In my judgment, propositions are either true or false. Either this or that. I don't understand a proposition being neither true nor false. If a proposition can be neutral it seems to make no assertion or statement of fact. But this seems to be self-refuting in virtue that the proposition "all future contingent propositions are neutral" is not neutral.
I'm willing to make the model claim the law of contradiction obtains in all possible worlds; I guess that implies I shoulder the burden to prove the same for bivalence. Perhaps. But I too affirm God possesses non-propositional knowledge. I concur one can deny bivalence. I think open theists do this since they think it entails fatalism. I don't buy it. I think it's a logical leap.
The main contention with open theism is whether propositions of future contingents can be known. I see no reason to deny this. But what is the difference between a truth and a truth that is logically possible to know? The open theist is free to attempt to argue such truths are logically impossible to know. At best I think she can argue God does not know future contingent propositions but this is a far cry from the stronger claim it is logically impossible for Him to know them.
I do think the open theist conception of God is deficient. In open theism God is ignorant of many truths yet considered omniscient. Omniscience is taken as a model notion by the open theist when it is, in fact, a categorical notion. God doesn't merely have the 'ability' to know only and all possible truths; he knows only and all truths.
Showing posts with label Calvinism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Calvinism. Show all posts
Sunday, July 30, 2017
Saturday, May 13, 2017
Divine Foreknowledge
How is man free if God foreknows all things (i.e. states of affairs that will happen)?
Middle knowledge and Simple Foreknowledge affirms libertarian freedom (LF), commonly called liberty of indifference. The position can be construed, roughly, that a person is free if she can choose equally options A or B as the primary source of her choice. She is the first cause of her choice in that she creates the causal chain between actions and acts. This construal of freedom may be the case without the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). Moreover, it denies the logical possibility of LF and determinism to be compatible, thus named incompatabilism.
The alternative takes compatibilist freedom (CF) as true. This approach argues freedom is best formulated as liberty of inclination. A person is free if she can choose her strongest inclination either option A or B without coercion or constrain. This view allows for hypothetical alternate possibilities. However, it concedes, all things considered, determinism and freedom (i.e. as so defined) are compatible.
If the first approach is true then God's foreknowledge is not equated with foreordination. God knows things intuitively and exhaustively either by simple foreknowledge or middle knowledge. So God's foreknowledge is causally inert.
God's knows all true necessary and contingent propositions qua omniscient. Any given proposition is known by God:
(1) God knows P will obtain
But this does not logically entail:
(1)* God knows P must obtain
(1) is a contingent proposition while (1)* is a necessary proposition. For example, God knows John will choose to eat a cheeseburger for lunch at T1. If John at T1, chose otherwise (e.g. Chicken Strips) then God would have known prior to T1. God's knowledge of free creatures is, in some significant sense, dependent upon their choices.
If the second approach is true then God's foreknowledge is grounded in foreordination. God knows things intuitively and exhaustively since He directly or indirectly determines the truth value of all contingent propositions. God determines all things such that it preserves liberty of inclination.
If, indeed, a person denies (1) he then affirms libertarian free choices are excluded from bivalence thus have no truth value until they obtain. Thus the future remains open. God's omniscience is revised. God only knows what is logically possible which excludes libertarian free choices.
Some problems with the open-theist that denies (1):
Open-theism's denial of the principle of bivalence is implausible. Propositions cannot be neutral, like concepts, since they bear truth value. Hence, a proposition is either true or false--despite it being indexed--thus bivalence applies to future contingent propositions.
If open theism is true then God is the most perfect being yet learns what free creatures will do. This seems contradictory to God as the greatest conceivable being.
