Atheism (Without the Thing in Itself)

Benjamin Watkins on an episode of the Semper Reformanda Podcast argues metaphysical naturalism is more probable than not from scientific 'facts'. He takes the latent assumption in the scientific method, namely methodological naturalism, as evidence for metaphysical naturalism.  Benjamin formulates his argument inductively with probability theory. His argument can be construed in terms of abduction or Bayesian probabilistic confirmation theory. For example,

If observations O then the best explanation of O is theory T. 

The internal critique of Ben's worldview offered by Tim, Carlos, Owen and Luke surrounded Ben's epistemology as to justify metaphysical naturalism. The intractable problems identified were as follows:

(1) Ben's empiricism, explicitly or implicitly, commits the logical fallacy affirming the consequent. Moreover, Benjamin failed to explain precisely the conditions in which beliefs are acquired. If he affirms some form of representational realism and/or correspondence theory of truth then there is no independent criteria to confirm any given mental image or belief, in fact, matches with the truth of reality.  Of course, then on such an account the problem of Kant's ding an sich (i.e. thing in itself) surfaces itself (there is irony here). A view with all the room needed for skepticism. Perhaps, better put, it has all the necessary ingredients of skepticism. 

The problem of induction (deriving a universal from particular examples) was discussed as a decisive feature of any given empirical theory yet Benjamin felt his view was exempt from the problem. He merely asserted induction as a properly basic belief without an account of epistemic justification. Hence, at which point, any belief can simply be asserted as properly basic (e.g. http://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-con/#H4). Still, probability assumes induction. Likewise, probability is predicated on limited, background-relative, data. Such that new data can always skew the results of old data. Thus  limited data can revise any given theory by new data. Therefore, any theory dependent upon probability is subject to whole sale revision. Not much security in probability.

(2) Benjamin asserts his particular epistemic theory is self-justifying. That's fine as far as the claim goes. Nevertheless, Benjamin's rationalism, explicitly or implicitly, collapses to either fideism or skepticism (unless, of course, he can show otherwise).   Ben attempts, I think unsuccessfully, to evade fideism or skepticism with some form of non-inferential epistemic internalism (e.g. Phenomenological conservativism). But since no criteria of conditions are provided to prefer one particular epistemic theory over another then the selection of any given epistemic theory (including Benjamin's theory) becomes viciously circular (e.g. Armstrong). Benjamin argues if a proposition appears to be true then that is a prima facie reason to believe it is true in the absence of any defeaters. Again, Kant's phenomenal and nomenal world comes back full force with such a view. On such grounds, it seems, we have a prima facie reason to reject Benjamin's epistemic theory, since it appears to be false, in the absence of any evidence to warrant his theory. . However, Benjamin may be able to provide a criteria of conditions to evaluate the virtues of any given epistemic theory and assess what qualifies as a properly basic belief.  In which case, Ben would need to show his particular epistemic theory meets the conditions provided (for the truth of any given epistemic theory to render it self-justifying and/or is properly basic) and tease out the philosophical tensions or apparent contradictions between his empiricism, rationalism and Platonism.  Further, Ben's epistemic theory prompts more questions: (i) how does Benjamin know reason, in general, or the laws of logic, in particular, aim at truth? (ii) how does he know beliefs aim at truth? (iii) how does Ben know the nature and limits of reason and/or truth? Ben asserts platonic realism as to abstract objects; yet how does abstract objects enforce or impose themselves on particulars?

(3) The discussion on ethics was intriguing. Benjamin affirms moral realism and not moral nihilism. But Benjamin's version of moral realism suffers the same problems as metaphysical Platonism. How does a particular person possess universal moral values and duties? How do these universal moral values and duties interact/relate with particular persons? What is a universal moral law without a moral lawgiver? How does Benjamin's view avoid the naturalistic fallacy (e.g. GE Moore)? 

David Robertson v. Matt Dillahunty

Here are my thoughts on the Unbelievable Podcast debate. The first debate centered on Robertson’s articulation of the traditional proofs for God’s existence, namely the cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument, and argument from religious experience.

Dillahunty attacked Robinson’s formulation of the teleological argument on the basis that it’s viciously circular. He objected that the argument builds its premises on the assumption God designed, and fine-tuned the universe then uses empirical data to extrapolate order and design to the conclusion of God. Dillahunty asserted that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact.

 Robertson presented a type of Leibnizian cosmological argument. But Dillahunty claimed it was an argument from ignorance. Since, he thinks, there can be vital undiscovered information that would naturalistically explain the origin of the universe. So according to Dillahunty one is too rash to logically take a stand, on the origin of the universe, where science is still advancing. Therefore, Dillahunty commends the listeners to suspend judgment until all the relevant data can be assessed.

Robertson used the Nazi concentration camps as an instance of moral evil that presupposes an objective moral standard. Dillahunty simply asserted morality is based on nonmaleficence or beneficence. However, he goes on to say it is situational.

