The Incarnation

The incarnation is a great mystery. Let me admit that upfront that God has not revealed the precise mechanics of the incarnation. So Christians have proposed plausible coherent and consistent models or theories of the incarnation—how the mechanics of the incarnation may be—not definitely is. Admittedly these can be quite sophisticated models or theories. 

The classical/conciliar incarnation model says the divine Son assumes a human nature. One divine person, namely the divine Son, second person of the Trinity, unites a complete human nature to the divine nature. The Son is the owner of both natures united together, neither divided, mixed nor confused. One person who owns two distinct, conjoined, natures/substances/essences(these terms are typically used synonymously). Each substance has its own distinct essential (or accidental) attributes/properties. I will address whether the divine substance can acquire accidental attributes/properties. But it should be emphasized here in the incarnation the divine substance is united to a district human substance. This union sometimes is loosely understood as an addition but technically the human substance is assumed, conjoined or united to the divine substance. This may sound like splitting hairs but the term ‘added’ or ‘addition’ is only useful provided the terms are understood that one substance is united to another substance. The two substances are not added or mixed together to make a new single substance. There is no substantial change in the union of the two substances. 

However, because the terms can be misunderstood to imply a change in God’s essential nature. The terms assumption, union, conjoined or united are preferred. These terms can also be used to further clarify the asymmetrical relation between the divine substance and the human substance of the incarnation. In the incarnation, the human substance depends upon the divine substance for its identity and existence. The divine substance does not depend upon the human substance for its identity and existence. Still it seems in the incarnation a contingent constitutive dependence obtains whereby the divine Son’s identity as the God-man depends on the contingent union of the divine and human natures. Without the human nature the divine Son would remain truly divine but not truly man. 

The divine substance and divine attributes are properly understood as essential and necessary—that which God can never be without. It is impossible for God to be without God’s nature and attributes. While the incarnation itself is contingent. The divine Son assumed a human substance (a human physical body and human rational soul). It was possible for our great triune God to not create anything. Yet our great triune God freely created the world from nothing. In Adam, humanity became fallen and ruined in sin. Our great triune God freely chose our redemption in the incarnation of the Son. 

Now to the crux of the worry. Can God can become incarnate without any alteration or modification of the divine substance? There are two competing models to make sense of this. The classical/conciliar model says this is possible because God timelessly and immutably intends to be incarnate at specific moments in time. Paul Helm uses an analogy of a timer. Imagine a timer that is eternally and immutably set in advance to produce a specific effect (e.g., turn on a water heater, Christmas lights, heater etc.) at a specific time. If such an analogy is coherent it shows the possibility of an eternal and immutable cause producing a temporal effect. God’s intention is understood as eternal, immutable and contingent to produce the temporal effect of being incarnate at a specific time. This is analogous to the timer. On such a view any changes that occur only apply to the created temporal order. God changeless transcends the created temporal order while timelessly producing temporal effects. There is division on the classical view if God’s external actions are grounded in God’s internal intentions or not. This matters for if God’s contingent intentions were different, then God’s contingent actions would be different. Consequently, there is an explanatory relation between extrinsic change and intrinsic change. If, however, God’s contingent actions could be different, but His intrinsic intentions must remain the same then God’s intentions play not explanatory role in grounding God’s contingent actions. This is quite a strange view that most who affirm divine immutability are not willing to affirm since it makes God’s intentions the same regardless of His actions. God’s intentions become explanatorily vacuous. Others may advocate both God’s intentions and actions must always be the same necessarily.  God’s intentions and actions are necessary not contingent. This is the most radical view.  It means God must create in order to be God. 

If you want to research the classical/conciliar view further I would recommend the work of Paul Helm, Timothy Pawl, Richard Cross and James Dolezal. 

