Showing posts with label original sin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label original sin. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Anderson, Calvinism and the First Sin


In this paper (here) Dr. James N. Anderson, Associate Professor of Reformed Theological Seminary, has masterfully taken up the subject of Calvinism (with its respective doctrines of God, providence and sin) to address those that charge it of implicating God as the author of sin.

I do not wish to give a complete summary here. I’d prefer to commend readers to it. I wish only to discuss some of the paper with comments.

Dr. Anderson begins with a familiar discussion in Christian Theology of the devastating nature and effects of sin brought by Adam’s transgression. God created Adam and Eve after His image good--with the ability to choose good or evil. Adam for unknown reasons chose to violate one of God’s commandments. Subsequent to Adam’s transgression, sin was imputed, inherited and imitated, by all mankind.

Dr. Anderson asks the deep and difficult questions we are confronted with, as Calvinists, in light of Adam’s transgression. It is the very same questions believers in the past have had to struggle with such as St. Augustine and Jonathan Edwards. Dr. Anderson states, “the most perplexing question of all is simply this: If Adam was created good, why did he commit evil?”[1]

Dr. Anderson stresses that it must be admitted, from the start, that all theological traditions face difficulties. Nevertheless, all theological traditions must each attempt to construct a coherent model to make sense of God’s providence in relation to Adam’s sin. As we take Calvinism to be the most faithful theological tradition to Scripture. We affirm: (1) God either directly or indirectly determines all things (which includes Adam’s transgression), (2) man freely determines actions and acts, and (3) God is neither the author nor approver of sin. Yet it is precisely these affirmations that require us to construct a coherent model. But many from other theological traditions deem this as an impossible task. Dr. Anderson in the rest of his paper directly addresses objections to the possibility of a Calvinistic model, critiques alternative models, and then offers a Calvinistic model, which best affirms (1), (2), and (3), with less (severe?) philosophical difficulties than alternative models.

Dr. Anderson states that Calvinism is committed to divine determinism in which God is the sufficient cause of all things. But how God precisely determines and causes all things does not necessarily entail physical or causal determinism. So then, in what way are we to understand “God determines all things” and “God is the cause of all things?” Dr. Anderson points out that Calvinism essentially is not committed to any specific view of causality. Therefore many views are open to Calvinism. In this paper Dr. Anderson takes cause generally in its ordinary sense, namely, to bring about a state of affairs. With this definition in mind, Dr. Anderson distinguishes between creator and creature causation. There is a creator/creature distinction that vastly separates God essentially from His creation. For example, God can cause things to exist from nothing. But creation cannot cause things to exist from nothing. By this distinction, Dr. Anderson argues that divine causation can be properly understood as analogical. Thus God determines C by X and man determines C by Y. Divine causation is not transitive to human causation. Things in creation do not cause Y by Z and God causes creation to cause Y by X where XYZ are equivalent. There are two levels of causation that must be kept in tact. The first level is divine causation and the second is creation causation. On the latter we experience daily in creation. It is a linear perspective of causation. However, the first level, God causes the creation to exist; He sustains its existence and concurs with its causation precisely in accordance with His will. I think Paul Helm reinforces Dr. Anderson’s model when he writes,

“(9) Wherever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.
 (10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.
    
… it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evil is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act is not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”[2]

Dr. Anderson gives helpful insight to divine determinism with discussion on particular models of providence. The first he calls the Domino Model and the second Authorial Model. The first takes causation as straightforwardly causal determinism. The world and everything in it is like a giant game of dominos. In the game of dominos, each individual domino is placed face to face with another domino. Typically a long chain of face-to-face dominos is spread out like a train. And once the first domino of the chain falls, it causes the adjacent domino to fall, continuing on from domino to domino. Eventually, through the chain of causes and effects, all the dominos fall. In the same manner as dominos the Domino model of providence views everything that happens in the world as a chain of causes and effects. God just taps the first domino to fall, as it were, and everything happens precisely in accordance with His will. The Authorial Model takes providence much like an author writes a book.[3] The author controls every element in the story; he can even write himself into the story. But how the author writes the story is not the same as how the characters act in the story. The author can write that a particular character commits a wicked deed, without approving or applauding it, but the author does not thereby commit a wicked deed.[4] Moreover, there is a one-way streak of moral accountability in the Authorial Model. Since the author can rightly hold its characters accountable for their actions. But the characters have no right to hold their author accountable for their actions.[5] Furthermore, to the least extent, the author is merely telling a story with characters that participate in evil, but the author himself does not participate in evil. Dr. Anderson sees that Calvinism with this Authorial Model of Providence is most helpful in understanding divine determinism.

