Criticisms of Clark

Why not follow Gordon Clark or Cornelius Van Til's apologetic methodology? I think they both had strengths and weaknesses. Robert Reymond constructed a synthesis of their strengths. Dr. Reymond's book is available for free entitled "The Justification of Knowledge".

Criticisms of Dr. Clark's Philosophy 

(1) Arbitrary Axiom 

(1)* Scripturalism is self-refuting (e.g. AquaScum)

(2) Robust Thomistic divine simplicity with its inherent denial of the Trinity.

(3) Denial of the free offer of the gospel.

(4) Voluntarism 

(5) Eternal generation of the Son from the Father. The Son, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit eternally derived/proceed from the Father as the original source. This derivation is conditioned upon the Father's decree. 

(6) Necessitarianism with its entailed dependence upon creation

(7) Continuous creation with its denial of personal identity through time

(8)Unlivability. Basic knowledge (e.g. non-propositional knowledge of self) cannot be known only asserted as mere opinion.

(9) The three Persons of the Trinity are merely instances of a genus, namely, God. Hence, a Quadrinity.

(10) The obscurity of Clark's epistemology. Clark demands a definition of sensations from empiricists but does not explain precisely how humans come to know propositions via divine illumination through recollection/reminiscence. 

(11) Incompatibilism (Hard Determinism)

(12) Saving faith is merely understanding and assent

(13) The Son within the incarnation there possessed two distinct natures with two minds. This sounds awfully close to Nestorianism without the proper nuances (e.g. Thomas Morris).
(14) Primacy of the intellect
(15) Occassionalism
(16) Univocal knowledge of God
(17) Denial of theological paradoxes
(18) Supralapsarianism

The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit

18 Run from sexual immorality! “Every sin a person can commit is outside the body.”[a] On the contrary, the person who is sexually immoral sins against his own body. 19 Don’t you know that your body is a sanctuary of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have from God? You are not your own, 20 for you were bought at a price. Therefore glorify God in your body.[b]

1 Corinthians 18-20 HCSB

This passage is cited, from a prima facie reading, as to teach the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It is a common sense interpretation of this doctrine that the Holy Spirit, in fact, indwells believers whereby the Holy Spirit infuses all believers such that the Holy Spirit is present with their souls within their bodies. On this common sense interpretation all human persons possess bodies and souls. But believers have the Holy Spirit united to their souls and bodies. This interpretation has some startling theological and philosophical implications. First, it is a denial of any form of divine simplicity. It affirms the Holy Spirit is divided among all believers. Second, it denies God is timeless and immutable. If the Holy Spirit is spacially located in each believer's body then He exhibits change as He relates with spacial things. The argument can be formulated in a syllogism:

1. If the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is spacial presence then God is spacial, temporal and mutable.
2. God is incorporeal, timeless and immutable.
3. Hence the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is not spacial presence.  

Third, it seems to affirm the incoherent. If the Holy Spirit is spacially located in all believers, from various spacial distances (e.g. those in Australia, China, Japan, Hawaii and Brazil), then the Holy Spirit from one spacial point can be presently "here" and equally, with millions of miles of distance apart, at another spacial point be presently "here"; two points miles apart but both "here". Fourth, it assumes a naive sense of omnipresence. There are two competing interpretations of omnipresence. Either God exists spacelessly but is present at every point in space in the sense that he is cognizant of and causally active at every point in space. Hence, immediate knowledge and power extending everywhere. Or God is spatially located in the universe but is wholly present at every point in space. Of course, both can be affirmed without contradiction. Fifth, to attribute to the Holy Spirit the temporal spacial indexical  "I am now here"  would presuppose the Holy Spirit is both spacial and temporal. 

 It's amazing to read even Hank Hanaegraaff understands many of these distinctions. 

Resources on Divine Attributes:

http://www.bethinking.org/god/the-coherence-of-theism

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipresence/

Resources on the indwelling of the Holy Spirit:

http://www.equip.org/article/the-indwelling-of-the-holy-spirit/

This looks very promising:

http://journalofanalytictheology.com/jat/index.php/jat/article/view/jat.2014-1.170024240414a/233

http://digitalcommons.acu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=etd

Biblical Ethics: The Golden Rule

Covenant theology, Dispensationalism and NCT share a common core--in that any given Christian ethical theory must be both expositionally and philosophically consistent with Biblical exegesis. But when serious ethical reflections and questions are raised this commonality breaks down. For example, which particular commandments apply to contemporary Christians? Is lying ever permissible? Is war ever permissible? Answers to such questions from a specific theological position will have significant theological and philosophical implications. 