First, the teleological argument is not viciously circular. Since it presupposes what science depends on—the order, and design for any continuity of human experience in the past, present, and future. Second Dillahunty’s criterion of facts is self-refuting. His criterion states that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact. This criterion would also apply to itself. But what can it contrast with to prove it a fact? As I see it Dillahunty’s criterion of facts cannot stand against its own tests. Moreover such a criterion assumes knowledge possible given Dillahunty's viewpoint. Yet this begs the question. Furthermore, the same problems with correspondence and coherence theories of truth can be applied to Dillahunty's view of facts.  Third to criticize an argument on the basis of it being predicated on ignorance assumes there is knowledge, or alternative positions, which an argument overlooks. But if neither knowledge or alternative positions can be provided the criticism is groundless. If anything such an accusation appeals to the mere possibility of further knowledge or alternative positions but no actual knowledge or alternative positions. Therefore such a critcism should be regarded as a desperate attempt to revive a failed position, only to be left in resounding defeat.

How can one know what is relevant data and what is not? Especially considering Thomas Kuhn’s insights on theory ladenness?  When someone suspends judgment is not one making a judgment against those positions that require belief? Put in another way, if one suspends judgment on a viewpoint that claims it is always wrong to suspend judgment, is not one already judged the viewpoint in advance to be wrong?

If morality is based on the well-being of others, who or what defines what is ‘well’? In any case, regardless of how humanity “is,” what is it that determines how humanity “ought” to be?  How is it humans are morally equal? I think Dillahunty’s position reduces to relativism, ethical subjectivism, or moral nihilism.      

          

Atheism, Unicorns, Santa, and Pixies

Preliminary Remarks

I listened to the Unbelievable? Podcast this week; and to my surprise the atheist guest claimed the status of belief in God is equal to belief in unicorns (or Santa, and Pixies). 

Presuppositions

What are we to reply to atheists with such a claim? First, any reasonable atheist would not conclude belief in God is the same as the belief in unicorns. Since such a claim entails the absurd conclusion that the most brilliant Christian philosophers (e.g. Alvin Plantinga) are deluded. Second, for an atheist to claim that two beliefs are equal requires justification. Anything short of justification for a claim is mere arbitrariness. Third, why think belief in God is like the belief in unicorns? Why not think of belief in God is like belief in other minds, the law of contradiction, or the external world? 

In fact, to the Christian, belief in God presupposes the creator/creature distinction. God is necessarily: triune, infinite, perfect, omnipotent, omnicient, and omnibenevolent. God created man in His image to be personal, relational, rational, moral, and administerial. Thus man is contingent, finite, limited and dependent upon God for everything. God extends some of His attributes to man. In such a way that God is necessary for knowledge, truth, goodness, and beauty. In other words, man must presuppose God (and borrow from Christianity) to make sense of knowledge, truth, goodness, and beauty.

  

What is Atheism I

A great introduction to the particulars of Atheism. Very informative given the nature of the presentation by a genuine atheist.

Objections to the Kalam argument

What is the Kalam argument?

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.


What are some common objections to the Kalam argument?



Are these objections intractable? 

1. Something can come from nothing. 


Dr. Craig writes,

"Sometimes it is said that quantum physics furnishes an exception to premise (1), since on the sub-atomic level events are said to be uncaused. In the same way, certain theories of cosmic origins are interpreted as showing that the whole universe could have sprung into being out of the sub-atomic vacuum or even out of nothingness. Thus the universe is said to be the proverbial “free lunch.” This objection, however, is based on misunderstandings. In the first place, not all scientists agree that sub-atomic events are uncaused. A great many physicists today are quite dissatisfied with this view (the so-called Copenhagen Interpreta- tion) of quantum physics and are exploring deterministic theories like that of David Bohm. Thus, quantum physics is not a proven exception to premise (1).36 Second, even on the traditional, indeterministic interpretation, particles do not come into being out of nothing. They arise as spontaneous fluctuations of the energy contained in the sub-atomic vacuum, which constitutes an indeterministiccause of their origination. Third, the same point can be made about theories of the origin of the universe out of a primordial vacuum. Popular magazine articles tout- ing such theories as getting “something from nothing” simply do not understand that the vacuum is not nothing but is a sea of fluctuating energy endowed with a rich structure and subject to physical laws. Such models do not therefore involve a true origination ex nihilo. [1] 

"Sometimes skeptics will respond to this point [premise 1] by saying that in physics
subatomic particles (so-called “virtual particles”) come into being from
nothing. Or certain theories of the origin of the universe are sometimes
described in popular magazines as getting something from nothing, so that
the universe is the exception to the proverb “There ain’t no free lunch.” 

This skeptical response represents a deliberate abuse of science. The theories in question have to do with particles originating as a fluctuation of the energy contained in the vacuum. The vacuum in modern physics is not what the layman understands by “vacuum,” namely, nothing. Rather in physics the vacuum is a sea of fluctuating energy governed by physical laws and having a physical structure. To tell laymen that on such theories something comes from nothing is a distortion of those theories.                                                                                                                                        

Properly understood, “nothing” does not mean just empty space. Nothing is the absence of anything whatsoever, even space itself. As such, nothingness has literally no properties at all, since there isn’t anything to have any properties! How silly, then, when popularizers say things like “Nothingness is unstable” or “The universe tunneled into being out of nothing”![2]

2. The argument does not entail the cause must be omnipotent, omniscient, and good. 
This is true and that is why Craig doesn't conclude the cause must be omnipotent, omniscient and good. Craig would say this is why further arguments must be given, like the modal ontological argument,  moral argument, or the resurrection of Jesus, to show the cause must be omnipotent, omniscient, and good found in the person of Jesus Christ. Moreover, to argue some minds are dependent on brains to think does not entail all minds are dependent upon brains to think.  

