Wednesday, March 1, 2017

Covenants and Law

Just some thoughts on the Covenant of Grace and Law.

(1) If there are multiple diverse covenants in the Bible then there is an overarching covenant of Grace to unite all the diverse covenants.

(2) There are multiple diverse covenants in the Bible

(3) Therefore, there is an overarching covenant of Grace to unite all the diverse covenants.

Why affirm (1), when it is not obvious nor more plausibly true than its denial? Explanatory power and scope? Why not merely affirm one divine plan to unite the diverse covenants?

I've noticed some make a category mistake on the nature of the Mosaic Law. First, they assert the law is a whole composed of parts. The OT indicates the whole Mosaic Law is a simple indivisible unit thus without parts; but nevertheless, we may make artificial obligatory distinctions. Second, they confuse epistemic divisions with ontic divisions. Third, they implicitly deny any given law legislated by God is moral in nature.

Hebrews 7:12 elucidates a change of law:

(1) If there is a change in priesthood then there is a change in law.
(2)There is a change in priesthood.
(3) Therefore there is a change in law

James 2:10 shows us the simplicity and indivisibility of the Mosaic Law with its 613 commandments.

If any given person violates part of the Law then she violates the whole Law.

Moreover, If we assume (*1) the Mosaic Law Covenant is an agreement between God and Israel. Whereby God was to be Israel's King under a theocracy. God legislated 613 commandments that was to be Israel's rule of law including those people that were subject to the protection/jurisdiction of the nation of Israel.

If we grant (*1) then (1) to (3) follows:

(1) If the Mosaic Law is abolished then the Mosaic Law is not objectively binding.
(2) The Mosaic Law is abolished.
(3) Therefore the Mosaic Law is not objectively binding.

One can object to premise (2) but must then affirm the Mosaic Law, in some sense, which is patently false.

We grant that there are different punishments proportionate to violations of God's commands as legislated by God under a theocracy. But this does not logically demonstrate any given command is not moral in nature; nor does it establish any given command is ontologically ceremonial.

Saturday, January 21, 2017

Divine Impassability

I'd be the first to admit there is no easy answer. If you affirm or deny it there will be significant implications in your theology. Let's begin with a common argument in its favor:

(1) If God is not impassible then God is not timeless nor immutable.
(2) God is timeless and immutable
(3) Therefore, God is impassable.


There are two interpretations of divine eternity, namely timelessness and everlastingness:

Timeless: God is outside of time. God does not possess temporal duration nor temporal location. For God, all of time exists in one eternal present.

Everlasting: God exists at all moments in time. Time is an attribute of God, however, God created intrinsic metric time with creation.

Both interpretations are underdetermined from scripture thus one must weigh the Pros & Cons.

Timelessness entails the B-theory of time, hence the universe is both contingent and eternal yet dependent on God. Everlastingness entails there is some change, although neither for the better nor worst, in God's life.

Whichever interpretation you affirm both agree: God has neither a beginning nor end; God is the Lord of time. He is forever!

 Psalm 90:2
Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.

Isaiah 57:15
For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy; I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones.

 Jude 1:25
To the only wise God our Saviour, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever. Amen.

To the only God, our Savior, through Jesus Christ our Lord, be glory, majesty, dominion, and authority, before all time and now and forever. Amen.

There are two interpretations of Immutability: Maximal vs. Minimal Immutability. The maximal sense of immutability interprets this attribute as it is impossible for God to change in any and all senses: in all state of affairs. Simply, God cannot change. The minimal sense of immutability concedes God can and does exhibit some change-- that is neither for the better nor worse-- yet remains unchanging in His essential nature and character.

John Feinberg provides a summary that both interpretations affirm:
"At the heart of Christian theology is the belief that God does not change in his person (being and attributes), will (decree), or purposes."

Impassability is logically entailed from timelessness and maximal immutability:

Impassibility: God is unaffected by anything outside Himself.

Richard E Creel writes,

"Some critics object that even if this is possible [God as maximally immutable and impassible], it is a cold, impersonal conception of God. But what could be more intimate than to think of oneself as and to feel oneself to be wrapped in the eternal, all-sufficient providence of a loving God who wants the best for us, who is and always has been willing the best for us, and who continually accom- panies, surrounds, and embraces us in our actuality?
Perhaps we can save what is most important on each side of this dispute [of impassible vs passible] by distinguishing between God being emotionally “touched” and emotionally “crushed” by the experiences and actions of God’s creatures. What we should save from the impassibilist position is that God is not emotionally “crushed” by what goes on in the world. God is perfectly, imperturbably happy through enjoyment of God’s own perfection, through knowledge of the goodness of God’s creation, through enjoyment of the creation, and through knowledge of God’s ultimate control over history.