Middle Knowledge is a creative attempt to reconcile meticulous providence with libertarian freedom. I agree with the Molinist it is not logically contradictory to say God determines the outcome of a free creatures decision. Perhaps some Molinist ideas can be used by the compatibilist as a heuristic device (e.g. Bruce Ware). However, in my judgement, Molinism does not reconcile the two. In fact, it compounds the problem. It adds mystery with mystery. The Molinist does not explain precisely how God knows what all free creatures will do in all circumstances. Some molinists assert God's knowledge penetrates to the very essence of free creatures. Yet this remains a mystery. But then we are asked, by Molinists, to affirm God knows what all free creatures would do in all circumstances. Two mysteries without parsimony or comprehensive explanatory power and scope.
Middle knowledge and Simple Foreknowledge affirms libertarian freedom (LF), commonly called liberty of indifference. The position can be construed, roughly, that a person is free if she can choose equally options A or B as the primary source of her choice. She is the first cause of her choice in that she creates the causal chain between actions and acts. This construal of freedom may be the case without the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). Moreover, it denies the logical possibility of LF and determinism to be compatible, thus named incompatabilism.
The alternative takes compatibilist freedom (CF) as true. This approach argues freedom is best formulated as liberty of inclination. A person is free if she can choose her strongest inclination either option A or B without coercion or constrain. This view allows for hypothetical alternate possibilities. However, it concedes, all things considered, determinism and freedom (i.e. as so defined) are compatible.
If the first approach is true then God's foreknowledge is not equated with foreordination. God knows things intuitively and exhaustively either by simple foreknowledge or middle knowledge. So God's foreknowledge is causally inert.
God's knows all true necessary and contingent propositions qua omniscient. Any given proposition is known by God:
(1) God knows P will obtain
But this does not logically entail:
(1)* God knows P must obtain
(1) is a contingent proposition while (1)* is a necessary proposition. For example, God knows John will choose to eat a cheeseburger for lunch at T1. If John at T1, chose otherwise (e.g. Chicken Strips) then God would have known prior to T1. God's knowledge of free creatures is, in some significant sense, dependent upon their choices.
If the second approach is true then God's foreknowledge is grounded in foreordination. God knows things intuitively and exhaustively since He directly or indirectly determines the truth value of all contingent propositions. God determines all things such that it preserves liberty of inclination.
If, indeed, a person denies (1) he then affirms libertarian free choices are excluded from bivalence thus have no truth value until they obtain. Thus the future remains open. God's omniscience is revised. God only knows what is logically possible which excludes libertarian free choices.
Some problems with the open-theist that denies (1):
Open-theism's denial of the principle of bivalence is implausible. Propositions cannot be neutral, like concepts, since they bear truth value. Hence, a proposition is either true or false--despite it being indexed--thus bivalence applies to future contingent propositions.
If open theism is true then God is the most perfect being yet learns what free creatures will do. This seems contradictory to God as the greatest conceivable being.
Middle Knowledge is a creative attempt to reconcile meticulous providence with libertarian freedom. I agree with the Molinist it is not logically contradictory to say God determines the outcome of a free creatures decision. Perhaps some Molinist ideas can be used by the compatibilist as a heuristic device (e.g. Bruce Ware). However, in my judgement, Molinism does not reconcile the two. In fact, it compounds the problem. It adds mystery with mystery. The Molinist does not explain precisely how God knows what all free creatures will do in all circumstances. Some molinists assert God's knowledge penetrates to the very essence of free creatures. Yet this remains a mystery. But then we are asked, by Molinists, to affirm God knows what all free creatures would do in all circumstances. Two mysteries without parsimony or comprehensive explanatory power and scope.
Sunday, July 12, 2015
Grace
The trouble with people and language is specific words can loose their significance by the people that use the words; this happens in theology and Christian living. We use the word 'grace', it's in our churches names, worship songs/hymns, bumper stickers, and T-shirts, but is it in the understanding of our hearts? What is grace? How is it properly defined? The dust of confusion will settle only when terms are properly defined. Once we understand the meaning of grace, and therefore its significance, we cannot help but to savor it. Grace is much like a diamond with many different facets to it but there is a definite meaning behind it. Grace is God's goodness actively to us and for us such that we get what we don't deserve; instead of receiving God's just punishment, we get the gift of God's righteousness in Christ. We get God, when we deserve the rod. But we miss the unconditional, free, nature of grace. It cannot be obligated nor should it be trivialized. Yet we often do both! Or we depreciate grace by mistaking it for mercy. But one is not the other. Mercy is not getting what is deserved. Grace is much more profound. It stretches the limits of our minds and the depths of our hearts. It gives us all that we could ever need, ask or hope for in the place of what we've earned, deserved or entitled.
