Universals

If universals exist in God's mind---as conceptual realism maintains--then relations would exist in God's mind prior to Him instancing them. Would not the same be said of concrete things then? If so, then the force of Bill Craig's "real relations argument" against an Atemporal conception of Divine Eternity looses sway. 

Just a thought!      

Craig, Providence, and Calvinism

Dr. William Lane Craig lists five objections against a Calvinistic conception of providence in the book above. Craig's five objections can be summarized as follows:

1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures (indications of a robust doctrine of human freedom).
2. Calvinism is self-refuting.
3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin.
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience is illusory.

1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures.

Craig merely asserts Calvinism is contrary to the plain teachings of Scripture. He does not exegete any text to argue the supposed exegetical shortcomings of Calvinism. Craig claims Calvinism undermines all scriptural texts that affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency."I fail to see how Calvinism cannot affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency," if God (analogically) determines them.

2. Calvinism is self-refuting.

Simply to say one believes Calvinism given the truth of Calvinism seems trivial. But Craig sees this as self-refuting. Since a person is determined to believe in determinism, (somehow) this determined belief is not acquired rationally, but why not? Craig is assuming latently by this objection Calvinism entails causal determinism. But there is no obvious reason why it must. In fact, many Calvinists would adopt an analogical understanding of determinism whereby God determines C by X and man determines C by Y. On such a view divine causation is not taken as univocal, but, rather analogical.

3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin. 

“…God is the first efficient cause of everything, but evil has come, not from His first act, but by a second act, an act of creatures.

God is the author of the author of sin, He cannot be the author of sin itself, for sin is the result of a rebellion against God. 

If God is not the author of sin, at least He must be charged with being responsible for sin…A little reflection on the subject will show the contradiction involved in charging God with responsibility. Let us ask one question: Responsible to whom, or to what?...Obviously  if we are talking about the Almighty, He already is the highest power there is. Therefore, when God decreed this type of universe where Christ was to die for the sins of all who believe, God was responsible to none but Himself.” [1]

“God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though He is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever God does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that He does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit. Righteousness is what God does…God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids Him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.” [2]

“(1) Necessarily, if God exists he is all-good.

 (2) God exists and ordains whatsoever comes to pass.

 (3) Necessarily, if A is a human action then A is causally determined.

 (4) There are morally evil human actions.

 (5) Either God is the morally culpable author of the morally evil actions or human beings are   their sole morally culpable authors.

 (6) (1) and the first disjunct of (5) are formally inconsistent.

 (7)(1),(3) and the second disjunct of (5) are not formally inconsistent.

 (8)Any agent who freely and knowingly sets up a deterministic process with a certain outcome must be responsible for that outcome.

 (9) Wherever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.

 (10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.

    

…moreover, it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evil is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act in not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”[3]

“Since our moral duties are grounded in the divine commands, they are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since he does not issue commands to himself.

If God does not fulfill moral duties then what content can be given to the claim he is good? Here Kant’s distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule has proved helpful. God may act naturally in ways which for us would be rule following and so constitutive of goodness in the sense of fulfilling our moral duties, so that God can be said similarly to be good in an analogical way….God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of his own character.” [4]

             
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
Instead of rehearsing the, already mentioned, alternative to causal determinism in favor of compatibilism, I'd like to focus on Craig's offered alternative. He would say libertarian freedom is the only view that rightly upholds human freedom. On such view a subject is free if the subject makes a choice without any sufficient or necessary causal conditions. Any given person, with the options of X or Y, to be free should have the ability to choose between the two (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices). But how is such a view any more plausible? Given the fact that a person can choose between X or Y (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices) amounts to the person being indifferent. Why then should an indifferent person chose one thing over another? I think Craig wants to say, simply because the agent reasoned to will one choice over another. It seems to me, then, this freedom of indifference make a person's choice utterly arbitrary. Reason being that any given reason why a person should choose X, an identical reason can be given to choose Y. [5]

5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience are illusory. 

Quite the contrary, if analogical determinism is true. But for the sake of argument, even if causal determinism is true,  it would not entail human experience is illusory given the fact that on such a view there really is secondary causes. And therefore, people are not rightly construed as puppets in the hands of God; instead they're agents that possess knowledge, volition, purpose, and deliberation. 

[1] Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303.
[2]Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269.
[3]Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.
[4]Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview.Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
[5] I take this point from the insights of Bruce Ware, John Frame, and Ronald Nash. 

