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of his own character.”

Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview. Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.

     

Analytic Theology and Calvinism

Here is a link to an article on Calvinism I just wanted to bring to the attention of my blog readers. It is Paul Manata using the helpful tools and insights of analytical philosophy and applying them to theology.  

Calvinism, Objections, Questions and Answers

Calvinism, Objections, Questions and Answers

1. A person cannot rightly claim that Christ died for him, unless he knows he's elect.

This objection is answered when we understand that a person can know he/she is elect by repenting and trusting in Christ for salvation. It is true that Calvinism teaches that Christ did not died for every single individual. However, Calvinism asserts that Christ died for all those that repent and trust in Him. Thus people can know they’re elect by obeying God—repenting and trusting in Jesus Christ.

2. Doesn’t God have to “force” a person to believe the gospel?

It depends on what is meant by ‘force.’ If one means that God does everything, including believe for a person, then no. That would be hyper-Calvinism. If by it one means that God makes a person believe, like a person is forced to give money to a gunman, then no.  But if force is understood as changing a person’s heart, and desires to willingly want salvation, then yes.

3. If God makes a person trust in Christ, then a person does not have to do anything.

This objection is confusing Biblical Calvinism with Hyper-Calvinism. Calvinism teaches that God changes a person’s heart giving him/her the ability to trust in Christ (Eph 2:1-5). Thus a person does something, namely believes in Christ, but behind this action is God’s enablement. In modern terms, a person commits him/herself to the person of Christ. But this commitment is only possible by God’s grace. Everyone is obligated to commit one’s self to Christ. Have you attempted to do so? If not why? 

4. If Calvinism is true people do not need to preach the gospel.

This objection is a repackage of the previous Hyper-Calvinist idea that God does not need or require means to accomplish his will. Again, this is against what scripture teaches. God does whatever He pleases (Psalm 115). It is true that God does not need anything, but if God requires means to accomplish His will then we cannot object to it. God has commanded Christians to preach the gospel as a means to draw people to Himself.

Furthermore, if God commands something, it is sufficient to obligate us to obey. So if God says preach, we should preach. If God says believe, we should believe. If He says repent, we should repent.

5. It doesn’t matter what your motive is for believing in Christ.

This is not true. The very reason why there is a distinction between pure and impure motives testifies to the fact. A pure desire for salvation is one that is Scriptural. For example, in Luke 13 Christ commanded people to repent or perish, indicating that fear of hell is a proper motivation to obey God. A more broad definition could be that pure motives are ones that consider God as the primary one offended by our sins. Thus we should seek to please and make right, the wrong done by our sins the way God has commanded through his Son. The offended party should be our primary concern, which is God. In summary, pure desires/motives are Scriptural and Theo-centric (God-centered). Motives, although maybe noble, cannot be based on a desire to please man but God. For example, a person should not desire salvation merely to be a part of a Christian community. Nor should a person trust in Christ in order to please their Christian friends or family. A person should want to please God and have a right relationship with Him, regardless of anything else. Thus a person, individually, trusts Christ for salvation because of awareness of sin and the only remedy Christ.

 

Logical Contradictions?

Divine Determinism and Human Freedom

Is God’s providence and man’s freedom incoherent? Most Christians would say no! Why, because there is a few different logically plausible models to account for Biblical teaching on the subject. Both models would affirm determinism and freedom are not incoherent ideas; however the models would disagree on the compatibility of determinism and freedom. One model, call it Arminian, argues determinism and freedom are incompatible. So the Arminian model affirms God guides human actions to accomplish His plans without violating human freedom. God knows everything including what humans will do in any situation. So God puts people in situations were He knows they will freely choose to do what is His plan. However, the Armianiam model stresses the fact that God must work with what He gets. There are many different ways God could have arranged the world but there was no logical possibility to save the most free creatures possible without the possibility of some freely choosing to sin. So there was risk on the part of God from the Arminian model.

The second model, call it the Calvinist model, argues determinism and freedom are compatible. The compatibility lies in the nature of freedom. The Calvinist model defines freedom as a creature’s ability to choose to will an act, without constraint, by his/hers desires, with a will he/she desires. Such a view of freedom is perfectly consistent with determinism so long as one can know any creature’s desires. Imagine there were two people Bill and Shawn. Suppose that Bill put a device in Shawn’s brain that enabled Bill to control Shawn’s actions with a remote.  Lets say that Bill has determined Shawn will kill the President Barack Obama by pressing a button on the remote. But suppose further that Shawn already wants to kill the President without Bill having to use the remote, and Shawn kills the President. We would say Shawn didn’t have the ability to do otherwise than kill the President and yet we would say Shawn was morally responsible for his actions. This is due to the fact that Shawn did what he desired to do with the will he wanted. Now the question arises, how can one know in advance a free creature’s desires? Well, different factors can influence one’s desires, like genetics, parents, cultures, and friends; but the one thing the person has control over is his identity with those desires. For example, a person wanting to loose weight can either identify himself with food or identify himself with loosing weight. By difficult training one can train to have a stronger desire to loose weight than eat fat producing foods. God being omniscient knows what factors would influence an agent to cause him/her to choose one thing over another. Notice, I said "cause" an agent. Thus there are necessary and sufficient conditions for any agent's actions. To summarize then, God determines all things that come to pass in such a way that man freely determines what he most wants to do.   