Think on these things!
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Monday, June 16, 2014
Son Eternally Begotten?
Many contemporary
theologians I respect (e.g. Dr. Bruce Ware) do not see the eternal generation
of the Son in Scripture nor do they see it necessary to preserve Trinitarian
theology. This does not prove the eternal begetting of the Son false, but it
should give us pause to think through the doctrine carefully. If one wishes to
defend the eternal generation of the Son, I think one must clarify the eternal
begetting of the Son from the Father. The begetting cannot be contingent on the
Father, or else, I fear, we are left with some form of Arianism. Even if we construe it as contingent
necessity, it is not necessity. The Father and Son must possess the same
essential properties as God. So how, then, should we consider the eternal
begetting? We have a choice: either discard the doctrine or revise the
doctrine. If we revise the doctrine, I think, the eternal begetting can be understood
as necessary. In other words, there can be no possible world which the Father does not beget
the Son.
What are your thoughts?
What are your thoughts?
Sunday, March 16, 2014
Is EE Calvinistic?
Evangelism Explosion (EE) is calvinistic as an evangelism outline. Since it rightly upholds the distinction between God's prescriptive/revealed will and decreetive/secret will. Moreover, it makes a genuine offer of the gospel to all people in Jesus Christ. Furthermore, EE, although at first glance may seem to teach easy believeism or decisionism, at its heart takes seriously the sovereignty of God in regeneration to bring people immediately to salvation. So EE ends the gospel presentation with an invitation and obligation to commit one's self to Christ immediately for salvation.
Tuesday, March 4, 2014
Evangelism Explosion, and Calvinism
Mark Dever writes,
"And then came Evangelism Explosion. D. James Kennedy, a native of Augusta, Georgia, became the pastor of a little PCUS church in Ft. Lauderdale in 1959. He began training his people to do evangelism. And by 1962, he had organized this as a program called Evangelism Explosion. The book continues on, in its 4th edition. It has been used literally around the world. It is the subject of much debate and criticism among evangelicals. Missional types dismiss it as a modernistic sales job, assuming too much to be of any use today. Reformed types dismiss it as one-sided, coercive, or decisionistic. Nevertheless, neither of those sets of discussions need to detain us as a matter of history.I have come across, quite recently, criticisms of evangelism explosion (EE) questioning James D. Kennedy's Calvinism, and method. (2)
My suggestion is that Evangelism Explosion (and the subsequent dramatic growth of Coral Ridge Presbyterian Church, especially in the 1960's) became a quiet, but telling piece of counter-evidence against the stereotype of Calvinism killing evangelism. Kennedy was unashamedly Calvinistic in the soteriology he presented in his sermons. He later joined the PCA, with the Westminster Confession as its doctrinal standard. Regardless of how consistent or inconsistent one takes aspects of EE to be with Reformed theology, a church that clearly meant to be Calvinistic pumping out evangelism, and evangelism training throughout the 1960s and 1970s was a telling argument in pragmatic America. I'm not sure anyone thought of it at the time. But I think that it substantially weakened the ground of the opponents of Reformed theology. A pastor born in the 1920s, coming to maturity in the 1940s may have assumed that Calvinism was as gone as the horse and buggy, and partly he may have assumed that because of the "evangelism-killing" argument. But a pastor born in the 1960s, maturing in the 1980s, would have a hard time taking it for granted that a Calvinistic theology always (slippery slope) leads to killing missions and evangelism. There would be too many churches around him using Evangelism Explosion."(1)
Anyone familiar with EE can understand why fellow Calvinists would be suspicious of it. EE is not a detailed gospel presentation that emphasizes the wonderful truths of limited atonement, unconditional election or irresistible grace. Primarily because James D. Kennedy took the Scriptures seriously that milk comes before meat. Deep, wonderful, magnificent, beautiful, doctrinal truths that glorify God cannot be received before the doctrinal basics. However, James D. Kennedy did stick to his calvinist convictions, like limited atonement, by outlining EE closely to scripture (e.g. Romans 5:8). Where EE gets off track, in the eyes of some calvinists, is its insistence upon, misquoting texts as exegesis instead of application, and what appears to be decisional regeneration. The former criticism is simple to correct. The latter criticism is serious if in fact true. Does EE reduce the gospel to easy believeism? I think not. Look at what the presenter asks the presentee. First, he explains that eternal life is a gift offered from God to all in Jesus Christ. Second, he proclaims this gift is received by saving faith. Saving faith is defined as (continually) trusting in Jesus Christ alone for eternal life. Third, he instructs the gift is received through faith in Christ with evidence of, transferring trust from self to Christ alone, acknowledging Christ as personal Lord and Savior over all, and repentance. After this, a person is told to pray to God to acknowledge the gospel, trust Christ for salvation and ask for help in repentance. Clear necessary characteristics of the gospel are preached. The EE emphasis is salvation is justification by grace through faith in Jesus Christ alone--not a mere prayer. Although at times it may seem like it, since EE gets lumped in with the Four Spiritual Flaws of Campus Crusade for Christ.
EE is great because it is flexible, can be personalized, and yet there is still room for improvement. As Calvinists we can make EE more doctrinally precise without sacrificing its simplicity. But we must stray away from, being too afraid to use the plain language of Scripture or, belaboring doctrinal truths to the expense of presenting meat before milk (e.g. Emphasizing unconditional election, or limited atonement). We should be open, if conscience permits, to use analogies (e.g. A gift for all who receive it) and terminology (e.g. offer, accept, receive, embrace ) that even Arminians use with the understanding that Calvinism lies at the foundation for both.
-----------------------
(1) Mark Dever. Where'd All These Calvinists Come From? http://www.9marks.org/blog/whered-all-these-calvinists-come-part-4-10
(2) George R. Jaffray Jr. Explosive Evangelism. http://www.the-highway.com/explosive_evangelism1.html
Tuesday, December 17, 2013
Anderson, Calvinism and the First Sin
In this paper (here) Dr. James N. Anderson, Associate Professor of
Reformed Theological Seminary, has masterfully taken up the subject of
Calvinism (with its respective doctrines of God, providence and sin) to address
those that charge it of implicating God as the author of sin.
I do not wish to give a complete summary here. I’d prefer to
commend readers to it. I wish only to discuss some of the paper with comments.
Dr. Anderson begins with a familiar discussion in Christian
Theology of the devastating nature and effects of sin brought by Adam’s
transgression. God created Adam and Eve after His image good--with the ability
to choose good or evil. Adam for unknown reasons chose to violate one of God’s
commandments. Subsequent to Adam’s transgression, sin was imputed, inherited
and imitated, by all mankind.
Dr. Anderson asks the deep and difficult questions we are
confronted with, as Calvinists, in light of Adam’s transgression. It is the
very same questions believers in the past have had to struggle with such as St.