3. If an actual infinite cannot exist then an infinite God cannot.

Dr. Craig writes,

"Rather the key to your question is to understand that the mathematical notion of an actual infinite is a quantitative concept. It concerns a collection of definite and discrete elements that are members of the collection. But when theologians speak of the infinity of God, they are not using the word in a mathematical sense to refer to an aggregate of an infinite number of elements. God's infinity is, as it were, qualitative, not quantitative. It means that God is metaphysically necessary, morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and so on.

Really "infinity" is just a sort of umbrella term used to cover all of God's superlative attributes. If you abstract away all of those attributes, there really isn't any distinct attribute called "infinity" left over. But none of those attributes need involve an infinite number of things. To take ...[an] example..., omniscience need not entail knowing an infinite number of, say, propositions, much less having an infinite number of thoughts; nor need we think of omnipotence as entailing the ability to do an infinite number of actions.1 When we define omniscience as knowledge of only and all true propositions, we are expressing the extent of God's knowledge, not its mode. The mode of God's knowledge has traditionally been taken to be non-propositional in nature. God has a single undivided intuition of reality, which we finite knowers break up into individual bits of information called propositions. Thus, the number of propositions is at best potentially infinite. Similarly, omnipotence is not defined in terms of quanta of power possessed by God or number of actions God can perform but in terms of His ability to actualize states of affairs. As such it involves no commitment to an actual infinity of things. Therefore, there's no reason to think that God is susceptible to the sort of quantitative analysis imagined by the objection.

Thus, denying that God is actually infinite in the quantitative sense in no way implies that God is finite. This inference does not follow, since the quantitative sense of infinity may be simply inapplicable to God."[3]

4. William Lane Craig is presupposing Christianity.

Of course Dr. Craig presupposes Christianity, just as much as naturalists presuppose naturalism. No one comes to the evidence in a neutral way. Neutrality is a myth, and this is why Craig must be more upfront to this fact. But to criticize Craig for doing the very thing the naturalist is doing is hypocritical. It is a double standard at its best!  




---------------------------------------------
[1] Dr. William Lane Craig. Reasonable Faith (Wheaton: Crossway, 2008).p.p.114-115
[2] Dr. William Lane Craig. On Gurad (Colorado Springs: David C Cook, 2010)p.76.
[3] Dr. William Lane Craig. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-god-actually-infinite#ixzz2oKhGKuOS 

Carrier and the Universe

Dr. Carrier writes (taken from his site here):

(1) • What caused the universe to exist?

Fallacy of loaded question. It is not established that the universe began, and thus had a cause at all.

Our universe began (at the Big Bang) but we have no way of knowing anymore what if anything preceded that event. And as for what caused our one specific universe, we already know the answer to that: the Big Bang did (an event and process that completely eluded all divine Christian revelation for two thousand years, as well as all divine Muslim and Jewish revelation throughout the whole of their existence). As to what caused the Big Bang, we have many viable theories (from Hawking’s The Grand Design to Krauss’ A Universe from Nothing to Vilenkin’s Many Worlds in One, all of which predict and explain numerous strange and often specific features of the universe that no theology has ever been able to deduce from the hypothesis that God did it). As far as figuring out which one is right, cosmological scientists are working on it. They’ve made tremendous progress. Theology has made none.

If we revise the question to ask something more abstract like “Why does the universe exist?” (thus admitting that maybe it has always existed in some form, and thus was never ultimately “caused,” but asking instead “why” it exists instead of something else, or nothing at all), then the answer is the same as why a god is supposed to exist. (He just does? Then the universe just does. He exists necessarily? Then a universe exists necessarily. We can play this game forever.) If we revise the question into something conditional like, “If all existence itself began, then what caused it?,” then the answer is any of dozens of possible things, all of which have a vastly lower specified complexity than a complex intelligent mind and therefore have a far greater prior probability (see The God Impossible)–and by explaining observed evidence better, they also have a far greater posterior probability as well. This follows from the argument from scale, including the mind-boggling scale of this universe’s lethality and inhospitability to life (indeed the universe is far better designed to generate black holes than life).

I discuss all these facts throughout my entries in the Carrier-Wanchick Debate. I have more recently described ten possible causal or explanatory theories of why an orderly universe exists in previous comments on my blog (and we needn’t know which are true to know they are all simpler theories, and often based in more background evidence, than any god hypothesis). I more formally outline why the evidence (the nature of the universe we find ourselves in) is far more likely on any such godless hypothesis than on any rational form of theism in my chapter “Neither Life Nor the Universe Appear Intelligently Designed” in The End of Christianity (pp. 279-304). I’ll quote one key section of that to give you an idea of what I mean:

[T]his universe is 99.99999 percent composed of lethal radiation-filled vacuum, and 99.99999 percent of all the material in the universe comprises stars and black holes on which nothing can ever live, and 99.99999 percent of all other material in the universe (all planets, moons, clouds, asteroids) is barren of life or even outright inhospitable to life. In other words, the universe we observe is extraordinarily inhospitable to life. Even what tiny inconsequential bits of it are at all hospitable are extremely inefficient at producing life—at all, but far more so intelligent life …. One way or another, a universe perfectly designed for life would easily, readily, and abundantly produce and sustain life. Most of the contents of that universe would be conducive to life or benefit life. Yet that’s not what we see. Instead, almost the entire universe is lethal to life—in fact, if we put all the lethal vacuum of outer space swamped with deadly radiation into an area the size of a house, you would never find the comparably microscopic speck of area that sustains life (it would literally be smaller than a single proton). It’s exceedingly difficult to imagine a universe less conducive to life than that—indeed, that’s about as close to being completely incapable of producing life as any random universe can be expected to be, other than of course being completely incapable of producing life. (pp. 295-96)

And yet…

That is exactly what we would have to see if life arose by accident. Because life can arise by accident only in a universe that large and old. The fact that we observe exactly what the theory of accidental origin requires and predicts is evidence that our theory is correct. (p. 290)

Because without a God, life can only exist by chemical accident, such a chemical accident will be exceedingly rare, and exceedingly rare things only commonly happen in vast universes where countless tries are made over vast spans of time. Likewise, a universe not designed for us will not look well suited to us but be almost entirely unsuited to us and we will survive only in a few tiny chance pockets of survivable space in it. Atheism thus predicts, with near 100% certainly, several bizarre features of the universe (it’s vast size and age and lethality to life), whereas we cannot deduce any of those features from any non-gerrymandered God hypothesis (while gerrymandered hypotheses all grossly violate Occam’s Razor).

My Reply

            Dr. Carrier is quite mistaken to say, “Our universe began (at the Big Bang) but we have no way of knowing anymore what if anything preceded that event” since he would have to know the limits of knowledge to make such a claim. In which case, Dr. Carrier would be inconsistent claiming to know what cannot be known.

Dr. Carrier tells us,

“As to what caused the Big Bang, we have many viable theories (from Hawking’s The Grand Design to Krauss’ A Universe from Nothing to Vilenkin’s Many Worlds in One, all of which predict and explain numerous strange and often specific features of the universe that no theology has ever been able to deduce from the hypothesis that God did it). As far as figuring out which one is right, cosmological scientists are working on it. They’ve made tremendous progress. Theology has made none.”

         It is strange how Dr. Carrier doesn’t explain in what ways these alternative theories can evade the absolute beginning of the universe. Perhaps it is because they, in fact, cannot. All of the models, he mentions, still conclude the absolute beginning of the universe. Dr. Carrier talks of the universe just existing inexplicably, which amounts to an arbitrary claim. He also discusses the possibility of the universe having necessary existence.This is obviously false since we can rationally imagine there being no universe. The universe did not have to exist. 

           Moreover, the theology and tone, Dr. Carrier wishes to criticize as “the hypothesis that God did it” is a naive understanding of Christian theology and philosophy. It is naive as if one characterized the metaphysical naturalism of Dr. Carrier as "the hypothesis that nature did it." But is God to be treated as merely a hypothesis? As Christians we understand all things are created and sustained by God’s direct providence.  So in this sense all things can be explain by God; but that taken by itself, especially for Christian scientists, can be somewhat trivial. This is why science focuses on God’s indirect providence with God’s direct providence as its foundation. That is to say science graphs the interactions and relations between secondary causes with the necessary assumption of God as the primary cause. Sound Christian theology and philosophy does not start with God as merely a hypothesis, but as a necessary prerequisite for even hypothesizing. There is a significant difference between the two. The former starts with God as a hypothesis to make experiments and predictions to confirm or falsify God. The latter starts with God as a presupposition necessary to even account for hypothesizes, experiments, predictions, confirmations, or falsifications. I sense, here, Dr. Carrier would say both views amount merely to the arbitrary claim, namely “God did it.” But Christians’ are certainly not making an arbitrary claim. Quite the contrary, Christians are arguing the very fact that arbitrariness is a key intellectual sin is due to God being the starting-point. God, who himself is rational, created us to reflect His nature. Since we are made in His image to be rational, we (have a reason to) object to arbitrariness. The very charge of arbitrariness, Dr. Carrier wishes to pin on Christianity, exposes the fact he is made in the image of God. Is the Christian claim arbitrary though? It must be a resounding no! Christianity as a worldview is coherent and self-justifying. The problem is naturalists preclude Christianity from being true simply on the basis of their faith in metaphysical naturalism. Still it is worth asking, why is an arbitrary answer insufficient for Dr. Carrier? Why isn’t an arbitrary answer preferred over a rational one? I bet he’d answer along the lines that a person ought to have reasons for what she believes. A person has the epistemic responsibility to acquire reasons to form beliefs. If he would say these things no appeal to natural selection can explain where these rational obligations and responsibilities come from.  

        Dr. Carrier uses probability theory to say certain theories make it more probable that the universe would arise from nothing by nothing in the way it exists presently. Yet he neglects to mention the highly unreliable nature of probability theory given the background information needed to accurately represent and calculate any given thing. 

He talks a lot about order which cannot be rightly accounted for given the requirement of chance to explain the universe from metaphysical naturalism. 

Why Dr. Carrier quibbles about sticking to Ockam’s razor is nonsense from naturalism.

For a different take on some of the same issues discussed here check out my posts here and here. 

Atheism and Morality

Here is an interesting article on atheism and morality.

Check it out here

Questions for Theists

I stumbled upon this article by Jeffery Lowder at the Secular Outpost Blog here.

I figured I'd start answering some of the questions. I will try to answer them from a Clarkian perspective (on my other blog here).

The question “Why is there something rather than nothing” presupposes “nothing” as being the normal state of affairs. Why believe that? Why can’t we flip the question on its head? In other words, why can’t it be the case that the normal state of affairs is for things to actually exist and nothingness itself would be weird.


When it is said, “things actually exist” in what manner do they exist? Do they exist contingently or necessarily? I do not believe there is any possible world, or state of affairs in which nothing could exist, since God is a necessary being, He exists in all possible worlds and states of affairs. But for the naturalist, he must affirm the necessary existence of the, parts or whole, universe or multi-verse.    


Given that the universe has a finite age, why did the universe begin with time rather than in time?


If time were infinite, then, there would be an actual infinite series of events. Events can simply be moments of time or temporal parts; in any case, an actual infinite series of events are impossible. Since an actual infinite series of events would require an infinite series of events to elapse before this present moment. But if an actual infinite series of events occur before this present event, then this present event will never occur. With the existence of this present moment we properly conclude that time, like space and matter, is finite.  


But if we assume time is eternal then are we not thereby committed to the eternality of space and matter? But this still pushes the fundamental question back further. Is time contingent or necessary?  We obviously can imagine a state of timelessness so time cannot be thought of as necessary.


Christians can account for time either way. Presentists can either affirm time necessarily is an attribute of God or part of contingent creation. Eternalists argue God eternally created time, hence it’s a contingent property. In what way does the naturalist account for time?   


Why is so much of our universe intelligible without any appeal to supernatural agency? Why does the history of science contains numerous examples of naturalistic explanations replacing supernatural ones and no examples of supernatural explanations replacing naturalistic ones?


Intelligibility presupposes God. Presuppositionalists have been pointing this out for years. The very laws of logic, mathematics, knowledge, consciousness, induction, intentionality and freedom all have been taken as examples of the general principle that human thought and experience presupposes God. Science assumes God exists from the very start so it is unnecessary for the discipline to explain things in terms of God’s direct providence. Instead, it is to explain things in terms of God’s indirect providence as secondary causes.

Why is the physical universe so unimaginably large?


It is to bring glory to God. It is ostensive to God’s majesty.

If you believe that visual beauty is evidence of God, why isn’t the universe saturated with auditory, tactile, or other non-visual types of sensory beauty?

Who says it doesn’t? Many sensations in themselves are forms of beauty. Maybe the film Equilibrium illustrates this point well. Moreover, it does not logically follow that if God created beauty in the world God must create the whole world beautiful. Nor does such a view take into account God’s purposes.  
 
If you believe the universe is fine-tuned for intelligent life, why isn’t our universe teeming with life, including life much more impressive than human life?


Who is to say it isn’t? Impressive by whom? This wasn’t God’s chief end in creation.

Why would God use biological evolution as a method for creation? 

Who said he did? But even if we grant that he did, He could have sufficient reasons for doing so.  
 
Why would God desire to create embodied moral agents, as opposed to unembodied minds (such as souls, spirits, or ghosts)?


God wanted to create humans to accomplish His will.

Why is the human mind dependent on the physical brain?


We have brains we use to think. Much like a musician uses an instrument to play music. It makes us physical. But we are not merely physical we are also spiritual. Five reasons can be given for this. First, our brains are affected by our thoughts. Second, if we think of a physical object, say, like a toaster, and a neurosurgeon opens up our brains, there would be no object in it.  Third, our brains change but our minds do not. Forth, the only people that have access to their own thoughts are themselves. People have to ask what others are thinking. There is no way to know what a person is thinking without asking her. Fifth, we can think “about” things. We can think about what we want. So if the mind is merely the brain then there is no freedom. Actions, thoughts, and beliefs (including the belief that the mind is the brain) are a byproduct of chemical processes in the brain.     


Did Australopithecus have a soul? What about homo habilis? Homo erectus? Neanderthals? Why or why not? (HT: Keith Parsons)


If they didn’t they were robots.


How do souls interact with physical matter? Do you have any answer that is not tantamount to “I don’t know?” (HT: Keith Parsons)


Well, before I can adequately answer the question I must ask, how does a person lift his arm? Is it chemicals in the brain that force him/her to lift it? Or is it simply, the person chooses to lift his arm? If you grant the possibility that a person can lift his arm by simply willing it, I see no logical reason to not think also God could create humans with souls that can command their bodies to perform actions. What is the natural mechanism that allows the body and mind to interact? This question rides on a category mistake. But why even think there must be a mechanism for them to interact? If a mechanism must be given, which I don’t see why logically it must, certainly if God sustains the universe, He can sustain the interaction between the body and soul. Perhaps Parson’s wants to know precisely how God sustains both. God has not revealed this, nor is it clear we could even understand with our limited finite minds. But God’s providence is a sufficient general explanation for how the body and mind interact. Parson’s begs the question if he thinks my account is insufficient, since it does not fit his naturalistic criteria of what, he thinks, is an adequate explanation.          
 
If you believe humans have free will, why would humans have free will if God exists? Why are we able to exercise free will in some situations but not others?


It depends on what is meant by “free will”? If by it one means the ability to choose what one most desires, then yes, we have freedom. It is the kind of freedom that is compatible with God’s providence. We can exercise freedom in some cases and not others because we are sinful in a fallen world.  


Why are pain and pleasure so connected to the biological goals of survival and reproduction, but morally random?

Biological goals? If naturalism is true there is no goals in nature. It is all random chance. Pain and pleasure can have different moral statuses based on the commandments of God.


Is there some greater good that logically requires (or logically requires risking) that suffering be used to motivate animals to pursue the biological goal of self-preservation?

Are animals and humans intrinsically valuable? Do they have moral worth? God created us intrinsically valuable with instincts such as self-preservation.


Does some moral end make it desierable for suffering to continue even when it serves no biological purpose? 

Biological purpose? Notice you are borrowing teleological language. If God has a morally sufficient reason, which I believe he does, it is reasonable to think there is. 
 
Why do only a fraction of living things, including the majority of sentient beings, thrive? In other words, why do very few living things have an adequate supply of food and water, are able to reproduce, avoid predators, and remain  healthy? Why would God create a world in which all sentient  beings savagely compete with one another for survival? Why do an even smaller fraction of organisms thrive for most of their lives? Why do almost no organisms thrive for all of their lives? 
Why is there social evil, i.e., instances of pain or suffering that results from the game-theoretic interactions of many individuals? 


Why does God allow horrific suffering (and relatively little glorious pleasure)?


Why does horrific suffering often destroy a person, at least psychologically, and prevent them from growing morally, spiritually, and intellectually?


See my post God, why is there evil?

Why does the the relatively new discipline of cognitive science of religion support the claim that we have a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), which causes human beings to naturally form beliefs about invisible agents? Considering HADD’s poor track record of producing true beliefs about invisible agents in general, why should we trust it when it produces a belief about one invisible agent, the God of theism?

This is fallacious. It begs the question, makes a hasty generalization, and fails to discredit the belief in question on the grounds of its origin. 

Why should we believe that, of the innumerable deities worshipped by human beings over the ages, yours is the one that really exists?  Why believe in Yahweh rather than Zeus, Odin, Marduk, Ishtar, Osiris, Quetzalcoatl, Madame Pele, Ahura-Mazda, etc., etc., etc.? (HT: Keith Parsons)

Well, there are no good reasons for me to believe in Zeus, Odin, Marduk, Ishtar, Osiris, Quetzalcoatl, Madame Pele, or Ahura-Mazda. However, I have good reasons to believe Christianity is true (e.g. common objections). Furthermore, to ask such a question is to falsely make a hasty generalization.
    

Excellent Apologetics Seminar

Check out this worldview apologetics seminar by James N. Anderson here. 

Open Air Atheist

I had a discussion with Open Air Atheist on my Youtube channel. Here is my reply to him.

Please explain logically how objective values are contradictory? You maintain my question “…is like asking [you] to explain why a square circle is logically contradictory.” And then conclude, “It simply is the case that both of these concepts are by definition distinct from one another.”  No one disputes circles and squares are distinct. Your main point is misplaced. If the concept of objective moral values is logically contradictory, as you claim, then a conceptual analysis is due on your part to demonstrate it. But what you level against objective moral values is no simple task. You must show logically there is no possible world in which objective moral values can exist. But as I see it, by the use of possible world semantics, a conceptual analysis of ‘objective moral values’ can be shown as logically coherent.   

First, lets fill in the content of the words “objective moral values.”  By objective moral values, we mean moral values/facts that are universally binding on all people regardless of whether or not people acknowledge them. For example, an act of rape is morally wrong no matter if anyone believes it or not. 

Why is God essentially rational? I think this kind of question is wrongheaded. It is like the question, who made God? The question is fallacious or worse utter nonsense. I kindly take it to be the former than the latter. It is a category mistake on the part of the questioner. What the question is fundamentally asking is why God, a being who is necessarily rational, is not contingently rational. But clearly such a question confuses the categories of being, namely the necessary and contingent.    

Define your use of the term "created"? Do you mean A can cause something to come from nothing? If so, then if something can come from nothing, then we don't need God (whatever that is if indeed an is).

I maintain that God, who is omnipotent (i.e. consistently by nature all powerful), brought the universe, and humans into existence from no thing. It is the biblical doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. And my view conforms to biogenesis. Thus something only comes from something. But if you deny the biblical doctrine of creatio ex nihilo you are left with affirming the absurd conclusion that something comes from nothing by nothing. In the words of William lane Craig, “ such a view is worse than magic.” 

What is God? "God is a person?" Obviously you don't mean that in the usual sense. A person has qualia and physical correlates. If you say no! Then its like saying God is a person which is not a person, or at least not like any person you have experienced which tells me nothing!

What is qualia? Please define qualia. There are plenty of definitions for God. But since you asked me, I would subscribe to the Westminster or London Baptist Confession of Faith’s definition. Now if you wish to tell me the word ‘God’ has no referent; and in effect, all Christians are deluded when they talk about God, such a tactic gets us nowhere in discussion. Moreover, by leveling such a claim, you are taking upon the burden to prove all Christians are deluded when they speak of God and the word itself is meaningless. But there are countless books that would demonstrate the term ‘God’ is meaningful.[1] Moreover, your questions show you are out of step with the Christian renaissance in contemporary analytic philosophy. God is absolute personality, the one in the many, Tri-personal: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. He is absolute in lordship, authority, presence, knowledge, power and goodness.

Because value judgments are by nature intrinsically subjective. They are personal like, dislikes, expectations (first person experiences) etc.

So is it your subjective value judgment that all value judgments are subjective? This is clearly self-refuting.  I do not deny the subjective component to values but nor do I deny the normative component to values either. And the latter component was the main focus of my discussion with you.

Define your usage of the term "reality" without committing a fallacy of definition.