 Alternatively, to the classical/conciliar view, is a neoclassical view. This is not conciliar so I say that upfront. But I would say it is not necessarily innovative. It seeks to inherit the heart of the Protestant Reformation and Christian tradition but it does not have the same historical heritage as the classical view. Yet it has seeds of it in church history (e.g., John Duns Scotus). The neoclassical view agrees God can become incarnate without any alteration or modification of the divine substance. The neoclassical view sees the classical view as making creation contingent but eternal. This would imply God is coeternal with creation and the incarnation itself is eternal. The divine Son was always incarnate on such a view. God timelessness produces the temporal effect of the Son being incarnate. The neoclassical view may modify simplicity, timelessness, and immutability to avoid these intractable problems. They may take divine simplicity as God is not composed of essential separable or divisible parts or properties. Timelessness may still be affirmed or replaced with divine everlastingness. God is forever. God always exists with no temporal beginning or end. God does not essentially have temporal succession and/or temporal location. Immutability is defined as God does not change in God’s essential nature and character.  Notice this definition does not say God cannot change in any way, shape or form. So nothing precludes God from existing eternally and solitarily as triune (without creation) but then freely choosing to create. God exists without creation then freely creates whereby God exists with creation. These type of changes do not affect God’s immutability. What about the incarnation? The neoclassical view may say the divine Son of the Holy Trinity genuinely exists without a human nature logically or temporally prior to creation. The Holy Trinity eternally (logically or temporally) intends the Son to be united to a human nature at a specific moment in time with no ending duration subsequent

to creation. So there really is a pre-incarnate Son on this view. Whereas it is not easy on the classical view to talk of a pre-incarnate Son without qualifications. The divine Son is personally and contingently the subject and property bearer of his human nature while remaining truly God (all views agree to this). But a major difference is the neoclassical view will concede in the incarnation the divine Son undergoes an extrinsic change (e.g., Cambridge change) personally assuming and becoming the subject and bearer of a human nature. This extrinsic change is grounded by an intrinsic change: the Son contingently intends and becomes the subject and bearer of a human nature, which he was neither logically or temporally prior. This can be further clarified: in the incarnation, the Son knows he is incarnate. This contingent knowledge is grounded in God’s work, namely the divine Son’s assumption of a human nature. Prior to the incarnation: the divine Son knows, “I will become incarnate.” In the incarnation the Son knows, “I am incarnate.” The truthmaker of the Son’s mental token of the indexical “I am incarnate” is the fact of being incarnate. Moreover, the Son’s experiential knowledge through his assumed human nature of being incarnate is grounded in his actual experience as incarnate.  

The neoclassical view uses the distinction between essential and accidental attributes or properties. God’s essential nature and essential attributes can never change. Yet this does not preclude God from acquiring accidental, non-essential attributes. For example, God can become the Creator and Redeemer. God can stand in the contingent relation of being the Creator or Redeemer of creation which does not fundamentally change God’s essential nature and essential attributes. Thus, it is a contingent and accidental (i.e. non-essential) fact about God that he is both Creator and Redeemer. 

How does this apply to the incarnation? Well, it may help clarify that when the divine Son is united to a human nature, this union is contingent and non-essential. It does not fundamentally change the Son’s divine nature or essential attributes. Yet it does count as a genuine change in the Son whereby he becomes the God-man (personally assumes a human nature as its subject and bearer) he was not prior to the incarnation. 

If you want to research the neoclassical view further I would recommend reading Thomas Morris, Andrew Loke, Oliver Crisp, Ronald H. Nash, John S. Feinberg,  John M. Frame and Robert L. Reymond. 

I discuss the incarnation further here:

https://youtu.be/RcmMwdZ56wM?is=PgKPnYvUjoRnxwcc

Creatio Ex Nihilo: Reply to Felipe Leon

 Here are some initial thoughts

Felipe Leon formulates this argument against creation ex nihilo:

1. All concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining efficient cause have an originating or sustaining material cause, respectively.

2. If classical theism is true, then the universe is a concrete object that has an originating or sustaining efficient cause with neither an originating nor a sustaining material cause.