What should be saved from the passibilist position is that God is emotionally touched by the joys and the sufferings and the good and the evil actions of God’s creatures. .. an adequate conception of God must include the notion that God is touched by our sufferings and joys, victories and defeats – though not necessarily in the same ways as we are."

Malachi 3:6
6 For I am the Lord, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed.

Psalm 102:26-27

26 They shall perish, but thou shalt endure: yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed:

27 But thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end.

Hebrews 6:17-18
17 Wherein God, willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath:
18 That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have fled for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us:

The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit

18 Run from sexual immorality! “Every sin a person can commit is outside the body.”[a] On the contrary, the person who is sexually immoral sins against his own body. 19 Don’t you know that your body is a sanctuary of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have from God? You are not your own, 20 for you were bought at a price. Therefore glorify God in your body.[b]

1 Corinthians 18-20 HCSB

This passage is cited, from a prima facie reading, as to teach the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It is a common sense interpretation of this doctrine that the Holy Spirit, in fact, indwells believers whereby the Holy Spirit infuses all believers such that the Holy Spirit is present with their souls within their bodies. On this common sense interpretation all human persons possess bodies and souls. But believers have the Holy Spirit united to their souls and bodies. This interpretation has some startling theological and philosophical implications. First, it is a denial of any form of divine simplicity. It affirms the Holy Spirit is divided among all believers. Second, it denies God is timeless and immutable. If the Holy Spirit is spacially located in each believer's body then He exhibits change as He relates with spacial things. The argument can be formulated in a syllogism:

1. If the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is spacial presence then God is spacial, temporal and mutable.
2. God is incorporeal, timeless and immutable.
3. Hence the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is not spacial presence.  

Third, it seems to affirm the incoherent. If the Holy Spirit is spacially located in all believers, from various spacial distances (e.g. those in Australia, China, Japan, Hawaii and Brazil), then the Holy Spirit from one spacial point can be presently "here" and equally, with millions of miles of distance apart, at another spacial point be presently "here"; two points miles apart but both "here". Fourth, it assumes a naive sense of omnipresence. There are two competing interpretations of omnipresence. Either God exists spacelessly but is present at every point in space in the sense that he is cognizant of and causally active at every point in space. Hence, immediate knowledge and power extending everywhere. Or God is spatially located in the universe but is wholly present at every point in space. Of course, both can be affirmed without contradiction. Fifth, to attribute to the Holy Spirit the temporal spacial indexical  "I am now here"  would presuppose the Holy Spirit is both spacial and temporal. 

 It's amazing to read even Hank Hanaegraaff understands many of these distinctions. 

Resources on Divine Attributes:

Resources on the indwelling of the Holy Spirit:
This looks very promising:

Wednesday, December 28, 2016

Biblical Ethics: The Golden Rule

Covenant theology, Dispensationalism and NCT share a common core--in that any given Christian ethical theory must be both expositionally and philosophically consistent with Biblical exegesis. But when serious ethical reflections and questions are raised this commonality breaks down. For example, which particular commandments apply to contemporary Christians? Is lying ever permissible? Is war ever permissible? Answers to such questions from a specific theological position will have significant theological and philosophical implications. 

Let's examine one case example.

From most exponents of NCT the particular commandments that apply to everyone is the law(s) of conscience.

 Let's take the stipulated laws of conscience and deduce their corollaries.

(1) Any given person should, in all states of affairs, love God with all his/her heart, soul, mind and strength.

(2) Any given person should, in all states of affairs, love his/her fellow man/woman as him/herself. 

By command (1) we deduce

(a1) A priori knowledge of Trinitarian monotheism. 
(b1) A priori knowledge of love, goodness, sacrifice and personhood.
(c1) A priori knowledge of qualities and quantities (e.g. quality and quantity of love).

Likewise, from command (2) it entails:

(a2) A priori knowledge of the Imago Dei with intrinsic value/worth.
(b2) A priori knowledge of moral equality.

Gordon Clark's Philosophy

Gordon H. Clark argues there is no tabula rasa (i.e. blank slate). Man is the image of God-- and as such, consciously rational--in contrast to animals. Hence, man is able to use signs to refer to thoughts. Language is formed a priori not a posteriori. All forms of empiricism are objectionable since sensations suffer: (1) ambiguity, (2) unreliability, and (3) relativity. Therefore, knowledge (i.e. the propositions of Scripture) is revealed, directly or indirectly, via the Divine Logos, Christ. It is limited to only those propositions deduced from Scripture.