Augustine and Jonathan Edwards. Dr. Anderson states, “the most perplexing
question of all is simply this: If Adam was created good, why did he commit
evil?”[1]
Dr. Anderson stresses that it must be admitted, from the start,
that all theological traditions face difficulties. Nevertheless, all
theological traditions must each attempt to construct a coherent model to make
sense of God’s providence in relation to Adam’s sin. As we take Calvinism to be
the most faithful theological tradition to Scripture. We affirm: (1) God either
directly or indirectly determines all things (which includes Adam’s
transgression), (2) man freely determines actions and acts, and (3) God is
neither the author nor approver of sin. Yet it is precisely these affirmations
that require us to construct a coherent model. But many from other theological
traditions deem this as an impossible task. Dr. Anderson in the rest of his
paper directly addresses objections to the possibility of a Calvinistic model,
critiques alternative models, and then offers a Calvinistic model, which best
affirms (1), (2), and (3), with less (severe?) philosophical difficulties than
alternative models.
Dr. Anderson states that Calvinism is committed to divine
determinism in which God is the sufficient cause of all things. But how God
precisely determines and causes all things does not necessarily entail physical
or causal determinism. So then, in what way are we to understand “God
determines all things” and “God is the cause of all things?” Dr. Anderson
points out that Calvinism essentially is not committed to any specific view of
causality. Therefore many views are open to Calvinism. In this paper Dr.
Anderson takes cause generally in its ordinary sense, namely, to bring about a
state of affairs. With this definition in mind, Dr. Anderson distinguishes
between creator and creature causation. There is a creator/creature distinction
that vastly separates God essentially from His creation. For example, God can
cause things to exist from nothing. But creation cannot cause things to exist
from nothing. By this distinction, Dr. Anderson argues that divine causation
can be properly understood as analogical. Thus God determines C by X and man
determines C by Y. Divine causation is not transitive to human causation.
Things in creation do not cause Y by Z and God causes creation to cause Y by X
where XYZ are equivalent. There are two levels of causation that must be kept
in tact. The first level is divine causation and the second is creation
causation. On the latter we experience daily in creation. It is a linear
perspective of causation. However, the first level, God causes the creation to
exist; He sustains its existence and concurs with its causation precisely in
accordance with His will. I think Paul Helm reinforces Dr. Anderson’s model
when he writes,
“(9) Wherever one person X causes another
person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.
(10) Wherever one person X upholds
another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from
doing evil, X does moral evil.
… it is by no means clear that even if X does moral
evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty
of moral evil is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether
his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of
some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It
is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s
evil act is not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain
further goods.”[2]
Dr.
Anderson gives helpful insight to divine determinism with discussion on
particular models of providence. The first he calls the Domino Model and the
second Authorial Model. The first takes causation as straightforwardly causal
determinism. The world and everything in it is like a giant game of
dominos. In the game of dominos, each individual domino is placed face to face
with another domino. Typically a long chain of face-to-face dominos is spread
out like a train. And once the first domino of the chain falls, it causes the
adjacent domino to fall, continuing on from domino to domino. Eventually,
through the chain of causes and effects, all the dominos fall. In the same manner
as dominos the Domino model of providence views everything that happens in the
world as a chain of causes and effects. God just taps the first domino to fall,
as it were, and everything happens precisely in accordance with His will. The
Authorial Model takes providence much like an author writes a book.[3]
The author controls every element in the story; he can even write himself into
the story. But how the author writes the story is not the same as how the
characters act in the story. The author can write that a particular character
commits a wicked deed, without approving or applauding it, but the author does
not thereby commit a wicked deed.[4]
Moreover, there is a one-way streak of moral accountability in the Authorial
Model. Since the author can rightly hold its characters accountable for their
actions. But the characters have no right to hold their author accountable for
their actions.[5] Furthermore,
to the least extent, the author is merely telling a story with characters that
participate in evil, but the author himself does not participate in evil. Dr.
Anderson sees that Calvinism with this Authorial Model of Providence is most
helpful in understanding divine determinism.
Dr. Anderson after developing the Authorial Model to
understand divine determinism, he moves his attention to addressing possible
objections to such a model of providence as it relates to the first sin. Dr.
Anderson then critiques alternative non-Calvinistic models of providence in the
face of Adam’s sin.