Evaluation of William Lane Craig's Model

              Evaluation of William Lane Craig’s Model Of Divine Eternity

In the essay “Timelessness and Omnitemporality,” William Lane Craig argues God’s relation to time is best understood as “timeless” sans creation and “temporal” subsequent to creation. God exists without time, but chooses to create time, space, and matter; and at that moment, he exists in time. Thus we can summarize Craig’s thesis in the form of two propositions: (1) God is timeless without creation; (2) God is temporal with creation. What follows from these propositions is that God is not essentially timeless, but is contingently timeless. Hence, for Craig, timelessness is not an essential property of God qua God. Craig admits he espouses an A-theory[1] of time that the past, present, and future are metaphysically distinct. The past goes out of existence, the present exists, and the future yet exists. Craig is happy to affirm presentism. He believes the only events of time that metaphysically exist, are those in the present. So there can be no parts or events of time, except those in the present. Craig develops his thesis by surveying many arguments. I want to note only a few of his main arguments for (2), and argue they are inconclusive.

Craig’s strongest argument in favor of (2) is from “divine relations with the world;” it is one that many can understand without an extensive background in philosophy. Craig thinks God must be affected by the temporal world in which he creates. God cannot create a changing world without also exhibiting changes[2] himself and thereby being temporal. Craig argues if God creates a temporal world, he gains a new relation with it. An example would be helpful at this point. Imagine a person in an empty room. Suppose the person is alone but brings a plant into the room. The person gains a new relation with the plant. The person changes from a state of solitude to a state of relationship with the plant. As the plant changes so does the person’s relation. If the plant is two inches one week, and grows an inch the next week, the person’s relation to the plant changes (i.e. a relation with a two-inch plant becomes a relation with a three-inch plant). This example highlights an extrinsic change. At minimum, Craig argues, God undergoes an extrinsic change from a state of existing alone to co-existing with creation. Craig sees this as a change of real relations. God chooses to possess a real relation with the world he did not have sans creation. Craig takes this as evidence that God is temporal subsequent to creation. Craig writes, “ Thus even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to his creation of the world, he undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws him into time in virtue of his real relation to the world.”[3] Craig summarizes his argument as follows:

1. God is creatively active in the temporal world.

2. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, God is really related to the temporal world.

3. If God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal.

4. Therefore, God is temporal.[4]

Craig’s argument looks promising, but is it implausible to think that a timeless God can create a temporal world without extrinsic change? Given Craig’s commitment to an A-theory of time, I think Craig should make the stronger claim that it is logically impossible.  Since in all possible worlds [5] in which God creates W, God gains a new relation to W.[6] But if this is true, then any possible world God creates, an extrinsic change obtains. In effect, God cannot create any state of affairs without ceasing to be timeless. But cannot W be substituted for contingent things that are not temporal? Craig grants this possibility but finds it implausible. Creation would not be a temporal event but eternal. Such a view assumes the B-theory of time that the passage of time—things going in and out of existence—is exclusively a feature of the human mind. The events of the past, present, and future equally exist, and the division of time as past, present, and future is merely an epistemic than ontic distinction. Thus creation would only exist if and only if God eternally creates it. But Craig dispels this view on the grounds it denies a robust doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Furthermore, Craig deduces if such a view were true, then there would be no possible world in which God could exist without creation. But such a modal notion is unacceptable for robust doctrines, of God and creation, faithful to the Biblical data.[7] Therefore, Craig concludes, we have good reason to believe the event of creation was temporal. God, by virtue of creation, gains a new relation that entails entrance into time.        

              

Craig argues, further, that God must undergo an internal change whereby his knowledge of the temporal world changes. This is in virtue of what Craig describes as “tensed facts.” Craig understands facts [8] refer to all details or bits of information about the world that can be expressed in a true declarative sentence.[9] And tense, like in language, locates things in relation to the present. Craig distinguishes between tense and tenseless facts expressed in sentences.  For instance, “all bachelors are unmarried males,” and “ In 2012 the United States reelects Barrack Obama President.”[10] Both sentences express tenseless truths. Dates can be included in sentences to express and locate tenseless truths in time. The latter example with a year and tenseless verb targets this fact (of Obama’s reelection) tenselessly in time. Nevertheless, given this truth, we cannot know when Obama’s reelection as President took place without knowledge of 2012 being past or future. Now suppose we change the verb from tenseless to tensed by replacing the word ‘reelects’ with ‘reelected.’ By replacing the verb to ‘reelected’ we know the event has occurred, but prior to 2012 the tensed fact of Obama’s reelection as President is false. In order for the sentence to remain true, it must be future-tensed such as “will reelect.” Craig concludes that tensed sentences, unlike tenseless sentences with a fixed truth-value, change in truth-value relative to the present. Now let us apply Craig’s thesis about tensed facts to God’s knowledge. In order for God to know the changes of time God’s knowledge must change. For example it was 11:22pm, but now it’s 11:23pm. Such tensed facts go in and out of existence from true to false. God must know these facts with omniscience. Yet facts cannot be both true and false at the same time and sense. Logic prohibits this. So God being omniscient must know when tensed facts change from true to false. However one must be in time to know when any tensed fact is true or false. Therefore, God must be temporal. Craig formulates this argument from tensed facts for divine temporality:

1. A temporal world exists.

2. God is omniscient.

3. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows tensed facts.

4. If God is timeless, he does not know tensed facts.

5. Therefore, God is not timeless.

Evaluation

Craig is not forthcoming about the concept of a real relation. Craig gets this concept from Thomas Aquinas[11] without any alternatives to it. Craig’s argument from divine relations may be sufficient in defense of (1) and (2) but not enough to ground them as necessary. I can propose an alternative model that can account for Craig’s argument without kenoticizing timelessness. This would make Craig’s argument inconclusive. Suppose God is essentially timeless; and he eternally decrees his essential timeless nature be united with a contingent temporal nature. With the two natures, God would be both timeless in one sense and temporal in another. God would take part in both a timeless and temporal existence. God would think all truths at once timelessly; and he would also in his temporal existence think all truths temporally in successive moments. If such a view is coherent, I think it can account for Craig’s argument, and show it inconclusive.             

Craig’s argument from tensed facts can be recast, if we take time, as an experience. The argument is, roughly, if God does not have experiences of time, and humans have experiences of time, then God cannot know the experiences humans have of time. But God is omniscient, and thus knows the experiences humans have of time; therefore, God knows experiences of time and must be temporal. This, indeed, is an oversimplification, but it captures what is prevalent in Craig’s argument. Only those in time can know things in time. But this suffers the same problems as empiricism.  The problem is aptly expressed by the saying, “a person can know poison kills without swallowing it.” A person can know an item of knowledge without acquiring it. It is plausible that God can know tensed facts in virtue of divine omniscience and providence. This would require no acquisition of knowledge on God’s part. Craig rightly states tensed facts can change from being true to false or vice versa at any given moment. But it is possible that God is the one directing these changes by a timeless decree. Perhaps God is revealing and/or filling in the details of every event in time by timeless providence. If this were the case, then God would know tensed facts. Obviously this reply is unacceptable to Craig given his prior commitments to the A-theory of time. But cannot the same thing be said with the A-theory of time? In my judgment, it is possible.[12] Suppose God by an eternal decree creates the world. Granted that creation is a temporal event. Included in this decree are all the events that are to occur in time and the duration of their existence. With the assumption of presentism, it’s plausible to imagine God eternally sustains and directs only the present. God eternally creates and sustains a timeline of events, and the only events that God continually sustains are those presently occurring. As God ceases to sustain an event by eternal decree, it makes the event a past event. The passage of time would be real since God by eternal decree makes past events cease to exist. Such a model plausibly fits with the A-theory of time without abdicating God of timelessness. But Craig’s argument by tensed facts becomes inconsistent.  He simply asserts[13] God must know future contingent propositions[14] in virtue of omniscience.[15]Yet Craig will not apply the same reasoning to God knowing tensed facts. Craig argues that, “As a perfect being, the greatest conceivable being, God simply possesses essentially knowledge of only and all truths; future contingent propositions [i.e. truths about the future] are among the truths that there are; therefore God possesses essential knowledge of future contingents.”[16] But why not understand this argument to include knowledge of tensed facts? Craig’s argument here does not preclude God from having knowledge of tensed facts by omniscience. Craig to be consistent must admit God knows both future and tensed facts in virtue of omniscience or run the risk of a double standard. Craig’s analysis of divine omniscience seems quite arbitrary, since he picks and chooses what should be included within the scope of God’s knowledge. He affirms God knows future facts without a metaphysical ground (of how precisely God can know them);[17] yet he denies God can know tensed facts without the metaphysical ground of temporality.    

Craig divides God’s knowledge into three logical moments. God possess natural knowledge of all facts that could exist for any given possible world. Since God freely created the actual world, he enjoys free-knowledge of all the facts that will obtain in the actual world. Craig contends God has middle knowledge, and thus knows if the arrangement of facts that comprise any given possible world were different, God would know what would be the arrangement or outcome of facts. Craig believes God has knowledge of counterfactuals [18] prior to creation; [19] and God uses this knowledge to create the world. Craig asserts counterfactuals gain their truth-values from the facts that make up a given possible world.[20] If this is the case, I see no reason why temporal relation of facts should not be included in the make up of a given possible world as one property that determines the truth-value of counterfactuals. Craig’s argument, although long, is as follows:

1.If there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then God knows these truths.

2.There are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

3.If God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God knows them either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.

4.Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be known only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.

5. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

6. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.

7. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to the divine creative decree.[21]

Does this argument entail that God would know tensed facts (about free creatures) in all possible temporal worlds[22]even if such worlds were not actualized? It seems plausibly! If so, then Craig admits a timeless God can know tensed facts since Craig believes God is timeless prior to creation. On the other hand, if Craig says God does not know all tensed facts of all possible temporal worlds then God does not know all counterfactuals prior to the creative decree. If this is true, Craig’s argument fails to prove God knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Likewise, if Craig denies God knows tensed facts of all possible temporal worlds prior to creation, he undercuts God’s omniscience.

Conclusion

Craig’s arguments from “divine relations of the world” and tensed facts are inconclusive to demonstrate God is (1) timeless without creation and (2) temporal subsequent to creation. Craig’s arguments for (2) fail to meet both sufficient and necessary conditions to ground them true. Craig is inconsistent to hold that God knows future contingent propositions without a metaphysical ground of how precisely God can know them in virtue of omniscience; and yet he argues, God cannot know tensed facts unless we metaphysically ground this knowledge in God being temporal and omniscient. Craig’s inconsistency reveals arbitrariness on how Craig chooses what should be included in God’s knowledge. The most devastating critique, assuming Craig's model, is if God must be temporal to know tensed facts, then God cannot know tensed facts of any temporal possible world (logically) prior to creation given (1). Craig’s argument from tensed facts in support of (2) undermines omniscience and middle knowledge from (1). In effect, by Craig defending (2), he must deny (1).    

Construction

If, as Craig argues, God is timeless sans creation and temporal with creation how precisely can God be temporal? Did He already possess the properties necessary to be temporal prior to creation? What are those properties? How are we to understand God as temporal and yet immutable (without falling into a minimalist position)? Did God in His essential nature change with creation? Why not postulate a model similar to the incarnation with Christ’s hypostatic union? Is it logically possible that God has two eternal natures one essential the other contingent? If such a model were even logically possible then wouldn’t it affirm both God is timeless (in one nature) and temporal (in another)? What would such a model look like? God would have two natures, much like the incarnation, in which God would exist qua God, with all the properties of both natures attributed to the three persons without confusing the two natures. But what would these natures and properties be?  The first nature, that is uncontroversial, would be the traditional understanding of God’s essence with all the properties that should properly be attributed to God (which would include timelessness). The second nature, somewhat controversial, would be in some sense spatial and therefore temporal. The nature need not be thought of as physical. It could be similar to that of angelic beings that are incorporeal, spatial, and temporal.               

---

[1] Craig uses the terms ‘dynamic’ theory or ‘A’ theory to refer to his view of time.    

[2] The change might be construed as a mere Cambridge change. See Richard Swinburne. The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: U. P. Oxford, 1977), 212-213. 

[3] William Lane Craig.“Timelessness and Omnitemporality.” God and Time: Four Views. Ed. Gregory E. Ganssle. (Downers Grove: IV Press, 2001), 141.

[4] Ibid.,p.141.

[5] Possible worlds, for those not trained in Philosophy, refer to the different ways God could have created the world.

[6] The same can be said of contingent things. If God creates a contingent thing W in any possible world, then he gains a new relation to W in any possible world; a relation he did not possess (logically) prior to creation of W.      

[7] Ibid.,pp. 65-66. I think Craig would also say such a view is an attack on the self-sufficiency and aseity of God. See J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003), 504-505. 

[8] Craig explains factual content and propositional content are identical. Ibid.,p.145.

[9] .” Ibid.,p. 145. Craig defines a fact as “the state of affairs described by a true declarative sentence.” But in other writings Craig defines a proposition in terms of information content expressed in a declarative sentence. See William Lane Craig, What Does God Know? Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002),19-20. See also J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003)136-137. 

[10] My example of Obama is inspired by Craig’s example of Kennedy; however, the examples are different in content. Craig’s example refers to the pledge given by Kennedy; my example refers to the reelection of Obama. Ibid.,p.145.

[11] Paul Helm. “Divine Timeless Eternity.” God and Time: Four Views. Ed. Gregory E. Ganssle. (Downers Grove: IV Press, 2001),47-48.

[12] Leibniz would be an interesting case example. I think a person that espoused a process theory of time and accepted Leibniz’s metaphysical doctrines--pre-established harmony and notions--could argue God must know tensed facts without being temporal. It would be based on a strong view of divine providence.   

[13] See William Lane Craig. What Does God Know? Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002),40-41. Also The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 123.

[14] Future contingent propositions are true facts about the future.

[15] Paul Kjoss Helseth draws the same conclusion in his response to Craig’s essay. In Four Views of Divine Providence. Ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Dennis W. Jowers. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011),104.

[16] Craig, William Lane. What Does God Know? Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002), 40.

[17] I assume here there are counterfactuals prevolitional to God’s decree simply to make the argument against Craig. But I think counterfactuals are grounded in God’s natural knowledge and therefore, do not exist apart from God.   

[18] Ibid.,p.41. Counterfactuals are conditional statements in the subjective mood. For example, if Judas were offered 30 pieces of silver then he would betray Jesus. They are “if-then” statements.

[19] Ibid., pp.43-45. This is called middle knowledge or hypothetical knowledge. It is the idea that God not only knows what could happen or what will happen, but he also knows what would happen under any given circumstances.

[20] Ibid., p.56. Here Craig replies to the grounding objection against middle knowledge. By Craig’s reply I cannot help but think how Craig can consistently be a molinist and nominalist. Craig grants God universal knowledge prior to creation without concrete objects. Given Craig’s molinism, he ought to side with a version of theistic conceptual.

[21] Ibid.,p.51-52.

[22] e.g. In W1, if Judas is offered 30 pieces of silver at T1, then he will betray Jesus.

Calvinism and Molinism

 Greg Koukl gives a great explanation on why Christians ought not to take up middle knowledge as articulated by William Lane Craig.

Original Sin, and Middle Knowledge

My email to Dr. Bruce Ware:

Dr. Ware,

 

I have been listening diligently to your lectures on Systematic Theology through podcasts, so I do not have the luxury of interacting in the classroom. I have a few questions that I hope you might be able to shed some light on. First, concerning the origin of sin, how was it that Lucifer a creature with a good will was able to sin? Lucifer could not have had a libertarian free will for that would mean his choice was arbitrary. The account in Scripture implies he had a desire to be autonomous or as you have said independent. He wanted to be his own god. Where could this desire in Lucifer arise from in a creature that was good? I am truly struggling with this because I cannot consider any creature having a libertarian freewill.

 

Let me give you my account, for you to judge if it is misguided. Lucifer was a creature that was created good. This can only be the case because God is by nature God, therefore, all of his creation was good. God who is the only perfect being, independent, self-sufficient, and impeccable (by necessity of his nature) created creatures to glorify Himself. His creatures like Lucifer were good (this would seem to imply impeccable), but they were not perfect, independent, or self-sufficient. His creatures where created to be completely dependent upon Him. Thus in some sense God's creatures where deficient needing God for all things. They were and are, completely dependent upon Him. From a human perspective the deficiency in the creatures made it possible for sin to come into existence. Sin originated in the good will of Lucifer who choose the lesser good instead of the Ultimate Good. He choose to love himself, which is a good thing (self-love) more than God, which is sinful. Lucifer asserted his love for himself more than God thereby creating / authoring sin. This account would still be compatabilistic. Lucifer acted according to his nature even when he chose to sin. 

 

Concerning Middle Knowledge does it not reduce to entrapment? For if God knows what creatures would do in any given circumstances with their compabilistic wills, and puts them in certain circumstances to act; does not this entail entrapment?    

 

To my final question what is sin or more specifically what is our sinful nature? Sin cannot be physical for the fallen angels would have a sinful nature, so what is it? I know it is a ruling principle Romans 6 makes it really clear, but how is it that one can have a sinful nature? I agree with the Traducian tradition, so it comes through heredity by Adam, but what is it? Is it that our souls are sinful and our bodies are simply instruments? This cannot practically be the case because when a person is regenerated he or she does not get a new soul, nor is the noetic effects of sin removed.