Clark doesn't explain precisely how knowledge is revealed. Is it by telepathy? Does man create language as it reflects God? If so, does this not entail Adam had an actual private language (at one point in time)? Does not a private language entail self-knowledge? If a private language is denied, then language is a social construct, then how can there be agreement between symbols that matches thoughts without self-knowledge? How precisely does first order knowledge (e.g. I know P) refute Skepticism, if second order knowledge (e.g. I know that I know P) is denied? Moreover, how is skepticism circumvented if there is no standard to confirm language and thoughts match? If Clark appeals to the Divine Logos to prevent skepticism, does not Christian empiricists (e.g. Representational realists) have the same option?

Clark's demand for a definition of sensations is reasonable. Yet it is not necessary to define sensations in order to possess prima facie warrant to believe in sensations. It strikes me as a category mistake to require a definition of sensations in terms of logic and math. (e.g. Rationalism requires empiricism to provide definitions in terms of Rationalism or Empiricism contend Rationalism provide an definition in terms of empiricism).The traditional definition of sensations is a non-propositional experience possessed by an experiencing subject. Further distinctions are made in philosophy of perception (e.g. Seeing, seeing as, and seeing that). Thomas Reid makes a helpful point that sensations cannot be reduced to a mere logical definition. Hence, my charge that Clark seems to make a category mistake (e.g. The smell of logic). I think sensations and/or experiences are irreducible to a mere logical definition but that is not to render them unintelligible. For example, we can make sense of the sensation of pain but pain is not reducible to C-fiber stimulation or a mere logical definition (e.g. A person experiences the sensation of pain iff a person's physical body functions properly to interact with the mind in which the mind is aware " I am in pain."

Clark states God causes us to believe in Christianity. In what sense does God 'cause' us to believe? Obviously Clark excludes any empirical method. It's like saying, "I don't know what a 2017 Honda Civic looks like but it doesn't look like that! Clark does narrow what he considers how God 'causes' us to know. It reminds me of the brain in a vat thought experiment. We are to suppose the possibility of a person existing as a brain in a vat. Next, we are to envision an agent (often a mad scientist or demon--take your pick) is the primary efficient cause of the person's beliefs by electrodes. This thought experiment is often leveled in favor of skepticism. The warrant for beliefs is argued to be underdetermined.  Any argument put forward against such skepticism is argued to be based upon beliefs from the agent (presupposing skepticism). I wish to make two points. First, 'cause' deals primarily with metaphysics and ''beliefs' deal with epistemology. If it is granted a causal process produces beliefs then beliefs are not acquired merely for their truth-value but due to the intentionality of an agent. Second, this view seems to commit the genetic fallacy. If one traces the belief to its origin this does not make it true nor false. Furthermore, it commits the naturalistic fallacy. It confuses what 'is' the case (e.g. I believe P) for what 'ought' to be the case (e.g. I ought to believe P). Thomas Reid, the Old Princeton tradition and arguably Plantinga would argue directly a posteriori with properly functioning cognitive faculties. My point is to demand a definition of experiences, e.g. experiencing the color red, such a request seems to confuse categories on the one hand and denies any limit to the extent of how far such a demand can be met.  

(1) If Clark's metaphysics is deduced from his epistemology then his epistemology can be understood from his metaphysics.
(2) Clark's metaphysics is deduced from his epistemology 
(3) Therefore, Clark's epistemology can be understood from his metaphysics. 

In Clark's metaphysics propositions are the object of thought and knowledge not things. The only logically possible world is the actual world. God actualized the actual world comprised of propositions (that can be further reduced to subjects and predicates). All propositions are logically necessary. But some, if not all, propositions are necessarily instantiated (in virtue of necessitarianism). Each proposition is necessarily true. 

Each person is (i.e. in the sense of identity) a set of propositions. Any given person is what he/she thinks. I think it can be argued Dr. Clark's system may be properly associated with epistemic foundationalism, accessible internalism, infallibilism, metaphysical realism and a coherentism theory of truth. But in particular on epistemic justification an argument can be formulated in favor of some form of internalism:   

(1) If Clark affirmed some form of reliabilism/externalism then a person is warranted/rational to believe X, independent of any accessible reasons.

(1a)  If any given belief must be deduced by its axiom to be justified then Clark affirmed any given system of beliefs must be logically deduced from its axiom to be justified.
(1b) Any given belief must be deduced by its axiom to be justified.
(1c) Clark affirmed any given system of beliefs must be logically deduced from its axiom to be justified.
(1d) Logical deduction either requires mental awareness or mental unawareness
(1e) not mental unawareness 
(1f) mental awareness 

(2) A person is not warranted/rational to believe X, independent of any accessible reasons.

(3) Clark did not affirm some form of reliabilism/externalism.