I think Dr. Anderson brings great clarity to the
difficulties for those who wish to affirm libertarian freedom. First, he points
out that such a view violates a moderate principle of sufficient reason (ironically the very
law many Arminians vehemently defend in the Cosmological argument).[6]
That is to say everything has an explanation for its existence either by
necessity or contingency. But Dr. Anderson points out that if libertarian
freedom is true there is no explanation for any given person’s decision. Since
reasons merely influence any given person, but decisions are made, if any given
person wills them. Thus why any given person chooses to will one decision over
another remains inexplicable. I think Arminians and Molinists alike would
respond to Dr. Anderson that Adam sinned simply on the basis he willed it. So
in that sense there is something in Adam. But such a reply does not escape Dr.
Anderson’s criticism.
Dr. Anderson concludes with “…five significant virtues of
the Calvinist account:
1. Unlike its competitors, the Calvinist account does full justice to the divine perfection of aseity (God’s self-existence and absolute independence). There are no events in the creation that take place apart from God’s will, and God’s knowledge isn’t dependent on brute facts or on anything in the creation.
2. Unlike its competitors, the Calvinist account doesn’t
require God to take chances or to rely on “good fortune.” (Even the Molinist
account subjects God to some degree of chance insofar as God has to play the hand
of feasible worlds that is dealt to him, so to speak, by the counterfactuals
of freedom.)
3. Calvinism affirms the doctrine of meticulous providence,
which receives strong support in both the Christian scriptures and the
Christian tradition.
4.On the Calvinist account there is an ultimate sufficient
explanation for the first sin, namely, the good and wise decree of God. God
has authored a creational story in which human sin plays an integral
role. While the first sin may have been irrational in terms of Adam’s nature,
character, and circumstances, it was not irrational in terms of God’s
decree. The first sin was not ultimately an irrational brute event in God’s
universe. God worked out his sovereign plan through Adam’s sin rather than around it.
5. Calvinists can affirm that the first sin considered in
itself was a supremely evil act while at the same time affirming that God decreed
Adam’s sin for his good and wise purposes—ultimately, for his own glory
manifested in his mercy and his justice—as part of the overall storyline of the
history of creation.”[7]
See also my posts Craig, Providence and Calvinism, Original Sin and Middle Knowledge and Harmatology.
[1] James N. Anderson. Forthcoming in Calvinism and
the First Sin in Calvinism and the
Problem of Evil, edited by David E.
Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson (Wipf & Stock, 2014) http://www.proginosko.com/docs/Calvinism_and_the_First_Sin.pdf
p.3.
[2] Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time (Oxford: Oxford UP,
2010)pp.161-162.
[3] John M. Frame. The Doctrine of God. (Philipsburg, N.J.,:P&R Pub., 2002)p.p.154-159.
See also Dr. Gordon H. Clark’s discussion of cause and authorship in Christian Philosophy, vol 4. (Unicoi: Trinity
Foundation, 2004)p.p. 268-269.
[4] Dr. Anderson
even points out that most, if not all, good stories must contain some amount of
evil. http://www.proginosko.com/docs/Calvinism_and_the_First_Sin.pdf;
p.11. See also Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Richard Francks, and R.S. Woolhouse. Philosophical
Texts (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998)p.252.
[5] I see no
reason why a moderate divine command theory of ethics cannot be incorporated in this
model. See Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303. Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269. Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2010.pp.161-162.Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical
Foundations For A Christian Worldview.Downers
Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
[6] William Lane Craig. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/leibnizs-cosmological-argument-and-the-psr
Monday, December 16, 2013
Thursday, December 12, 2013
Craig, Providence, and Calvinism
Dr. William Lane Craig lists five objections against a Calvinistic conception of providence in the book above. Craig's five objections can be summarized as follows:
1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures (indications of a robust doctrine of human freedom).
2. Calvinism is self-refuting.
3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin.
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience is illusory.
1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures.