 

Jonathan Edwards seems to be the only one I found that has attempted to give an explanation. To sumerize Edwards. Within man God originally created two principles: the inferior, and the superior. The inferior principle which can be called the natural principle dealt with self-love, appetites, and self-preservation. The superior or Supernatural principle was the grace of God supplying man with the ability to communicate and love God which comprised true happiness for man. However, after the fall the supernatural principle was gone because God by His holiness could not continue to dwell in man. God withdrew himself from man because of sin this resulted in the inferior principle replacing the superior principle making man’s focus himself. This is like a candle that lights a room when it is removed it becomes dark. This is what happened to the heart of man it became darkened. From Edwards I conclude that at regeneration God does not reconstitute the Supernatural principle as originally, but instead bestows man with His grace and Holy Spirit. It is as if God brings light into the darkened hearts of the unregenerate making them new creations with new desires to serve Him. However, man still posses a slavish mentality to serve sin, and still contains some sort of desire for sin after regeneration.        

 

Jonathan Edwards explains:

 

"There was an inferior kind, which may be called NATURAL, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor, and pleasure, were exercised: these, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call FLESH. Besides these, there were superior principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man’s righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called SUPERNATURAL being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from and inseparably connected with, mere human nature; and being such as immediately depend on man’s union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God’s Spirit: which though withdrawn, and man’s nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still; man’s nature, as such, being entire without these divine principles, which the Scripture sometimes calls SPIRIT, in contradistinction to flesh. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect state. These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man’s nature. When man sinned and broke God’s covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the constitution God had established, that he should still maintain communion with man, and continue by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God’s wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption, and ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love, and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, of course became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of God. These inferior principles are like fire in a house; which, we say, is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man’s love to his own honor, separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects, without regard to God’s honor, or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when against God’s honor and law, as when agreeable to them. God still continuing strictly to require supreme regard to himself, and forbidding all undue gratifications of these inferior passions — but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and agreeableness to the rules and limits, which his holiness, honor, and law prescribe — hence immediately arises enmity in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but war ensues, in a constant course, against God, As, when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to show, how every lust, and depraved disposition of man’s heart, would naturally arise from this private original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on man’s eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, without God putting any evil into his heart, or implanting any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt taint, and so becoming the author of depravity. Only God’s withdrawing, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel-man, and his natural principles being left to themselves, is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God."

 

The things of God outside of Scripture are some what speculative if not mysterious, but to be a good student I feel I need to connect the dots as Theologian and Apologist.

 

I hope this is not an annoyance.

 

In Christ,

 

Ryan Dozier

 

 

Dr. Ware's reply: 

 

Ryan:

 

As you know, email is not the best format for such complex questions.  Please understand that I must be brief – MUCH briefer than these deserve.

 

1. You are on track, as I also see things.  Lucifer had “freedom of inclination” (as we all do) and hence he always did what he most wanted.  I think Gen 3:1-7 is instructive, since it shows how free agents can be influenced to have their inclinations changed and so want, for the first time, as their strongest inclinations, to go against God.  Something like this happened to Lucifer who perhaps contemplated some portion of the vast created order that was NOT his, and he began to wonder why he should not have it – after all, he was so magnificent, why should it not be his?  So, the same kind of mental transformation occurred in Lucifer as happened with the woman in Gen 3 (see esp. v.6), but it took place in his own mind w/o external temptation occasioning it.    Your point about his dependency fits in here, since he was finite, created, and hence did not have everything (in contrast to God).  Well, so freedom of inclination works to provide a plausible explanation.

 

2. No, it is not entrapment so long as the free agent does exactly what he most wants.  The ordering of circumstances provides the occasion for the action, but it does not coerce or constrain the action. 

 

3. The sinfulness that continues to mark (and mar) our new natures in Christ is the inner “drive” or “impulse” or “urge” to strike out in independence from God (which sin’s deepest urge is where ever it shows up).  God chooses not to end this “urge for independence” w/in a believer, though he could!  (Consider 1 Jn 3:1-2 – in a moment, it will be ended!!!).  So, why not?  I think because he wants us to learn more of the horrors of sin, and our need for grace (there is much in this answer that I can’t unpack).

 

Hope these brief responses help some. 

 

Blessings in Christ,

 

Bruce Ware