Premise (2) can be demonstrated by Clark's critical analysis of ideas contrary to his. He didn't simply level objections/defeaters. He demanded reasons from his opponents. Clark argued against any position that allowed for the possibility of skepticism. Reliabilism/externalism argues a belief is warranted without conscious awareness, if and only if any given belief is produced by a reliable belief forming process, in the absence of defeaters. But this does not assail skepticism since a person would need to "know" all his/her beliefs are produced by a reliable belief forming process to avoid skepticism. This will not do for Clark. Also, the doctrine of divine simplicity entails some form of internalism (e.g. epistemic mentalism). God's omniscience flows from His decrees. In other words, divine foreknowledge is grounded in divine foreordaination.   


Sunday, October 23, 2016

Atheism (Without the Thing in Itself)

Benjamin Watkins on an episode of the Semper Reformanda Podcast argues metaphysical naturalism is more probable than not from scientific 'facts'. He takes the latent assumption in the scientific method, namely methodological naturalism, as evidence for metaphysical naturalism.  Benjamin formulates his argument inductively with probability theory. His argument can be construed in terms of abduction or Bayesian probabilistic confirmation theory. For example,

If observations O then the best explanation of O is theory T. 

The internal critique of Ben's worldview offered by Tim, Carlos, Owen and Luke surrounded Ben's epistemology as to justify metaphysical naturalism. The intractable problems identified were as follows:

(1) Ben's empiricism, explicitly or implicitly, commits the logical fallacy affirming the consequent. Moreover, Benjamin failed to explain precisely the conditions in which beliefs are acquired. If he affirms some form of representational realism and/or correspondence theory of truth then there is no independent criteria to confirm any given mental image or belief, in fact, matches with the truth of reality.  Of course, then on such an account the problem of Kant's ding an sich (i.e. thing in itself) surfaces itself (there is irony here). A view with all the room needed for skepticism. Perhaps, better put, it has all the necessary ingredients of skepticism. 

The problem of induction (deriving a universal from particular examples) was discussed as a decisive feature of any given empirical theory yet Benjamin felt his view was exempt from the problem. He merely asserted induction as a properly basic belief without an account of epistemic justification. Hence, at which point, any belief can simply be asserted as properly basic (e.g. Still, probability assumes induction. Likewise, probability is predicated on limited, background-relative, data. Such that new data can always skew the results of old data. Thus  limited data can revise any given theory by new data. Therefore, any theory dependent upon probability is subject to whole sale revision. Not much security in probability.

(2) Benjamin asserts his particular epistemic theory is self-justifying. That's fine as far as the claim goes. Nevertheless, Benjamin's rationalism, explicitly or implicitly, collapses to either fideism or skepticism (unless, of course, he can show otherwise).   Ben attempts, I think unsuccessfully, to evade fideism or skepticism with some form of non-inferential epistemic internalism (e.g. Phenomenological conservativism). But since no criteria of conditions are provided to prefer one particular epistemic theory over another then the selection of any given epistemic theory (including Benjamin's theory) becomes viciously circular (e.g. Armstrong). Benjamin argues if a proposition appears to be true then that is a prima facie reason to believe it is true in the absence of any defeaters. Again, Kant's phenomenal and nomenal world comes back full force with such a view. On such grounds, it seems, we have a prima facie reason to reject Benjamin's epistemic theory, since it appears to be false, in the absence of any evidence to warrant his theory. . However, Benjamin may be able to provide a criteria of conditions to evaluate the virtues of any given epistemic theory and assess what qualifies as a properly basic belief.  In which case, Ben would need to show his particular epistemic theory meets the conditions provided (for the truth of any given epistemic theory to render it self-justifying and/or is properly basic) and tease out the philosophical tensions or apparent contradictions between his empiricism, rationalism and Platonism.  Further, Ben's epistemic theory prompts more questions: (i) how does Benjamin know reason, in general, or the laws of logic, in particular, aim at truth? (ii) how does he know beliefs aim at truth? (iii) how does Ben know the nature and limits of reason and/or truth? Ben asserts platonic realism as to abstract objects; yet how does abstract objects enforce or impose themselves on particulars?

(3) The discussion on ethics was intriguing. Benjamin affirms moral realism and not moral nihilism. But Benjamin's version of moral realism suffers the same problems as metaphysical Platonism. How does a particular person possess universal moral values and duties? How do these universal moral values and duties interact/relate with particular persons? What is a universal moral law without a moral lawgiver? How does Benjamin's view avoid the naturalistic fallacy (e.g. GE Moore)? 

Wednesday, September 7, 2016

Heavenly Freedom?

Read this:(LINK)

If the link doesn't work, try cut and paste: