Showing posts with label Incinerating Presuppositionalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Incinerating Presuppositionalism. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 3, 2014

Matt Dillahunty v. Sye Ten Bruggencate





My comments on the Refining Reason Debate, with its topic, "Is it Reasonable to Believe God Exists?"  

Ten Bruggencate's opening statement sought to argue that any worldview, specifically Dillahunty's, which does not start with God is reduced to absurdity. He argues in favor of the topic by the following argument:

(1) It is reasonable to believe that which is true.              P->Q
(2) It is true that God exists                                             Q->R
(3) Therefore it is reasonable to believe God exists.        P->R

Rightly, Ten Bruggencate identifies premise (2) as the most controversial. So he sets his guns towards Dillahunty's worldview to indirectly prove (2). Ten Bruggencate goes about this task by pointing to the epistemic fruits of Dillahunty's worldview. Dillahunty's worldview requires solipsism to be, in principle, possible, if not actual. Dillahunty's worldview permits this on the grounds that solipsism cannot be disproven, and thus could be true, but he thinks this in no way impinges his worldview. Ten Bruggencate uses Dillahunty's admission to solipsism as a primary example of the absurdity that flows from unbelief. Ten Bruggencate goes to the second phase of his attack by chipping away at Dillahunty's theory of truth. Dillahunty defines truth as that which corresponds or coheres to reality. Bruggencate presses Dillahunty to provide sufficient justification, to know, Dillahunty's beliefs correspond or cohere to reality. Dillahunty concedes the problems Ten Bruggencate raise. So Dillahunty takes a reductionist view of knowledge and whittles it down to mere belief, one might say, opts for Fideism. 

Dillahunty counters Ten Bruggencate's arguments as arbitrary. In fact, he construes all forms of presuppositionalism as a method of utter arbitrariness. He then faults Ten Bruggencate for not demonstrating the uniqueness of Christianity.        

Dillahunty in his opening statement admits to arbitrarily selecting logic, truth, realism, and parsimony as presuppositions. Dillahunty's admission strikes me as Fideism. Likewise, Dillahunty refuses to defend any form of knowledge claims; and he equates any given belief as knowledge. Moreover, Dillahunty views the evidence for solipsism as underdetermined and thus he arbitrarily believes realism. I can't help but wonder if possible world semantics would show, by model logic, Dillahunty must espouse solipsism. Here is a feeble attempt:

1. It is possible for solipsism to be true in all possible worlds.
2. If it is possible that solipsism be true in all possible worlds then solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world.
3. If solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world, then it must be true in every possible world. 
4. If solipsism must be true in every possible world, then it must be true in the actual world.
5. If solipsism must be true in the actual world, then solipsism is true.   

If  Dillahunty grants premise (1) then he logically must affirm solipsism. I think Dillahunty misses Bruggencate's whole argument when he demands proof for exclusively Christianity. Dillahunty is interpreting Ten Bruggencate's argument through evidential lenses. Ten Bruggencate's argument is from the impossibility of the contrary. It is an argument against all tokens of the same type--namely non christian. Dillahunty does not see the necessity of presuppositions that, coheres well into a worldview and, has wide explanatory power.        

I would recommend Dillahunty read Dr. James Anderson's  first  and second reply  to my encounter with a fellow atheist fideist.  









Thursday, May 8, 2014

Presuppositionalism Made Simple


Too often there is more dispute on how Presuppositional apologetics should be performed and less practical instruction on how to put it to use. 

There are many great men who have made successful efforts to fill in these gaps in presuppositional apologetics application. John Frame, Greg Bahnsen, James Anderson, Jason Lisle and Sye Ten Bruggencate all come to mind. 

Where Do We Start?

We show existence, truth, goodness, justice, and beauty, can only be made sense of by the truth of Christianity alone. This can take effect in various ways. But it always involves comparing worldviews. We show Christianity to be true by demonstrating its logical opposite is false. Two principles must be followed in this process, (1) no one can be religiously neutral in their beliefs, and (2) no one, except God, can claim the rights of power and authority over all things, especially in intellectual or moral judgements. 

Some one-liner objections I recently encounter on the college campus. 

1. That's your interpretation. 
2. God is prideful
3. God is unloving if babies go to hell
4. The Bible is not God's word.
5. The Bible has been corrupted
6. Genocide is not justice. 
7. The heathen goes to hell without any hope. 