Let's examine one case example.

From most exponents of NCT the particular commandments that apply to everyone is the law(s) of conscience.

 Let's take the stipulated laws of conscience and deduce their corollaries.

(1) Any given person should, in all states of affairs, love God with all his/her heart, soul, mind and strength.

(2) Any given person should, in all states of affairs, love his/her fellow man/woman as him/herself. 

By command (1) we deduce

(a1) A priori knowledge of Trinitarian monotheism. 

(b1) A priori knowledge of love, goodness, sacrifice and personhood.

(c1) A priori knowledge of qualities and quantities (e.g. quality and quantity of love).

Likewise, from command (2) it entails:

(a2) A priori knowledge of the Imago Dei with intrinsic value/worth.

(b2) A priori knowledge of moral equality.

Atheism (Without the Thing in Itself)

Benjamin Watkins on an episode of the Semper Reformanda Podcast argues metaphysical naturalism is more probable than not from scientific 'facts'. He takes the latent assumption in the scientific method, namely methodological naturalism, as evidence for metaphysical naturalism.  Benjamin formulates his argument inductively with probability theory. His argument can be construed in terms of abduction or Bayesian probabilistic confirmation theory. For example,

If observations O then the best explanation of O is theory T. 

The internal critique of Ben's worldview offered by Tim, Carlos, Owen and Luke surrounded Ben's epistemology as to justify metaphysical naturalism. The intractable problems identified were as follows:

(1) Ben's empiricism, explicitly or implicitly, commits the logical fallacy affirming the consequent. Moreover, Benjamin failed to explain precisely the conditions in which beliefs are acquired. If he affirms some form of representational realism and/or correspondence theory of truth then there is no independent criteria to confirm any given mental image or belief, in fact, matches with the truth of reality.  Of course, then on such an account the problem of Kant's ding an sich (i.e. thing in itself) surfaces itself (there is irony here). A view with all the room needed for skepticism. Perhaps, better put, it has all the necessary ingredients of skepticism. 

The problem of induction (deriving a universal from particular examples) was discussed as a decisive feature of any given empirical theory yet Benjamin felt his view was exempt from the problem. He merely asserted induction as a properly basic belief without an account of epistemic justification. Hence, at which point, any belief can simply be asserted as properly basic (e.g. http://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-con/#H4). Still, probability assumes induction. Likewise, probability is predicated on limited, background-relative, data. Such that new data can always skew the results of old data. Thus  limited data can revise any given theory by new data. Therefore, any theory dependent upon probability is subject to whole sale revision. Not much security in probability.

(2) Benjamin asserts his particular epistemic theory is self-justifying. That's fine as far as the claim goes. Nevertheless, Benjamin's rationalism, explicitly or implicitly, collapses to either fideism or skepticism (unless, of course, he can show otherwise).   Ben attempts, I think unsuccessfully, to evade fideism or skepticism with some form of non-inferential epistemic internalism (e.g. Phenomenological conservativism). But since no criteria of conditions are provided to prefer one particular epistemic theory over another then the selection of any given epistemic theory (including Benjamin's theory) becomes viciously circular (e.g. Armstrong). Benjamin argues if a proposition appears to be true then that is a prima facie reason to believe it is true in the absence of any defeaters. Again, Kant's phenomenal and nomenal world comes back full force with such a view. On such grounds, it seems, we have a prima facie reason to reject Benjamin's epistemic theory, since it appears to be false, in the absence of any evidence to warrant his theory. . However, Benjamin may be able to provide a criteria of conditions to evaluate the virtues of any given epistemic theory and assess what qualifies as a properly basic belief.  In which case, Ben would need to show his particular epistemic theory meets the conditions provided (for the truth of any given epistemic theory to render it self-justifying and/or is properly basic) and tease out the philosophical tensions or apparent contradictions between his empiricism, rationalism and Platonism.  Further, Ben's epistemic theory prompts more questions: (i) how does Benjamin know reason, in general, or the laws of logic, in particular, aim at truth? (ii) how does he know beliefs aim at truth? (iii) how does Ben know the nature and limits of reason and/or truth? Ben asserts platonic realism as to abstract objects; yet how does abstract objects enforce or impose themselves on particulars?

(3) The discussion on ethics was intriguing. Benjamin affirms moral realism and not moral nihilism. But Benjamin's version of moral realism suffers the same problems as metaphysical Platonism. How does a particular person possess universal moral values and duties? How do these universal moral values and duties interact/relate with particular persons? What is a universal moral law without a moral lawgiver? How does Benjamin's view avoid the naturalistic fallacy (e.g. GE Moore)?