Dr. Anderson after developing the Authorial Model to understand divine determinism, he moves his attention to addressing possible objections to such a model of providence as it relates to the first sin. Dr. Anderson then critiques alternative non-Calvinistic models of providence in the face of Adam’s sin.

I think Dr. Anderson brings great clarity to the difficulties for those who wish to affirm libertarian freedom. First, he points out that such a view violates a moderate principle of sufficient reason (ironically the very law many Arminians vehemently defend in the Cosmological argument).[6] That is to say everything has an explanation for its existence either by necessity or contingency. But Dr. Anderson points out that if libertarian freedom is true there is no explanation for any given person’s decision. Since reasons merely influence any given person, but decisions are made, if any given person wills them. Thus why any given person chooses to will one decision over another remains inexplicable. I think Arminians and Molinists alike would respond to Dr. Anderson that Adam sinned simply on the basis he willed it. So in that sense there is something in Adam. But such a reply does not escape Dr. Anderson’s criticism.

Dr. Anderson concludes with “…five significant virtues of the Calvinist account:

1. Unlike its competitors, the Calvinist account does full justice to the divine perfection of aseity (God’s self-existence and absolute independence). There are no events in the creation that take place apart from God’s will, and God’s knowledge isn’t dependent on brute facts or on anything in the creation.

2. Unlike its competitors, the Calvinist account doesn’t require God to take chances or to rely on “good fortune.” (Even the Molinist account subjects God to some degree of chance insofar as God has to play the hand of feasible worlds that is dealt to him, so to speak, by the counterfactuals of freedom.)

3. Calvinism affirms the doctrine of meticulous providence, which receives strong support in both the Christian scriptures and the Christian tradition.

4.On the Calvinist account there is an ultimate sufficient explanation for the first sin, namely, the good and wise decree of God. God has authored a creational story in which human sin plays an integral role. While the first sin may have been irrational in terms of Adam’s nature, character, and circumstances, it was not irrational in terms of God’s decree. The first sin was not ultimately an irrational brute event in God’s universe. God worked out his sovereign plan through Adam’s sin rather than around it.

5. Calvinists can affirm that the first sin considered in itself was a supremely evil act while at the same time affirming that God decreed Adam’s sin for his good and wise purposes—ultimately, for his own glory manifested in his mercy and his justice—as part of the overall storyline of the history of creation.”[7]




                  




[1] James N. Anderson. Forthcoming in Calvinism and the First Sin in Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, edited by David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson (Wipf & Stock, 2014) http://www.proginosko.com/docs/Calvinism_and_the_First_Sin.pdf p.3.
[2] Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010)pp.161-162.
[3] John M. Frame. The Doctrine of God. (Philipsburg, N.J.,:P&R Pub., 2002)p.p.154-159. See also Dr. Gordon H. Clark’s discussion of cause and authorship in Christian Philosophy, vol 4. (Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004)p.p. 268-269.   
[4] Dr. Anderson even points out that most, if not all, good stories must contain some amount of evil. http://www.proginosko.com/docs/Calvinism_and_the_First_Sin.pdf; p.11. See also Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Richard Francks, and R.S. Woolhouse. Philosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998)p.252.
[5] I see no reason why a moderate divine command theory of ethics cannot be incorporated in this model. See Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303. Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269. Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview.Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
[6] William Lane Craig. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/leibnizs-cosmological-argument-and-the-psr

Thursday, December 12, 2013

Craig, Providence, and Calvinism



Dr. William Lane Craig lists five objections against a Calvinistic conception of providence in the book above. Craig's five objections can be summarized as follows:
1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures (indications of a robust doctrine of human freedom).
2. Calvinism is self-refuting.
3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin.
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience is illusory.

1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures.

Craig merely asserts Calvinism is contrary to the plain teachings of Scripture. He does not exegete any text to argue the supposed exegetical shortcomings of Calvinism. Craig claims Calvinism undermines all scriptural texts that affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency."I fail to see how Calvinism cannot affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency," if God (analogically) determines them.


2. Calvinism is self-refuting.


Simply to say one believes Calvinism given the truth of Calvinism seems trivial. But Craig sees this as self-refuting. Since a person is determined to believe in determinism, (somehow) this determined belief is not acquired rationally, but why not? Craig is assuming latently by this objection Calvinism entails causal determinism. But there is no obvious reason why it must. In fact, many Calvinists would adopt an analogical understanding of determinism whereby God determines C by X and man determines C by Y. On such a view divine causation is not taken as univocal, but, rather analogical.


3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin. 


“…God is the first efficient cause of everything, but evil has come, not from His first act, but by a second act, an act of creatures.


God is the author of the author of sin, He cannot be the author of sin itself, for sin is the result of a rebellion against God. 

If God is not the author of sin, at least He must be charged with being responsible for sin…A little reflection on the subject will show the contradiction involved in charging God with responsibility. Let us ask one question: Responsible to whom, or to what?...Obviously  if we are talking about the Almighty, He already is the highest power there is. Therefore, when God decreed this type of universe where Christ was to die for the sins of all who believe, God was responsible to none but Himself.” [1]

“God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though He is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever God does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that He does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit. Righteousness is what God does…God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids Him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.” [2]

“(1) Necessarily, if God exists he is all-good.
 (2) God exists and ordains whatsoever comes to pass.
 (3) Necessarily, if A is a human action then A is causally determined.
 (4) There are morally evil human actions.
 (5) Either God is the morally culpable author of the morally evil actions or human beings are   their sole morally culpable authors.
 (6) (1) and the first disjunct of (5) are formally inconsistent.
 (7)(1),(3) and the second disjunct of (5) are not formally inconsistent.
 (8)Any agent who freely and knowingly sets up a deterministic process with a certain outcome must be responsible for that outcome.
 (9) Wherever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.
 (10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.
    
…moreover, it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evil is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act in not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”[3]

“Since our moral duties are grounded in the divine commands, they are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since he does not issue commands to himself.

If God does not fulfill moral duties then what content can be given to the claim he is good? Here Kant’s distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule has proved helpful. God may act naturally in ways which for us would be rule following and so constitutive of goodness in the sense of fulfilling our moral duties, so that God can be said similarly to be good in an analogical way….God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of his own character.” [4]

             

4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
Instead of rehearsing the, already mentioned, alternative to causal determinism in favor of compatibilism, I'd like to focus on Craig's offered alternative. He would say libertarian freedom is the only view that rightly upholds human freedom. On such view a subject is free if the subject makes a choice without any sufficient or necessary causal conditions. Any given person, with the options of X or Y, to be free should have the ability to choose between the two (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices). But how is such a view any more plausible? Given the fact that a person can choose between X or Y (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices) amounts to the person being indifferent. Why then should an indifferent person chose one thing over another? I think Craig wants to say, simply because the agent reasoned to will one choice over another. It seems to me, then, this freedom of indifference make a person's choice utterly arbitrary. Reason being that any given reason why a person should choose X, an identical reason can be given to choose Y. [5]

5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience are illusory. 


Quite the contrary, if analogical determinism is true. But for the sake of argument, even if causal determinism is true,  it would not entail human experience is illusory given the fact that on such a view there really is secondary causes. And therefore, people are not rightly construed as puppets in the hands of God; instead they're 
agents that possess knowledge, volition, purpose, and deliberation. 


[1] Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303.

[2]Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269.
[3]Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.
[4]Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview.Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
[5] I take this point from the insights of Bruce Ware, John Frame, and Ronald Nash. 

Sunday, November 17, 2013

Free-WIll Defense and Original Sin


W. Paul Franks argues that a broad robust free-will defense of Christian theism against the problem of evil requires abandoning original sin or significantly rethinking it.

Franks argues that if an agent cannot choose his own will, then he is not blameworthy for actions that flow from it.

One cannot be held accountable for what could be but only for what will be the case. In other words, one is not held responsible for possible actions he or she  would commit in different circumstances; rather, one is responsible only for those actions he or she will commit

Franks thinks the traditional formulation of original sin as inheritance, imputation and imitation should be revised lest God be implicated as the source of sin and evil.  He suggests possible revisions are to remove inheretence and replace imputation with association. On his model humans would be guilty by association. When Adam sinned God associated all humans with him. Thus we all are guilty by association.  The implications of such a view is to neglect exegesis. First, guilt by association is based on a hasty generalization. It is often called the fallacy of association. But more importantly, it assumes, as does imputation, that God set the laws,  commandments, and punishments for mankind prior to Adam's sin. Second, it drastically affects justification. If Adam's guilt is not imputated then nor is Christ's righteousness imputed. Then how do men stand righteous before God? By association? Third, such a robust revision is  unnecessary with other possible models available to account for sin and evil. Forth, guilt by association does not remove the knotty problem of sin and evil.  How is sin universal? Why are all humans by nature children of wrath?

Check out my post here  

Sunday, September 15, 2013

Calvinism and the first sin

Check this new article out by James Anderson here.

Things to think about when you read Anderson's article.


“…God is the first efficient cause of everything, but evil has come, not from His first act, but by a second act, an act of creatures.

God is the author of the author of sin, He cannot be the author of sin itself, for sin is the result of a rebellion against God. 

If God is not the author of sin, at least He must be charged with being responsible for sin…A little reflection on the subject will show the contradiction involved in charging God with responsibility. Let us ask one question: Responsible to whom, or to what?...Obviously  if we are talking about the Almighty, He already is the highest power there is. Therefore, when God decreed this type of universe where Christ was to die for the sins of all who believe, God was responsible to none but Himself.” 

Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303.

“God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though He is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever God does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that He does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit. Righteousness is what God does…God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids Him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.”

Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269.

“(1) Necessarily, if God exist he is all-good.
(2) God exists and ordains whatsoever comes to pass.
(3) Necessarily, if A is a human action then A is causally determined.
(4) There are morally evil human actions.
(5) Either God is the morally culpable author of the morally evil actions or human beings are their sole morally culpable authors.
(6) (1) and the first disjunct of (5) are formally inconsistent.
(7)(1),(3) and the second disjunct of (5) are not formally inconsistent.
(8)Any agent who freely and knowingly sets up a deterministic process with a certain outcome must be responsible for that outcome.
(9) Whatever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.
(10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.
    
…moreover, it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evile is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act in not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”

Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.


“Since our moral duties are grounded in the divine commands, they are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since he does not issue commands to himself.

If God does not fulfill moral duties then what content can be given to the claim he is good? Here Kant’s distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule has proved helpful. God may act naturally in ways which for us would be rule following and so constitutive of goodness in the sense of fulfilling our moral duties, so that God can be said similarly to be good in an analogical way….God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of his own character.”

Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview. Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
     

Sunday, June 30, 2013

Analytic Theology and Calvinism

Here is a link to an article on Calvinism I just wanted to bring to the attention of my blog readers. It is Paul Manata using the helpful tools and insights of analytical philosophy and applying them to theology.  

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

The Problem of Sin and Evil

Personal Reflections
The problem of sin and evil can be resolved by the fact God is the standard of good. His commandments and actions are a reflection of His omnibenevolent nature. The reason God planned the existence of evil and sin in His providence is not fully disclosed by God but He has revealed Who He is. Hence, He must have a morally sufficient reason for why He has planned sin and evil to existence given His nature. Furthermore, God uses sin and evil for ultimately good. Therefore, we ought to trust God and His providence.


A wonderful argument by Paul Helm regarding sin and evil.






























See
Paul Helm. Eternal God. 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford P, 2010)p.162.
Downing, William. The Problem of Evil Here