How can all these objections be answered properly without getting away from the gospel? All these questions can successfully be addressed by attacking the underlying presuppositions. Make God in all reasoning the ultimate standard. Man cannot be elevated to the position of God to judge Him. Man must be brought down intellectually to face his position before God--a mere limited creature dependent upon God for everything.   Let's try to do this. How would you answer these above one-liners?    



1. That's your interpretation. Often this objection is given to a particular passage or doctrinal teaching of scripture. You can always quote the disputed passage of Scripture. Ask the objector, "why do you say I am not interpreting this passage correctly?" And then proceed to tell the person its a quotation.  Notice the objector has made a fatal move in his objection. By pressing hard against the scripture's plain meaning, the objector substitutes its content with his desired meaning. He thinks the text has more than one valid interpretation. One interpretation is no better than another. The problem is the objector cannot possibly claim to know the text has multiple valid interpretations unless the objector also claims to interpret the text better than you. Thus the objector refutes himself. The objector claims, "nobody's interpretation is any better;" but in the same breath utters, "except my interpretation that nobody's interpretation is any better." To keep God first in handling this objection one can always simply say, "since you are limited in knowledge how can you know?  You are not God, yet you elevate yourself in the place of God to judge God. By who's authority, power, and right do you sit in judgement of God? If you arbitrarily appoint yourself as judge over God, you are no less than irrational, and no better than insane."                


2. God is prideful. This objection takes pride to be immoral. One could challenge the objector to make sense of morals without God. Or one can say the objector is a hypocrite, since he judges God as prideful, yet the objector makes the objection out of pride. He says in his heart, " at least I am not like that." The objector can rightly be corrected by biblical theology. God is the most perfect being and thus there is no pride that resides in Him. He ought to be praised, honored and glorified, not merely because he commands it, but, since he deserves it. He commands, deserves, and is worthy of, worship.    

3. God is unloving if babies go to hell. This is a sensitive issue which should be answered with precision and caution. I'd say Christ died for all those that will, or physically cannot (i.e. mentally disabled or infants), believe. Other plausible positions can be argued for as well. Let us assume though God sends babies to hell. How would this be unloving or unjust? Where can love or justice exist without God? God is the source of love and justice. Does not God have the right to do what He wants with His creation? Who are we, as limited humans, to question God? Is it not possible that God would still love them even in hell? The Scriptures teach us no one is innocent of sin. All humans are guilty of sin. Thus God would be perfectly just to send all mankind to hell. Yet God chose in His mercy to redeem and transform people from their sins in Jesus Christ. And I believe God, in His providence and compassion, saves those He has not given the time or physical ability to exercise faith in Christ to magnify His justice, mercy, love and grace.       

4. The Bible is not God's Word. Such an objection assumes the objecter knows the Bible is not God's Word. But how can a creature with limited knowledge know this? How does the objector know there is no evidence proving the Bible is God's Word?  Often this objection is made with a cluster of beliefs that drive it. So probe the objector with questions to get to the root of the problem. Underlying all these objections is the commitment that the objector is the standard of truth. This commitment must be challenged by the Bible itself. First, do this by showing the objector's prejudice against the Bible. Second, demonstrate the necessity of starting first with God to even approach the question of whether or not the Bible is or isn't God's Word. Third, reveal the glaring gaps in the objector's knowledge by explaining the historical reliability of the Scriptures, fulfilled prophecies, and archaeological  discoveries. Show the Bible alone provides us with explanation, consistency, coherence, conscience, hope, fulfillment and livability. It takes us from a limited perspective to an incorporation of the normative, existential and situational perspectives that finds completeness, an objective perspective, in Christ. That is to say, it brings us from the limited to the complete in Christ alone.         

5. The Bible has been corrupted. This objection can be taken as a shot in the dark. Simply ask, " can you prove this?" The objection is at its heart autobiographical information of the objector. It is merely the objector's opinion.   

6. Genocide is not justice. Why is genocide wrong to the objector since he rejects God? How can justice make sense if God is not taken as King in our beliefs? Once again, though, the objector is ignorant of Biblical theology. First, God has the right to dispose of His creation however He sees fit. Second, God is the locus of moral perfection, therefore, He alone is the standard of goodness. Third, all humans are guilty, so God can never be charged with Genocide.  God can only be seen as enforcing justice. 