    

The Incarnation

JP Moreland and William Lane Craig give an interesting model of how Christians can defend the coherence of the incarnation. They argue if God intrinsically possesses all attributes that are required to be a human person then all that is needed for a genuine incarnation is a body. If the Divine Logos takes upon flesh that is sufficient for a legitimate incarnation. This view would sail smoothly away from Nestorianism. Since it does not make a "human soul" a necessary condition for being human. Or even if it does, the condition is all ready met in God's nature.

On such a model the mind of Christ being the divine Logos makes it difficult to explain the human character and experiences of Christ. The problem is solved, according to Moreland and Craig, by distinguishing Christ's consciousness and subconsciousness. If the divine thoughts are in the subconsciousness of Christ, then it can makes sense to say Jesus went through human experiences; he learned, cried, and suffered.

The Trinity

The Trinity is not contradictory since we are saying God is one in one sense and three in another sense. God is one in essence and three in personhood. God is one what and three who’s. In a more precise way, God is one incorporeal Spirit with three sets of cognitive faculties comprised of intellect, will and emotions. Another way to put it is God has three centers of self-consciousness.      

Are there any other evidences that testify to God being Triune apart from Scripture? Well one way to see the plausibility of the Trinity is to think of the attribute love. What is love? It is an action, right? It is the act of giving one’s self to another. It is “otherness” instead of self-centeredness. A thought experiment would help here. Imagine if God did not choose to create the world. Would we still say God is all-loving before creation? How so? God had no one to love prior to creation. God was always loving. Since as Scripture says God is love (1 John 4:8). This requires God to love another prior to creation. To say one can love without someone to love is meaningless. The very concept of love requires another person to love. And it is unbiblical to think God created love. Thus we are left with the plausible conclusion that God as one being exists in three persons: the Father Son and Holy Spirit; and that they love each before the creation of anything. 

Omnipotence

God can only do what is consistent with His character and nature. So can God do anything? Obviously not! He cannot stop willing His own existence. Nor can God stop being omnipotent and still be God. God cannot lie, or sin. Does this make God no longer omnipotent? No! The contradiction lies with the objector not defining omnipotence from faithful Biblical teaching.

  

God Responsible for Sin?

Page excerpt from Edward John Carnell's"Christian Apologetics."

Opposition

We had a roaring heckler last night. His name was Alex. I am inclined to say he was my most passionately irrational heckler I have ever encountered. I couldn't even address the crowd since he constantly yelled. Eventually, Alex and his 4 year old son Alex, blew green horns right in my face. I couldn't preach and the crowd was hostile. Finally the gospel went forth after a long intermission. God was teaching me to be both bold and compassionate to the lost who suppress the truth in unrighteousness (Rom 1).

The cops came and broke up our preaching. They threatened to arrest us if we did not stand-down from preaching. They said we were disturbing businesses. We were infringing the rights of business owners. They made all these accusations, all the while infringing on our First Amendment rights. In fact, I have contacted ADF to see what to do next.

Please don't stop preaching the gospel even in the midst of opposition. Preach the gospel and glorify God no matter the circumstances.

Original Sin, and Middle Knowledge

My email to Dr. Bruce Ware:

Dr. Ware,

 

I have been listening diligently to your lectures on Systematic Theology through podcasts, so I do not have the luxury of interacting in the classroom. I have a few questions that I hope you might be able to shed some light on. First, concerning the origin of sin, how was it that Lucifer a creature with a good will was able to sin? Lucifer could not have had a libertarian free will for that would mean his choice was arbitrary. The account in Scripture implies he had a desire to be autonomous or as you have said independent. He wanted to be his own god. Where could this desire in Lucifer arise from in a creature that was good? I am truly struggling with this because I cannot consider any creature having a libertarian freewill.

 

Let me give you my account, for you to judge if it is misguided. Lucifer was a creature that was created good. This can only be the case because God is by nature God, therefore, all of his creation was good. God who is the only perfect being, independent, self-sufficient, and impeccable (by necessity of his nature) created creatures to glorify Himself. His creatures like Lucifer were good (this would seem to imply impeccable), but they were not perfect, independent, or self-sufficient. His creatures where created to be completely dependent upon Him. Thus in some sense God's creatures where deficient needing God for all things. They were and are, completely dependent upon Him. From a human perspective the deficiency in the creatures made it possible for sin to come into existence. Sin originated in the good will of Lucifer who choose the lesser good instead of the Ultimate Good. He choose to love himself, which is a good thing (self-love) more than God, which is sinful. Lucifer asserted his love for himself more than God thereby creating / authoring sin. This account would still be compatabilistic. Lucifer acted according to his nature even when he chose to sin. 

