Matt Dillahunty v. Sye Ten Bruggencate

My comments on the Refining Reason Debate, with its topic, "Is it Reasonable to Believe God Exists?"  

Ten Bruggencate's opening statement sought to argue that any worldview, specifically Dillahunty's, which does not start with God is reduced to absurdity. He argues in favor of the topic by the following argument:

(1) It is reasonable to believe that which is true.              P->Q

(2) It is true that God exists                                             Q->R

(3) Therefore it is reasonable to believe God exists.        P->R

Rightly, Ten Bruggencate identifies premise (2) as the most controversial. So he sets his guns towards Dillahunty's worldview to indirectly prove (2). Ten Bruggencate goes about this task by pointing to the epistemic fruits of Dillahunty's worldview. Dillahunty's worldview requires solipsism to be, in principle, possible, if not actual. Dillahunty's worldview permits this on the grounds that solipsism cannot be disproven, and thus could be true, but he thinks this in no way impinges his worldview. Ten Bruggencate uses Dillahunty's admission to solipsism as a primary example of the absurdity that flows from unbelief. Ten Bruggencate goes to the second phase of his attack by chipping away at Dillahunty's theory of truth. Dillahunty defines truth as that which corresponds or coheres to reality. Bruggencate presses Dillahunty to provide sufficient justification, to know, Dillahunty's beliefs correspond or cohere to reality. Dillahunty concedes the problems Ten Bruggencate raise. So Dillahunty takes a reductionist view of knowledge and whittles it down to mere belief, one might say, opts for Fideism. 

Dillahunty counters Ten Bruggencate's arguments as arbitrary. In fact, he construes all forms of presuppositionalism as a method of utter arbitrariness. He then faults Ten Bruggencate for not demonstrating the uniqueness of Christianity.        

Dillahunty in his opening statement admits to arbitrarily selecting logic, truth, realism, and parsimony as presuppositions. Dillahunty's admission strikes me as Fideism. Likewise, Dillahunty refuses to defend any form of knowledge claims; and he equates any given belief as knowledge. Moreover, Dillahunty views the evidence for solipsism as underdetermined and thus he arbitrarily believes realism. I can't help but wonder if possible world semantics would show, by model logic, Dillahunty must espouse solipsism. Here is a feeble attempt:

1. It is possible for solipsism to be true in all possible worlds.

2. If it is possible that solipsism be true in all possible worlds then solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world.

3. If solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world, then it must be true in every possible world. 

4. If solipsism must be true in every possible world, then it must be true in the actual world.

5. If solipsism must be true in the actual world, then solipsism is true.   

If  Dillahunty grants premise (1) then he logically must affirm solipsism. I think Dillahunty misses Bruggencate's whole argument when he demands proof for exclusively Christianity. Dillahunty is interpreting Ten Bruggencate's argument through evidential lenses. Ten Bruggencate's argument is from the impossibility of the contrary. It is an argument against all tokens of the same type--namely non christian. Dillahunty does not see the necessity of presuppositions that, coheres well into a worldview and, has wide explanatory power.        

I would recommend Dillahunty read Dr. James Anderson's  first  and second reply  to my encounter with a fellow atheist fideist.  

David Robertson v. Matt Dillahunty

Here are my thoughts on the Unbelievable Podcast debate. The first debate centered on Robertson’s articulation of the traditional proofs for God’s existence, namely the cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument, and argument from religious experience.

Dillahunty attacked Robinson’s formulation of the teleological argument on the basis that it’s viciously circular. He objected that the argument builds its premises on the assumption God designed, and fine-tuned the universe then uses empirical data to extrapolate order and design to the conclusion of God. Dillahunty asserted that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact.

 Robertson presented a type of Leibnizian cosmological argument. But Dillahunty claimed it was an argument from ignorance. Since, he thinks, there can be vital undiscovered information that would naturalistically explain the origin of the universe. So according to Dillahunty one is too rash to logically take a stand, on the origin of the universe, where science is still advancing. Therefore, Dillahunty commends the listeners to suspend judgment until all the relevant data can be assessed.

Robertson used the Nazi concentration camps as an instance of moral evil that presupposes an objective moral standard. Dillahunty simply asserted morality is based on nonmaleficence or beneficence. However, he goes on to say it is situational.

First, the teleological argument is not viciously circular. Since it presupposes what science depends on—the order, and design for any continuity of human experience in the past, present, and future. Second Dillahunty’s criterion of facts is self-refuting. His criterion states that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact. This criterion would also apply to itself. But what can it contrast with to prove it a fact? As I see it Dillahunty’s criterion of facts cannot stand against its own tests. Moreover such a criterion assumes knowledge possible given Dillahunty's viewpoint. Yet this begs the question. Furthermore, the same problems with correspondence and coherence theories of truth can be applied to Dillahunty's view of facts.  Third to criticize an argument on the basis of it being predicated on ignorance assumes there is knowledge, or alternative positions, which an argument overlooks. But if neither knowledge or alternative positions can be provided the criticism is groundless. If anything such an accusation appeals to the mere possibility of further knowledge or alternative positions but no actual knowledge or alternative positions. Therefore such a critcism should be regarded as a desperate attempt to revive a failed position, only to be left in resounding defeat.