7. The heathen goes to hell without any hope. There are multiple views on how to rightly answer this objection. I will simply say, that given general and/or special revelation, no one can claim to be without hope of knowing God since He has given us all sufficient knowledge of Himself. The heathen that goes to hell goes willfully rejecting God. He had enough revelation from God, to exercise faith in God, but He chose to fashion an idol in His place. 



Monday, February 24, 2014

David Robertson v. Matt Dillahunty


Here are my thoughts on the Unbelievable Podcast debate. The first debate centered on Robertson’s articulation of the traditional proofs for God’s existence, namely the cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument, and argument from religious experience.

Dillahunty attacked Robinson’s formulation of the teleological argument on the basis that it’s viciously circular. He objected that the argument builds its premises on the assumption God designed, and fine-tuned the universe then uses empirical data to extrapolate order and design to the conclusion of God. Dillahunty asserted that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact.

 Robertson presented a type of Leibnizian cosmological argument. But Dillahunty claimed it was an argument from ignorance. Since, he thinks, there can be vital undiscovered information that would naturalistically explain the origin of the universe. So according to Dillahunty one is too rash to logically take a stand, on the origin of the universe, where science is still advancing. Therefore, Dillahunty commends the listeners to suspend judgment until all the relevant data can be assessed.

Robertson used the Nazi concentration camps as an instance of moral evil that presupposes an objective moral standard. Dillahunty simply asserted morality is based on nonmaleficence or beneficence. However, he goes on to say it is situational.


First, the teleological argument is not viciously circular. Since it presupposes what science depends on—the order, and design for any continuity of human experience in the past, present, and future. Second Dillahunty’s criterion of facts is self-refuting. His criterion states that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact. This criterion would also apply to itself. But what can it contrast with to prove it a fact? As I see it Dillahunty’s criterion of facts cannot stand against its own tests. Moreover such a criterion assumes knowledge possible given Dillahunty's viewpoint. Yet this begs the question. Furthermore, the same problems with correspondence and coherence theories of truth can be applied to Dillahunty's view of facts.  Third to criticize an argument on the basis of it being predicated on ignorance assumes there is knowledge, or alternative positions, which an argument overlooks. But if neither knowledge or alternative positions can be provided the criticism is groundless. If anything such an accusation appeals to the mere possibility of further knowledge or alternative positions but no actual knowledge or alternative positions. Therefore such a critcism should be regarded as a desperate attempt to revive a failed position, only to be left in resounding defeat.

How can one know what is relevant data and what is not? Especially considering Thomas Kuhn’s insights on theory ladenness?  When someone suspends judgment is not one making a judgment against those positions that require belief? Put in another way, if one suspends judgment on a viewpoint that claims it is always wrong to suspend judgment, is not one already judged the viewpoint in advance to be wrong?

If morality is based on the well-being of others, who or what defines what is ‘well’? In any case, regardless of how humanity “is,” what is it that determines how humanity “ought” to be?  How is it humans are morally equal? I think Dillahunty’s position reduces to relativism, ethical subjectivism, or moral nihilism.      
          

Friday, January 10, 2014

Clark and Van Til



There are two very different traditions of presuppositionalism. The first comes from Dr. Gordon H. Clark. Dr. Clark understood Christianity as a system of thought. He treated it much like Euclidian Geometry. The Christian system is comprised of propositions (or theorems) that are deduced from the axiom of scripture. The axiom (first principle, or presupposition) for the Christian is the Bible alone is the Word of God. This axiom is selected among other possible axioms because of God’s illumination (by Christ and the Holy Spirit) and the axiom’s consistency and richness, i.e. its ability to provide knowledge. In other words, unlike other possible axioms, God reveals the Christian axiom to be true and it can solve problems in Epistemology, Metaphysics and Ethics. 

Dr. Clark’s presuppositionalism follows the tradition of Augustine's rationalism with its denial of sense perception. But contra traditional Rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Dr. Clark argued the laws of logic (i.e. the laws: of identity, excluded middle, non-contradiction, rational inference) have no content to them; hence, the laws as our sole axiom furnish us with very few theorems, if any.  Thus the laws of logic alone are not broad enough as an axiom. We must start from the sure foundation of Scripture. As the Holy Spirit has revealed it's truth to our minds. By this standard Dr. Clark repudiates all forms of Empiricism and uses this as an advantage in apologetics. This approach can be properly distinguished from traditional Rationalism as Dogmatism or Scripturalism. As Dr. Clark argued forcefully that knowledge is exclusively what is deduced explicitly or implicitly by the axiom of Scripture. This axiom, as a presupposition, is shown to be true by the Holy Spirit; and by the axiom's ability to solve simple and complex problems in thought. 