 

Concerning Middle Knowledge does it not reduce to entrapment? For if God knows what creatures would do in any given circumstances with their compabilistic wills, and puts them in certain circumstances to act; does not this entail entrapment?    

 

To my final question what is sin or more specifically what is our sinful nature? Sin cannot be physical for the fallen angels would have a sinful nature, so what is it? I know it is a ruling principle Romans 6 makes it really clear, but how is it that one can have a sinful nature? I agree with the Traducian tradition, so it comes through heredity by Adam, but what is it? Is it that our souls are sinful and our bodies are simply instruments? This cannot practically be the case because when a person is regenerated he or she does not get a new soul, nor is the noetic effects of sin removed.

 

Jonathan Edwards seems to be the only one I found that has attempted to give an explanation. To sumerize Edwards. Within man God originally created two principles: the inferior, and the superior. The inferior principle which can be called the natural principle dealt with self-love, appetites, and self-preservation. The superior or Supernatural principle was the grace of God supplying man with the ability to communicate and love God which comprised true happiness for man. However, after the fall the supernatural principle was gone because God by His holiness could not continue to dwell in man. God withdrew himself from man because of sin this resulted in the inferior principle replacing the superior principle making man’s focus himself. This is like a candle that lights a room when it is removed it becomes dark. This is what happened to the heart of man it became darkened. From Edwards I conclude that at regeneration God does not reconstitute the Supernatural principle as originally, but instead bestows man with His grace and Holy Spirit. It is as if God brings light into the darkened hearts of the unregenerate making them new creations with new desires to serve Him. However, man still posses a slavish mentality to serve sin, and still contains some sort of desire for sin after regeneration.        

 

Jonathan Edwards explains:

 

"There was an inferior kind, which may be called NATURAL, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor, and pleasure, were exercised: these, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call FLESH. Besides these, there were superior principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man’s righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called SUPERNATURAL being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from and inseparably connected with, mere human nature; and being such as immediately depend on man’s union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God’s Spirit: which though withdrawn, and man’s nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still; man’s nature, as such, being entire without these divine principles, which the Scripture sometimes calls SPIRIT, in contradistinction to flesh. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect state. These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man’s nature. When man sinned and broke God’s covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the constitution God had established, that he should still maintain communion with man, and continue by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God’s wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption, and ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love, and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, of course became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of God. These inferior principles are like fire in a house; which, we say, is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man’s love to his own honor, separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects, without regard to God’s honor, or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when against God’s honor and law, as when agreeable to them. God still continuing strictly to require supreme regard to himself, and forbidding all undue gratifications of these inferior passions — but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and agreeableness to the rules and limits, which his holiness, honor, and law prescribe — hence immediately arises enmity in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but war ensues, in a constant course, against God, As, when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to show, how every lust, and depraved disposition of man’s heart, would naturally arise from this private original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on man’s eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, without God putting any evil into his heart, or implanting any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt taint, and so becoming the author of depravity. Only God’s withdrawing, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel-man, and his natural principles being left to themselves, is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God."

 

The things of God outside of Scripture are some what speculative if not mysterious, but to be a good student I feel I need to connect the dots as Theologian and Apologist.

 

I hope this is not an annoyance.

 

In Christ,

 

Ryan Dozier

 

 

Dr. Ware's reply: 

 

Ryan:

 

As you know, email is not the best format for such complex questions.  Please understand that I must be brief – MUCH briefer than these deserve.

 

1. You are on track, as I also see things.  Lucifer had “freedom of inclination” (as we all do) and hence he always did what he most wanted.  I think Gen 3:1-7 is instructive, since it shows how free agents can be influenced to have their inclinations changed and so want, for the first time, as their strongest inclinations, to go against God.  Something like this happened to Lucifer who perhaps contemplated some portion of the vast created order that was NOT his, and he began to wonder why he should not have it – after all, he was so magnificent, why should it not be his?  So, the same kind of mental transformation occurred in Lucifer as happened with the woman in Gen 3 (see esp. v.6), but it took place in his own mind w/o external temptation occasioning it.    Your point about his dependency fits in here, since he was finite, created, and hence did not have everything (in contrast to God).  Well, so freedom of inclination works to provide a plausible explanation.

 

2. No, it is not entrapment so long as the free agent does exactly what he most wants.  The ordering of circumstances provides the occasion for the action, but it does not coerce or constrain the action. 

 

3. The sinfulness that continues to mark (and mar) our new natures in Christ is the inner “drive” or “impulse” or “urge” to strike out in independence from God (which sin’s deepest urge is where ever it shows up).  God chooses not to end this “urge for independence” w/in a believer, though he could!  (Consider 1 Jn 3:1-2 – in a moment, it will be ended!!!).  So, why not?  I think because he wants us to learn more of the horrors of sin, and our need for grace (there is much in this answer that I can’t unpack).

 

Hope these brief responses help some. 

 

Blessings in Christ,

 

Bruce Ware