Matt Dillahunty v. Sye Ten Bruggencate

My comments on the Refining Reason Debate, with its topic, "Is it Reasonable to Believe God Exists?"  

Ten Bruggencate's opening statement sought to argue that any worldview, specifically Dillahunty's, which does not start with God is reduced to absurdity. He argues in favor of the topic by the following argument:

(1) It is reasonable to believe that which is true.              P->Q

(2) It is true that God exists                                             Q->R

(3) Therefore it is reasonable to believe God exists.        P->R

Rightly, Ten Bruggencate identifies premise (2) as the most controversial. So he sets his guns towards Dillahunty's worldview to indirectly prove (2). Ten Bruggencate goes about this task by pointing to the epistemic fruits of Dillahunty's worldview. Dillahunty's worldview requires solipsism to be, in principle, possible, if not actual. Dillahunty's worldview permits this on the grounds that solipsism cannot be disproven, and thus could be true, but he thinks this in no way impinges his worldview. Ten Bruggencate uses Dillahunty's admission to solipsism as a primary example of the absurdity that flows from unbelief. Ten Bruggencate goes to the second phase of his attack by chipping away at Dillahunty's theory of truth. Dillahunty defines truth as that which corresponds or coheres to reality. Bruggencate presses Dillahunty to provide sufficient justification, to know, Dillahunty's beliefs correspond or cohere to reality. Dillahunty concedes the problems Ten Bruggencate raise. So Dillahunty takes a reductionist view of knowledge and whittles it down to mere belief, one might say, opts for Fideism. 

Dillahunty counters Ten Bruggencate's arguments as arbitrary. In fact, he construes all forms of presuppositionalism as a method of utter arbitrariness. He then faults Ten Bruggencate for not demonstrating the uniqueness of Christianity.        

Dillahunty in his opening statement admits to arbitrarily selecting logic, truth, realism, and parsimony as presuppositions. Dillahunty's admission strikes me as Fideism. Likewise, Dillahunty refuses to defend any form of knowledge claims; and he equates any given belief as knowledge. Moreover, Dillahunty views the evidence for solipsism as underdetermined and thus he arbitrarily believes realism. I can't help but wonder if possible world semantics would show, by model logic, Dillahunty must espouse solipsism. Here is a feeble attempt:

1. It is possible for solipsism to be true in all possible worlds.

2. If it is possible that solipsism be true in all possible worlds then solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world.

3. If solipsism is necessarily true in some possible world, then it must be true in every possible world. 

4. If solipsism must be true in every possible world, then it must be true in the actual world.

5. If solipsism must be true in the actual world, then solipsism is true.   

If  Dillahunty grants premise (1) then he logically must affirm solipsism. I think Dillahunty misses Bruggencate's whole argument when he demands proof for exclusively Christianity. Dillahunty is interpreting Ten Bruggencate's argument through evidential lenses. Ten Bruggencate's argument is from the impossibility of the contrary. It is an argument against all tokens of the same type--namely non christian. Dillahunty does not see the necessity of presuppositions that, coheres well into a worldview and, has wide explanatory power.        

I would recommend Dillahunty read Dr. James Anderson's  first  and second reply  to my encounter with a fellow atheist fideist.  

David Robertson v. Matt Dillahunty

Here are my thoughts on the Unbelievable Podcast debate. The first debate centered on Robertson’s articulation of the traditional proofs for God’s existence, namely the cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument, and argument from religious experience.

Dillahunty attacked Robinson’s formulation of the teleological argument on the basis that it’s viciously circular. He objected that the argument builds its premises on the assumption God designed, and fine-tuned the universe then uses empirical data to extrapolate order and design to the conclusion of God. Dillahunty asserted that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact.

 Robertson presented a type of Leibnizian cosmological argument. But Dillahunty claimed it was an argument from ignorance. Since, he thinks, there can be vital undiscovered information that would naturalistically explain the origin of the universe. So according to Dillahunty one is too rash to logically take a stand, on the origin of the universe, where science is still advancing. Therefore, Dillahunty commends the listeners to suspend judgment until all the relevant data can be assessed.

Robertson used the Nazi concentration camps as an instance of moral evil that presupposes an objective moral standard. Dillahunty simply asserted morality is based on nonmaleficence or beneficence. However, he goes on to say it is situational.

First, the teleological argument is not viciously circular. Since it presupposes what science depends on—the order, and design for any continuity of human experience in the past, present, and future. Second Dillahunty’s criterion of facts is self-refuting. His criterion states that any given claimed fact must be contrasted to other known facts, for any given fact, to even be considered a fact. This criterion would also apply to itself. But what can it contrast with to prove it a fact? As I see it Dillahunty’s criterion of facts cannot stand against its own tests. Moreover such a criterion assumes knowledge possible given Dillahunty's viewpoint. Yet this begs the question. Furthermore, the same problems with correspondence and coherence theories of truth can be applied to Dillahunty's view of facts.  Third to criticize an argument on the basis of it being predicated on ignorance assumes there is knowledge, or alternative positions, which an argument overlooks. But if neither knowledge or alternative positions can be provided the criticism is groundless. If anything such an accusation appeals to the mere possibility of further knowledge or alternative positions but no actual knowledge or alternative positions. Therefore such a critcism should be regarded as a desperate attempt to revive a failed position, only to be left in resounding defeat.

How can one know what is relevant data and what is not? Especially considering Thomas Kuhn’s insights on theory ladenness?  When someone suspends judgment is not one making a judgment against those positions that require belief? Put in another way, if one suspends judgment on a viewpoint that claims it is always wrong to suspend judgment, is not one already judged the viewpoint in advance to be wrong?

If morality is based on the well-being of others, who or what defines what is ‘well’? In any case, regardless of how humanity “is,” what is it that determines how humanity “ought” to be?  How is it humans are morally equal? I think Dillahunty’s position reduces to relativism, ethical subjectivism, or moral nihilism.