Dr. Clark was a Philosopher par excellence. So Clark’s main arsenal in apologetics is logical analysis of worldviews. He quite often, and brilliantly if I might add, uses reductio ad absurdum type arguments in refuting detractors.
    



The second tradition in the presuppositional school comes from Dr. Cornelius Van Til. Dr. Van Til thought of everything in terms of worldviews with presuppositions (e.g. Kuyper). But also acknowledged, as the Old Princeton School per Thomas Reid, all men as image bearers of God know Him innately, but they suppress the truth in unrighteousness. The noetic effects of sin preclude man from coming to a saving knowledge of God. Moreover, man as a rebel against God views himself as autonomous (i.e. the final standard for meaning and truth). However, the noetic effects of sin does not render apologetics useless. Van Til, unlike Abraham Kuyper, believed Christians have an ultimate proof of Christianity at its disposal—the transcendental argument for God’s existence. The first step to this approach is to deny religious neutrality and human autonomy. There is no middle ground between worldviews. A person is either committed to Christ or Satan. One either affirms Christianity or a token of the Non-Christian type. Furthermore only God, as described in Scripture, is the ultimate standard of meaning and truth. Here is where Dr. Van Till’s brilliance shined. Dr. Van Til argued that if the non-Christian is epistemically self-conscious (of his spurious human autonomy), he would be confronted with the necessity of the Christian presupposition, namely, only God, as described in Scripture, is the ultimate authority and source of meaning and truth.

The Christian should not argue for Christianity merely by empiricism, rationalism or existentialism; rather the Christian argues for the truth of Christianity transcendentally. He argues that the Christian worldview is the transcendental precondition for human thought and experience. Thus the Christian worldview is necessary to bring unity and completeness to the divided perspectives of empiricism (situational), rationalism (normative) or existentialism (subjective). 

In modern vernacular, unless the Christian worldview is true one cannot prove anything. The argument is formulated loosely by confronting non-Christians to make sense of knowledge, rationality, induction, freedom and morals all the while assuming human autonomy. Dr. Van Til called this arguing from the impossibility of the contrary (much like in Geometry the argument from contradiction). Once the presupposition of human autonomy is logically demonstrated as impossible then the Christian presupposition is offered as the only alternative to make sense of knowledge, rationality, induction, freedom and morals.

Dr. Van Til emphasized that all men have presuppositions (i.e. beliefs used to interpret evidence). Thus no one is religiously neutral to be able to follow the evidence whereever it leads. A person is either committed to Christ or Satan. In the context of truth and meaning, one is either committed to autonomy (self-law) or theonomy (God’s-law). The Christian proves his presupposition transcendentally.   He argues from the impossibility of the contrary (i.e. unless the Christian worldview is true one cannot prove anything).

Van Til was not opposed to reason. He viewed reason as a tool of God. Van Till understood reason as derivative from God. God, who is essentially and originally rational, created man rational after His image. God gave truth and meaning to the actual world. He was the ultimate standard for meaning and truth, which included proper interpretation of the actual state of affairs. However, after the fall, man exchanged the creator for the creature and became vain in his reasoning. Man placed himself on the throne of God; he claimed the right to be essentially and originally rational.  Man asserted his reasoning as the measure/judge of all things (including God and the Bible). In effect, fallen man asserted his reasoning alone was the ontic and epistemic foundation for knowledge, rationality, induction, freedom and morals. Fallen man sees these things as human constructs with man at its source. Van Til turned this kind of reasoning on its head by arguing for a Copernican revolution in apologetics we now call covenantal or presuppositional apologetics.   

Van Til was concerned to rightly put human reason in its proper place under God’s rationality, authority, control, presence and power. Such a task is accomplished when we argue transcendentally.

Dr. John Frame rightly shatters the criticism that presuppositionalism merely argues in a circle. First, Frame points out the logical order of a Biblical epistemology can be conceived as linear (e.g. God’s rationality ->; human faith -->; human reasoning). In God’s rational providence, He produces human faith that governs human reasoning. All three of these components are inseparable. One cannot reason without faith (in reason); and one cannot justify either faith or reason without God.