Craig merely asserts Calvinism is contrary to the plain teachings of Scripture. He does not exegete any text to argue the supposed exegetical shortcomings of Calvinism. Craig claims Calvinism undermines all scriptural texts that affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency."I fail to see how Calvinism cannot affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency," if God (analogically) determines them.
2. Calvinism is self-refuting.
Simply to say one believes Calvinism given the truth of Calvinism seems trivial. But Craig sees this as self-refuting. Since a person is determined to believe in determinism, (somehow) this determined belief is not acquired rationally, but why not? Craig is assuming latently by this objection Calvinism entails causal determinism. But there is no obvious reason why it must. In fact, many Calvinists would adopt an analogical understanding of determinism whereby God determines C by X and man determines C by Y. On such a view divine causation is not taken as univocal, but, rather analogical.
3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin.
“…God is the first efficient cause of everything, but evil has come, not from His first act, but by a second act, an act of creatures.
God is the author of the author of sin, He cannot be the author of sin itself, for sin is the result of a rebellion against God.
If God is not the author of sin, at least He must be charged with being responsible for sin…A little reflection on the subject will show the contradiction involved in charging God with responsibility. Let us ask one question: Responsible to whom, or to what?...Obviously if we are talking about the Almighty, He already is the highest power there is. Therefore, when God decreed this type of universe where Christ was to die for the sins of all who believe, God was responsible to none but Himself.” [1]
“God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though He is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever God does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that He does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit. Righteousness is what God does…God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids Him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.” [2]
“(1) Necessarily, if God exists he is all-good.
(2) God exists and ordains whatsoever comes to pass.
(3) Necessarily, if A is a human action then A is causally determined.
(4) There are morally evil human actions.
(5) Either God is the morally culpable author of the morally evil actions or human beings are their sole morally culpable authors.
(6) (1) and the first disjunct of (5) are formally inconsistent.
(7)(1),(3) and the second disjunct of (5) are not formally inconsistent.
(8)Any agent who freely and knowingly sets up a deterministic process with a certain outcome must be responsible for that outcome.
(9) Wherever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.
(10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.
…moreover, it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evil is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act in not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”[3]
“Since our moral duties are grounded in the divine commands, they are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since he does not issue commands to himself.
If God does not fulfill moral duties then what content can be given to the claim he is good? Here Kant’s distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule has proved helpful. God may act naturally in ways which for us would be rule following and so constitutive of goodness in the sense of fulfilling our moral duties, so that God can be said similarly to be good in an analogical way….God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of his own character.” [4]
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
Instead of rehearsing the, already mentioned, alternative to causal determinism in favor of compatibilism, I'd like to focus on Craig's offered alternative. He would say libertarian freedom is the only view that rightly upholds human freedom. On such view a subject is free if the subject makes a choice without any sufficient or necessary causal conditions. Any given person, with the options of X or Y, to be free should have the ability to choose between the two (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices). But how is such a view any more plausible? Given the fact that a person can choose between X or Y (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices) amounts to the person being indifferent. Why then should an indifferent person chose one thing over another? I think Craig wants to say, simply because the agent reasoned to will one choice over another. It seems to me, then, this freedom of indifference make a person's choice utterly arbitrary. Reason being that any given reason why a person should choose X, an identical reason can be given to choose Y. [5]
5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience are illusory.
Quite the contrary, if analogical determinism is true. But for the sake of argument, even if causal determinism is true, it would not entail human experience is illusory given the fact that on such a view there really is secondary causes. And therefore, people are not rightly construed as puppets in the hands of God; instead they're agents that possess knowledge, volition, purpose, and deliberation.
[1] Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303.
[2]Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269.
[3]Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.
[4]Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview.Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
[5] I take this point from the insights of Bruce Ware, John Frame, and Ronald Nash.
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Biblical Apologetics: Principles and Practice
II. Knowing God Exists
III. Showing God Exists
1. Cosmological Argument (Col 1:16-17)
2. The universe began to exist,