How can one know what is relevant data and what is not? Especially considering Thomas Kuhn’s insights on theory ladenness?  When someone suspends judgment is not one making a judgment against those positions that require belief? Put in another way, if one suspends judgment on a viewpoint that claims it is always wrong to suspend judgment, is not one already judged the viewpoint in advance to be wrong?

If morality is based on the well-being of others, who or what defines what is ‘well’? In any case, regardless of how humanity “is,” what is it that determines how humanity “ought” to be?  How is it humans are morally equal? I think Dillahunty’s position reduces to relativism, ethical subjectivism, or moral nihilism.      

          

What is Atheism I

A great introduction to the particulars of Atheism. Very informative given the nature of the presentation by a genuine atheist.

Skepticism

I have noticed atheists have now resorted to skepticism as a basis for a counter-argument against presuppositional apologetics.

This video makes a lot of claims that seem to follow the ideas from Michael Martin's article TANG. The latter article has been addressed by both Michael Butler and John Frame so I will not further discuss it here. I wish to only address those points that seem to be a counter-argument. First, then we go to epistemology. The video builds an argument on a false analogy between God and a king. This is obvious when one looks to perfect being theology. By definition God is the greatest conceivable being; He is the most perfect being (hence the name perfect being theology). If this is the case, then there is no substantial parallel between God and the king in the video. However if we grant the false analogy further problems arise. First, the analogy illustrates a misunderstanding of the Presuppositional argument. Since the unbeliever seeks to reverse the the argument back on the believer. As one's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. Here the problem is made explicit. The believer affirms that God is the necessary starting point to make sense of human experience and thought. Sye Ten Bruggencate argues this affirmation by pressing the unbeliever to admit knowledge is impossible in terms of the non-christian worldview. The alleged counter-argument is that the christian too is left in the same kind of skepticism. Since the believer can not ground his belief that God is not deceiving him. What is the problem of this argument? First, it acknowledges Christianity as the necessary presupposition of thought and human experience in attempt to show it is self-refuting. But it does not demonstrate Christianity is in fact self-refuting. Vincent Cheung explains this problem well:

    

"They suggest that according to my view, I could be deceived in affirming my view. First, this is just outright stupid, since the Bible says that God can send evil spirits to convince people of error. So no matter how it happens, God is the one who decrees that someone would be deceived. Second, they demonstrate that they really have no idea how to perform this fatal maneuver, since it again backfires against them. If I am deceived in the way that the objection suggests (that is, by my own explanation of how one comes to believe falsehood), then it actually proves my position. If I am deceived in the way that I say one is deceived, then I am in fact not deceived. To illustrate, if God sends a demon to "deceive" someone into thinking that God does not send demons to deceive, then God does send demons to deceive. Likewise, if God causes me to believe the "falsehood" that it is God who causes one to believe falsehood, then God does cause one to believe falsehood, and I am in fact not deceived. In other words, my position cannot be demonstrated as self-refuting in the manner attempted by the objection."[1]

Secondly, the counter-argument assumes there is truth. Since one cannot have doubt, deception, or falsehood without a standard of certainty, honesty, and truth. And this standard must be justified by the unbeliever. However, if the unbeliever rightly understood the presuppositional argument, then he would  know even deception is impossible without starting first with the God of Scripture. Moreover, the video asserts starting with God does not justify knowledge, logic, and regularity as simply as naturalism. This assertion is plainly false since the video advocates fideism. This has been dealt with here and here. One must presuppose the reliability of sensation and justify it by scripture which is circular reasoning (not a problem), but it results in two circles sensation is justified by scripture and scripture is justified by sensation. This demonstrates reason presupposes faith and that human experience and everything that is meaningful--sensation, induction, intuition, logic, free-will (free agency) morals,-- hinges on the truthfulness of the Christian worldview. Furthermore, contemporary religious epistemology is not even consulted for the premises of the unbeliever's arguments which leaves the arguments susceptible to refutation in light of this neglected data.   

The video asserts logic and the regularity of nature operates given the essences of their respective natures. Matter operates consistent with matter and this is how regularity can be justified. The problem with such a view is simply it begs the question. How does one know all matter operates the same? Have you tested every atom? If not, then the unbeliever is assuming without justification that from particulars one can get universals. It gets even more precise, if the unbeliever is an empiricist, then since he cannot observe the empirical connection between causes and effects, he is left in skepticism.    




[1] www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/