Synthesis

Scholars (e.g. Carnell, Reymond, Nash, Frame) have examined their apologetical contributions and  identify weaknesses and strengths to provide a synthesis of the best their systems offered.  






















          

Wednesday, November 27, 2013

Carrier and the Universe


Dr. Carrier writes (taken from his site here):



(1) • What caused the universe to exist?
Fallacy of loaded question. It is not established that the universe began, and thus had a cause at all.
Our universe began (at the Big Bang) but we have no way of knowing anymore what if anything preceded that event. And as for what caused our one specific universe, we already know the answer to that: the Big Bang did (an event and process that completely eluded all divine Christian revelation for two thousand years, as well as all divine Muslim and Jewish revelation throughout the whole of their existence). As to what caused the Big Bang, we have many viable theories (from Hawking’s The Grand Design to Krauss’ A Universe from Nothing to Vilenkin’s Many Worlds in One, all of which predict and explain numerous strange and often specific features of the universe that no theology has ever been able to deduce from the hypothesis that God did it). As far as figuring out which one is right, cosmological scientists are working on it. They’ve made tremendous progress. Theology has made none.
If we revise the question to ask something more abstract like “Why does the universe exist?” (thus admitting that maybe it has always existed in some form, and thus was never ultimately “caused,” but asking instead “why” it exists instead of something else, or nothing at all), then the answer is the same as why a god is supposed to exist. (He just does? Then the universe just does. He exists necessarily? Then a universe exists necessarily. We can play this game forever.) If we revise the question into something conditional like, “If all existence itself began, then what caused it?,” then the answer is any of dozens of possible things, all of which have a vastly lower specified complexity than a complex intelligent mind and therefore have a far greater prior probability (see The God Impossible)–and by explaining observed evidence better, they also have a far greater posterior probability as well. This follows from the argument from scale, including the mind-boggling scale of this universe’s lethality and inhospitability to life (indeed the universe is far better designed to generate black holes than life).
I discuss all these facts throughout my entries in the Carrier-Wanchick Debate. I have more recently described ten possible causal or explanatory theories of why an orderly universe exists in previous comments on my blog (and we needn’t know which are true to know they are all simpler theories, and often based in more background evidence, than any god hypothesis). I more formally outline why the evidence (the nature of the universe we find ourselves in) is far more likely on any such godless hypothesis than on any rational form of theism in my chapter “Neither Life Nor the Universe Appear Intelligently Designed” in The End of Christianity (pp. 279-304). I’ll quote one key section of that to give you an idea of what I mean:
[T]his universe is 99.99999 percent composed of lethal radiation-filled vacuum, and 99.99999 percent of all the material in the universe comprises stars and black holes on which nothing can ever live, and 99.99999 percent of all other material in the universe (all planets, moons, clouds, asteroids) is barren of life or even outright inhospitable to life. In other words, the universe we observe is extraordinarily inhospitable to life. Even what tiny inconsequential bits of it are at all hospitable are extremely inefficient at producing life—at all, but far more so intelligent life …. One way or another, a universe perfectly designed for life would easily, readily, and abundantly produce and sustain life. Most of the contents of that universe would be conducive to life or benefit life. Yet that’s not what we see. Instead, almost the entire universe is lethal to life—in fact, if we put all the lethal vacuum of outer space swamped with deadly radiation into an area the size of a house, you would never find the comparably microscopic speck of area that sustains life (it would literally be smaller than a single proton). It’s exceedingly difficult to imagine a universe less conducive to life than that—indeed, that’s about as close to being completely incapable of producing life as any random universe can be expected to be, other than of course being completely incapable of producing life. (pp. 295-96)
And yet…
That is exactly what we would have to see if life arose by accident. Because life can arise by accident only in a universe that large and old. The fact that we observe exactly what the theory of accidental origin requires and predicts is evidence that our theory is correct. (p. 290)
Because without a God, life can only exist by chemical accident, such a chemical accident will be exceedingly rare, and exceedingly rare things only commonly happen in vast universes where countless tries are made over vast spans of time. Likewise, a universe not designed for us will not look well suited to us but be almost entirely unsuited to us and we will survive only in a few tiny chance pockets of survivable space in it. Atheism thus predicts, with near 100% certainly, several bizarre features of the universe (it’s vast size and age and lethality to life), whereas we cannot deduce any of those features from any non-gerrymandered God hypothesis (while gerrymandered hypotheses all grossly violate Occam’s Razor).