What is the fallacy of definition? If you are claiming it is a tautology I'd refer you to Quine's paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.  It is obvious this question is simply a tactic to get away from debating. All one has to do to reveal this fact is ask, "is it true to reality you do not know what ‘reality’ means?" By reality I mean the actual state of affairs.  

 I know what I mean when I use the term "know," but I'm asking you to define your usage of the term. 

Again, another obvious question simply to get away from debating. But I will answer. The term “know” refers to knowledge, which is traditionally understood as justified true belief. But after Alvin Plantinga came along, it might properly be changed to warranted true belief.

 "Why care about truth?" The reason I project value onto truth etc, is because it suits my goals.

Goals to what ends? So truth is merely instrumental? It is instrumental to what? If there is no ultimate end to the means, then one is left in an infinite regress.    

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[1] JP Moreland and Kai Nielsen. Does God Exist? The Debate between Theists and Atheists (Prometheus, Amherst, 1993)p.p.57-59,156-158.

Kenneth Boa and Robert Bowman Jr. The Unchanging Faith in a Changing World (Thomas Nelson, Nashville, 1997)p.p.72-76.

Smith, George H. Atheism: The Case Against God. 2003. PDF. p.22.

Adler, Mortimer J. How to Think about God: A Guide to a 20^th-Century Pagan.(Macmillan, New York, 1980)p.p.78-93.

William Lane Craig. Defining God  

  

Presuppositionalism Refuted, Really?

Sye Ten Bruggencate

Atheist responses to the same questions asked by Sye.

Dan Courtney

James Stillwell (OAA)

A clear critique of these videos can be seen in James Anderson's replies to my questions here:

Atheism Deceptively Fideism

Presuppositions, Epistemology and Atheism

The Essence of Feuerbach

Ludwig Feuerbach in his book The Essence of Christianity, argues that religion is a projection of man’s own nature. Throughout the development of Feuerbach’s diagnosis of religion he attacks Historic Christianity. Feuerbach makes many assertions about religion and Christianity in particular. Overall, Feuerbach’s criticisms and explanation of religion are left unsubstantiated.   

           

Feuerbach’s diagnosis of religion can be considered an inversion of Hegel’s Philosophy of the Absolute. Instead of Hegel’s Absolute (God) becoming aware of itself through people; Feuerbach avows that people become aware of themselves in the concept of God.  As Van A. Harvey remarks, “Instead of saying that the Absolute Spirit (God) achieves self-knowledge by objectifying itself in the finite world, he [Feuerbach] argued that the finite spirit comes to self-knowledge by externalizing or objectivizing itself in the idea of God.”[1] Feuerbach considers the significant difference between animals and man is that man can be conscious of himself and species. Man has species-consciousness. Feuerbach maintains that man with his species-consciousness, projects human attributes and qualities to form God. However, the basis of Feuerbach’s projection theory rests on the genetic fallacy. As Karl Ameriks explains, “Even if it were true (or it somehow be shown to be at least likely) that projections like those alleged to occur on Feuerbach’s psychological theory have been the causes of all our actual attachments to religious belief, it still would not follow that the statements expressed in such beliefs could have absolutely no truth or possible justification.”[2] The conclusion from Ameriks remark is tremendously helpful, in that it, points out that Feuerbach’s projection theory does not invalidate the truthfulness of religious beliefs. Really, all Feuerbach has succeeded in doing is making an assertion about how we come to believe in God, but an assertion does not prove anything. For example, if I said that Feuerbach and all atheists are really projecting the non-existence of God to be relieved from morally accountability, this assertion, though it could be true, does not prove anything. All Feuerbach has shown is man’s desire to be God.

           

Feuerbach asserts that man, with his consciousness, can conceptualize his species. Now, Feuerbach may be right that man can conceptualize his species, but this becomes problematic for Feuerbach. For, if man is aware of the concept of species or humanity, it disproves materialism. Concepts like “humanity” and “equality” are not physical entities (material) in space. Therefore, it would be wrong for anyone to argue that concepts are material. Indeed, if concepts are immaterial, Feuerbach cannot rightly claim they are human without denying his materialism. But Feuerbach claims that man has what he calls the divine perfections of reason, will, and love. Clearly, Feuerbach’s perfections are concepts. This illustrates that Feuerbach’s belief betrays his materialism. He treats concepts like love, reason and humanity as something that transcends material chemicals in the brain. However, if Feuerbach were consistent with his materialism, it would make no sense for him to speak of concepts like humanity, love, and goodness, if all concepts were, merely material chemicals in the brain.

Feurbach argues that religion debases humanity.  Feuerbach declares that he wants man to realize that God is a projection of the human nature. Religion then, for Feuerbach spoils the prospect of man becoming conscious of his supposed divine nature, thus resulting in unhappiness. As Feuerbach states, “to know God and not know oneself to be God, to know blessedness and not know oneself to enjoy it, is a state of disunity and unhappiness.”[3] It is quite obvious that Feuerbach desires man to be God, but he fails to justify his assertion. Feuerbach seems to be doing a little projecting of his own, or some wishful thinking. Oddly enough, what Feuerbach seems to be saying is that if we do not believe his projection theory it leaves us unhappy. Feuerbach regards Christianity as debasing humanity because it teaches that man is radically corrupt.[4] Surprisingly, Feuerbach’s arguments he gives to prove that man is not corrupt, do not deal with the Christian conception of human corruption. All Feuerbach argues against is a false interpretation of Christian doctrine. Biblical Christianity does not teach that man is so corrupt that he is incapable of doing good as Feuerbach‘s arguments assume. Rather Christianity teaches that man is so permeated by sin that man spiritually can do nothing good in relationship to God without divine grace.[5] Feuerbach has only proven that he does not like the idea of man being corrupt. Although he may not like the idea, his opinion is irrelevant.

