My comments on the Refining Reason Debate, with its topic, "Is it Reasonable to Believe God Exists?"
Ten Bruggencate's opening statement sought to argue that any worldview, specifically Dillahunty's, which does not start with God is reduced to absurdity. He argues in favor of the topic by the following argument:
(1) It is reasonable to believe that which is true. P->Q
(2) It is true that God exists Q->R
(3) Therefore it is reasonable to believe God exists. P->R
Rightly, Ten Bruggencate identifies premise (2) as the most controversial. So he sets his guns towards Dillahunty's worldview to indirectly prove (2). Ten Bruggencate goes about this task by pointing to the epistemic fruits of Dillahunty's worldview. Dillahunty's worldview requires solipsism to be, in principle, possible, if not actual. Dillahunty's worldview permits this on the grounds that solipsism cannot be disproven, and thus could be true, but he thinks this in no way impinges his worldview. Ten Bruggencate uses Dillahunty's admission to solipsism as a primary example of the absurdity that flows from unbelief. Ten Bruggencate goes to the second phase of his attack by chipping away at Dillahunty's theory of truth. Dillahunty defines truth as that which corresponds or coheres to reality. Bruggencate presses Dillahunty to provide sufficient justification, to know, Dillahunty's beliefs correspond or cohere to reality. Dillahunty concedes the problems Ten Bruggencate raise. So Dillahunty takes a reductionist view of knowledge and whittles it down to mere belief, one might say, opts for Fideism.
Dillahunty counters Ten Bruggencate's arguments as arbitrary. In fact, he construes all forms of presuppositionalism as a method of utter arbitrariness. He then faults Ten Bruggencate for not demonstrating the uniqueness of Christianity.
Dillahunty in his opening statement admits to arbitrarily selecting logic, truth, realism, and parsimony as presuppositions. Dillahunty's admission strikes me as Fideism. Likewise, Dillahunty refuses to defend any form of knowledge claims; and he equates any given belief as knowledge. Moreover, Dillahunty views the evidence for solipsism as underdetermined and thus he arbitrarily believes realism. I can't help but wonder if possible world semantics would show, by model logic, Dillahunty must espouse solipsism. Here is a feeble attempt:
1. It is possible for solipsism to be true in all possible worlds.
2. If it is possible that solipsism be true in all possible worlds then solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world.
3. If solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world, then it must be true in every possible world.
4. If solipsism must be true in every possible world, then it must be true in the actual world.
5. If solipsism must be true in the actual world, then solipsism is true.
If Dillahunty grants premise (1) then he logically must affirm solipsism. I think Dillahunty misses Bruggencate's whole argument when he demands proof for exclusively Christianity. Dillahunty is interpreting Ten Bruggencate's argument through evidential lenses. Ten Bruggencate's argument is from the impossibility of the contrary. It is an argument against all tokens of the same type--namely non christian. Dillahunty does not see the necessity of presuppositions that, coheres well into a worldview and, has wide explanatory power.
I would recommend Dillahunty read Dr. James Anderson's first and second reply to my encounter with a fellow atheist fideist.