My Reply
            Dr. Carrier is quite mistaken to say, “Our universe began (at the Big Bang) but we have no way of knowing anymore what if anything preceded that event” since he would have to know the limits of knowledge to make such a claim. In which case, Dr. Carrier would be inconsistent claiming to know what cannot be known.

Dr. Carrier tells us,

“As to what caused the Big Bang, we have many viable theories (from Hawking’s The Grand Design to Krauss’ A Universe from Nothing to Vilenkin’s Many Worlds in One, all of which predict and explain numerous strange and often specific features of the universe that no theology has ever been able to deduce from the hypothesis that God did it). As far as figuring out which one is right, cosmological scientists are working on it. They’ve made tremendous progress. Theology has made none.”

         It is strange how Dr. Carrier doesn’t explain in what ways these alternative theories can evade the absolute beginning of the universe. Perhaps it is because they, in fact, cannot. All of the models, he mentions, still conclude the absolute beginning of the universe. Dr. Carrier talks of the universe just existing inexplicably, which amounts to an arbitrary claim. He also discusses the possibility of the universe having necessary existence.This is obviously false since we can rationally imagine there being no universe. The universe did not have to exist. 

           Moreover, the theology and tone, Dr. Carrier wishes to criticize as “the hypothesis that God did it” is a naive understanding of Christian theology and philosophy. It is naive as if one characterized the metaphysical naturalism of Dr. Carrier as "the hypothesis that nature did it." But is God to be treated as merely a hypothesis? As Christians we understand all things are created and sustained by God’s direct providence.  So in this sense all things can be explain by God; but that taken by itself, especially for Christian scientists, can be somewhat trivial. This is why science focuses on God’s indirect providence with God’s direct providence as its foundation. That is to say science graphs the interactions and relations between secondary causes with the necessary assumption of God as the primary cause. Sound Christian theology and philosophy does not start with God as merely a hypothesis, but as a necessary prerequisite for even hypothesizing. There is a significant difference between the two. The former starts with God as a hypothesis to make experiments and predictions to confirm or falsify God. The latter starts with God as a presupposition necessary to even account for hypothesizes, experiments, predictions, confirmations, or falsifications. I sense, here, Dr. Carrier would say both views amount merely to the arbitrary claim, namely “God did it.” But Christians’ are certainly not making an arbitrary claim. Quite the contrary, Christians are arguing the very fact that arbitrariness is a key intellectual sin is due to God being the starting-point. God, who himself is rational, created us to reflect His nature. Since we are made in His image to be rational, we (have a reason to) object to arbitrariness. The very charge of arbitrariness, Dr. Carrier wishes to pin on Christianity, exposes the fact he is made in the image of God. Is the Christian claim arbitrary though? It must be a resounding no! Christianity as a worldview is coherent and self-justifying. The problem is naturalists preclude Christianity from being true simply on the basis of their faith in metaphysical naturalism. Still it is worth asking, why is an arbitrary answer insufficient for Dr. Carrier? Why isn’t an arbitrary answer preferred over a rational one? I bet he’d answer along the lines that a person ought to have reasons for what she believes. A person has the epistemic responsibility to acquire reasons to form beliefs. If he would say these things no appeal to natural selection can explain where these rational obligations and responsibilities come from.  
        Dr. Carrier uses probability theory to say certain theories make it more probable that the universe would arise from nothing by nothing in the way it exists presently. Yet he neglects to mention the highly unreliable nature of probability theory given the background information needed to accurately represent and calculate any given thing. 

He talks a lot about order which cannot be rightly accounted for given the requirement of chance to explain the universe from metaphysical naturalism. 

Why Dr. Carrier quibbles about sticking to Ockam’s razor is nonsense from naturalism.

For a different take on some of the same issues discussed here check out my posts here and here

Tuesday, October 1, 2013

Faith Before Reason?


I believe faith is the foundation for reason. Since one cannot reason apart from prior affirming by faith that reason reliably gives one truth. In other words, a faith commitment must be made for reason before one can reason.  If one denies this position, then he/she must show reason is the foundation for faith. However,  if this is the case,  then one cannot assume reason gives one truth.  Since such an assumption is a faith commitment. If one does not by faith assume the validity of reason one is left in skepticism. Nevertheless, some may still insist that one cannot make a commitment without first affirming reason to distinguish between faith and reason. I think such a criticism looses sight of the issue. It confuses between semantics and ontology. But even if I am wrong here, the problem still remains that the very thing in question is if one can affirm anything without a prior faith commitment. I wonder if my concerns can be put in a syllogism? Perhaps these will do?   