Feuerbach believes that whenever humans describe something in terms of human attributes they make it human. As Feuerbach states, “If thy predicates are anthropomorphisms, the subject of them is an anthropomorphism too. If love, goodness, personality, are human attributes, so also is the subject which tho presupposest, the existence of God, the belief that there is a God, an anthropomorphism--a presupposition purely human.” [6] Feuerbach cannot seriously expect us to believe that whenever we compare or describe things in terms of human qualities it makes them human. When Feuerbach compares humans with animals, and concludes that man has species-consciousness; Feuerbach does not consider his comparisons as making animals human. Either Feuerbach is being inconsistent or he has set up a double standard. Furthermore, the idea that a human comparison makes everything human is like saying an animal becomes human when we give it a name. If it were absurd to think that we make animals human when we compare them to ourselves, it would follow then that it is even more absurd to think that God becomes human when we compare ourselves to Him.

Feuerbach suggests that Christians believe God is good because goodness itself is a divine attribute apart from God. However, this assertion misconstrues Christianity. Christianity teaches that God by His character and nature, gives meaning to all things. This implies that our concept of goodness is dependent upon God. Goodness would be defined by God’s character. Apart from God, we would be left in subjectivism without any true meaning of goodness.  Fundamentally, Christianity teaches that we come to know God by His verbal revelation (the Bible) and creation (nature). Therefore, the Bible and nature provides the basis for Christians to subscribe attributes to God. If Feuerbach thinks that goodness is a divine attribute apart from God, then he must account for why it is meaningful to speak of goodness objectively, and how it is good in and of itself. To put it another way, he must explain how something is good, and how goodness is good for its own sake apart from God.        

Underneath Feuerbach‘s criticisms, we can examine closely the logical implications of his assumptions. Feuerbach, from the preface of his book candidly confesses his presupposition of materialism.[7] From start to finish, Feuerbach assumes materialism. This assumption should be considered an unargued Philosophical bias towards Christianity. However, if we focus on Feuerbach’s materialism, we will see that it undermines his assertions, and arguments against Christianity. For materialism views thoughts, and choices as nothing more than determined chemical processes in the brain. Thus for Feuerbach to argue consistently, he would have to admit that his beliefs about humanity and religion are beliefs based not truth or evidence, but rather on chemicals in his brain. Therefore, it would make no sense for Feuerbach to argue assuming materialism, if the chemicals in his brain cause him to believe man created God, and the chemicals in Christian‘s brains’ cause them to believe God created man.

           

If we forced Feuerbach to reason logically from his presuppositions, we would find he refutes himself.  Feuerbach argues with the laws of logic, which nullifies his basic assumption of materialism. Counter to what Feuerbach may think the laws of logic he uses are not material. The laws of logic cannot be observed, tasted, touched, or smelled. Yet Feuerbach adamantly attacks Christianity while, he himself cannot even make sense of the laws of logic from his materialism. In fact, Feuerbach has claimed that we cannot even use negation as a means of knowing anything, which entails that we cannot use the laws of logic. For instance, we could not use the law of contradiction for it negates something being contradictory. Or the law of identity that negates something being what it is not. Still, the Christian worldview, which he criticizes, can account for these laws. Unlike Feuerbach’s materialism that destroys the very possibility of accounting for logic. The Christian worldview cannot only make sense of the laws, but provides the basis for being logical.  Christianity teaches that God has communicated some of his attributes to man. One of them being rationality, which reflects His character. This means we were created to be logical creatures with the purpose to glorify God. But given Feuerbach’s materialism we are forced to ask, “where did the laws of logic originate from?” And why should we be rational instead of irrational? As far as I can tell, Feuerbach’s materialism implies irrationality, because it does not provide a basis for the laws of logic.

Feuerbach’s empiricism makes it impossible to prove anything. Feuerbach assumes that we cannot have knowledge about something unless it can be perceived by the senses. But Feuerbach cannot observe concepts like humanity, and consciousness. He cannot observe the chemicals in his brain. Nor can he observe the laws of logic. Thus if Feuerbach were consistent with his empiricism he could not prove anything.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              Bibliography

Primary Sources

A. Harvey, Van.  Feuerbach and the interpretation of religion. (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 27.

Ameriks, Karl,” “From Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard” in  The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism. ed. Karl Ameriks. (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 261.

Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity, Trans. George Eliot. (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957)

Secondary Sources

Berkhof, Louis, Systematic Theology, (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996) 247.




Clark, Gordon, Thales to Dewey, (Vol. 3. 4^th ed. New Mexico: The Trinity Foundation, 2000) 368-370













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[1] A. Harvey, Van.  Feuerbach and the interpretation of religion. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 27.

[2] Ameriks, Karl,” “From Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard” in  The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 261.

[3] Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity, Trans. George Eliot. New York: Harper,1957. p.18

[4] Ibid., p.p.28-29

[5] Berkhof, Louis, Systematic Theology, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996. 247.

[6] Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity, Trans. George Eliot. New York: Harper,1957. p.16

[7] Ibid., p.xxxiv