Modus tollens
1. If reason precedes faith then reason is affirmed by reason and not faith. 
2. Reason cannot be affirmed by reason (since it is viciously circular).
3. Therefore, reason cannot precede faith.

Disjunctive

1. Either faith precedes reason, or reason precedes faith (This is based on the law of contradiction). 
2. Reason cannot precede faith (The very thing in question is if reason can be trusted without faith)
3. Therefore, faith precedes reason.

Yes, I draw this conclusion with reason, by faith, in the Triune God of Scripture.

Now some have tried to dodge the conclusion I have drawn by denying premise (2) in the first argument. They say it is not circular. I don't see how it isn't. It clearly begs the question. Maybe reason is taken as an axiom, like in Geometry, but then it is unprovable. Or maybe reason is just assumed arbitrarily. In either case, I don't see how my conclusion can be avoided. 


Check out:



Monday, June 17, 2013

Skepticism

I have noticed atheists have now resorted to skepticism as a basis for a counter-argument against presuppositional apologetics.




This video makes a lot of claims that seem to follow the ideas from Michael Martin's article TANG. The latter article has been addressed by both Michael Butler and John Frame so I will not further discuss it here. I wish to only address those points that seem to be a counter-argument. First, then we go to epistemology. The video builds an argument on a false analogy between God and a king. This is obvious when one looks to perfect being theology. By definition God is the greatest conceivable being; He is the most perfect being (hence the name perfect being theology). If this is the case, then there is no substantial parallel between God and the king in the video. However if we grant the false analogy further problems arise. First, the analogy illustrates a misunderstanding of the Presuppositional argument. Since the unbeliever seeks to reverse the the argument back on the believer. As one's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. Here the problem is made explicit. The believer affirms that God is the necessary starting point to make sense of human experience and thought. Sye Ten Bruggencate argues this affirmation by pressing the unbeliever to admit knowledge is impossible in terms of the non-christian worldview. The alleged counter-argument is that the christian too is left in the same kind of skepticism. Since the believer can not ground his belief that God is not deceiving him. What is the problem of this argument? First, it acknowledges Christianity as the necessary presupposition of thought and human experience in attempt to show it is self-refuting. But it does not demonstrate Christianity is in fact self-refuting. Vincent Cheung explains this problem well:

    
"They suggest that according to my view, I could be deceived in affirming my view. First, this is just outright stupid, since the Bible says that God can send evil spirits to convince people of error. So no matter how it happens, God is the one who decrees that someone would be deceived. Second, they demonstrate that they really have no idea how to perform this fatal maneuver, since it again backfires against them. If I am deceived in the way that the objection suggests (that is, by my own explanation of how one comes to believe falsehood), then it actually proves my position. If I am deceived in the way that I say one is deceived, then I am in fact not deceived. To illustrate, if God sends a demon to "deceive" someone into thinking that God does not send demons to deceive, then God does send demons to deceive. Likewise, if God causes me to believe the "falsehood" that it is God who causes one to believe falsehood, then God does cause one to believe falsehood, and I am in fact not deceived. In other words, my position cannot be demonstrated as self-refuting in the manner attempted by the objection."[1]
Secondly, the counter-argument assumes there is truth. Since one cannot have doubt, deception, or falsehood without a standard of certainty, honesty, and truth. And this standard must be justified by the unbeliever. However, if the unbeliever rightly understood the presuppositional argument, then he would  know even deception is impossible without starting first with the God of Scripture. Moreover, the video asserts starting with God does not justify knowledge, logic, and regularity as simply as naturalism. This assertion is plainly false since the video advocates fideism. This has been dealt with here and hereOne must presuppose the reliability of sensation and justify it by scripture which is circular reasoning (not a problem), but it results in two circles sensation is justified by scripture and scripture is justified by sensation. This demonstrates reason presupposes faith and that human experience and everything that is meaningful--sensation, induction, intuition, logic, free-will (free agency) morals,-- hinges on the truthfulness of the Christian worldview. Furthermore, contemporary religious epistemology is not even consulted for the premises of the unbeliever's arguments which leaves the arguments susceptible to refutation in light of this neglected data.   

The video asserts logic and the regularity of nature operates given the essences of their respective natures. Matter operates consistent with matter and this is how regularity can be justified. The problem with such a view is simply it begs the question. How does one know all matter operates the same? Have you tested every atom? If not, then the unbeliever is assuming without justification that from particulars one can get universals. It gets even more precise, if the unbeliever is an empiricist, then since he cannot observe the empirical connection between causes and effects, he is left in skepticism.    





[1] www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/    

Sunday, June 16, 2013

The Burden of Proof

Most atheists will affirm the burden of proof lays on the christian since he or she asserts a positive claim, namely God exists. However, no claims can be made in a vacuum. Both the atheist and christian make truth claims either explicitly or implicitly. For example, the atheist affirms metaphysical naturalism and the christian affirms metaphysical supernaturalism. Therefore, both stand in positions of taking on a burden of proof.  

If the atheist insists the christian provide evidence for his claims, implicitly the atheist presupposes a criterion for claims, which must be justified, since it is a claim. And thus he is left with the burden of proof of justifying the validity of his criterion for truth. Furthermore, if the atheist demands proof from the christian, the christian can legitimately request the atheist to provide an metaphysical foundation for the epistemic obligation he appeals to when the atheist says, "all rational persons ought to have justification for their claims."    

In summary then, there are no neutral positions. The christian and atheist have an epistemic responsibility to justify his/her beliefs. The burden of proof belongs to both the christian and unbeliever.

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

Thoughts on Empiricism

There are only a few positions to take regarding universals. 

Either,


(1) universals reduce to particulars, o(2) universals and particulars are distinct.
If (1) is the case, then some form of nominalism is true. If (2) is true, some form of either realism or conceptualism is true. 

Given (1), abstractionism asserts universals are formed by particulars. An agent encounters a particular via sense perception and then by inference abstracts a universal. For example, Sally sees a particular human, then infers from this general characteristics that form the concept of humanity.  Universal concepts are allegedly open-ended, they point to an indefinite number of things.

Problems
The term abstraction is vague. It does not analytically explain the process in which universals are formed from particulars. Moreover, a logical definition of the term cannot be provided.


Logically how can one abstract concepts, like time, space, and color, from particular sensations?  

To say universal concepts are open ended is to confuse semantics with ontology. The issue is not if words are vague in picking out concretes; rather, the issue is if words in fact pick out universal concepts that exist.

How can one from sensations infer perceptions and abstractions and then determine if the perceptions are in fact true? Kant had a similar problem with his Ding an sich


Abstraction presupposes there are persons with minds, sensations, beliefs, thoughts, and intentionality without setting forth a metaphysical view that can account for such things. But logically prior to giving reasons for abstraction, one must logically justify empiricism.

It is impossible to show logically that universals come from particulars. Since such a demonstration would rely on induction which assumes the very thing one needs to prove, namely that one can get universals from particulars.


Gordon H. Clark's thoughts on the subject from his "A Christian View of Men and Things."



Sunday, May 19, 2013

Defining 'God'

Some Atheists take up positivism and AJ Ayer's verification principle when it suits them to block dialogue between Christians and Atheists. They argue any statement must be empirically verifiable in order for it to be meaningful. A word must have an analytic definition attached to it in order for it to be meaningful. Often these atheists will ask Christians to define attributes of God, like incorporeality, and scrutinize them as meaningless since they violate the verification principle. What is the problem with this? First, it confuses ontology with semantics. A word may be meaningless (the semantic element) to a person (the epistemic element) but it doesn't negate the fact the word has an ontological referent. Second, a word can be stipulated or understood by its use. But even if an atheist doesn't grant this we can still think of words as variables, like in Algebra, that are place holders with stipulated meaning. Third, to say all words or statements must conform to a principle of empirical verification is self-refuting. Since the above principle itself cannot be empirically verified. Nor can the words, like 'must' 'all' or 'words,' be empirically verified. But some have sought to reform verificationism by saying only positive definitions are meaningful. But on what basis? Apparently by the self-refuting verificationist principle. Words like 'non-contradictory', 'incoherent','invariable', 'immutable', and 'immaterial' are said to be meaningless because they do not refer to positive definitions. But on such an account it makes things like falsification in science meaningless. Since falsity is not positively definable. Thus this resurgence to revisions of positivism fall prey to the same problems of positivism and therefore should be rejected.





Some helpful links:

William Lane Craig Here

Greg Bahnsen Here

Christian Skeptic critique of George Smith Here

Anthony Flood Here