3. Therefore, classical theism is false.

Leon takes Classical theism of any sort that has a sharp creator and creature distinction. His target is to show classical theists (anyone who embraces creatio ex nihilo) must embrace creatio ex materia, pantheism or panentheism. 

Premise (1) is controversial. Leon goes through anticipated objections to (1). To me this reminds me of the mind / body problem. The premise presupposes some sort of physicalism or materialism. Perhaps it assumes philosophical naturalism. So the only possible world which is actual is for material causes; this taken as categorical or modal begs the question. Why think this? This is less plausable than not. The problem of induction could be raised as well to cast doubt on (1). But it seems neither logically nor metaphysically impossible for:

(1)* an incorporeal omnipotent God as efficient cause to bring about the existence of a material universe from no other thing. 

Leon says if such a state of affairs is conceivable to render possible then so is the possibility of an uncreated universe popping into existence from nothing. This strikes me as metaphysically impossible for such a state of affairs to obtain for something contingent to have no fundemental cause or explanation for its existence. In such a senerio there is no fundamental necesary existent cause or ground for contingent reality which (1) assumes. But why not (1)*?

Holy Trinity: Reply to Sean Luke

 I read ​Sean Luke’s paper a year ago, in this latest volume of the Theologica Journal, on the Holy Trinity. My initial thoughts were on my YouTube community post. I will also posted them here. There is an unargued philosophical bias against those like myself who deny simplicity as numerical identity. I see relations/modes can individuate but very thinly given simplicity as numerical identity. In fact, Trinitarian divine cognition and knowledge seems to contradict divine simplicity as numerical identity. The divine persons of the Trinity seem to have distinct self-knowledge, de re beliefs or mental tokens, perhaps better characterized as a first-person perspective, that is unaccounted for by Thomistic simplicity. Baddorf is footnoted but very little engagement with him, Gregory Fowler or Paul M Gould. Substantial priority (e.g. Fowler, Inman, Gould) would have overcome objections against taking the whole substance as the fundamental ground of its parts, properties or powers. As for what makes a property divine, it is the relation it has to the property bearer that gives the property its existence and identity. John Duns Scotus would identify the mode of infinity as the defining feature of divinity for the numerically distinct divine properties (e.g. Smith, Williams). Just some quick thoughts. But a great paper in the right direction 😎

Reply to Drew Sparks

I did an informal book review of Jeffrey Johnson’s (of Free Grace, Grace Bible Theological Seminary) book “The Revealed God” posted on YouTube. 

https://youtu.be/YrajHBFhLIg?si=MNsKZ8dH67fpy1SH

I just skimmed Drew Sparks (of Ivy Tech Community College and IRBS) review of the same book. 

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fbbe68e004e8f7a2365ec17/t/67a6374633b61b095673455d/1738946374950/2024.JIRBS.review.article.In+Defense+of+Classical+Theism.final.pdf

Sparks raises some issues worth exploring more. He believes necessitarianism in the form of a modal collapse does not logically follow from a robust doctrine of divine simplicity (construed as numerical identity) with the proper metaphysical distinction of hypothetical necessity. He thinks nothing about creation is essential to God to be God. This is a great opportunity for further analysis. Sparks assumes all change is necessarily extrinsic to God such that it could never be intrinsic to God. This is under the assumption of absolute immutability. So if God goes from a state of eternally existing solitarily as triune without creation to a state of creating existing with creation. But this is in question—what is the nature of change in creating. Generally, extrinsic change is explained by intrinsic change. A specific effect is explained by the properties and powers of its cause. If the properties or powers were different of a cause then the effect could be different. But to posit a cause that could never change that can produce different effects is explanatorily vacuous. Moreover, if divine cognition affirms both necessary and contingent knowledge. The contingent knowledge God possesses of the actual world would be different if God created a different world. If such a state of affairs is logically possible then there must be a tight relation between intrinsic and extrinsic change. Demonstrating change must be intrinsic to ground extrinsic change. But if God is necessarily and absolutely the immutable eternal creator then God modally cannot do other than God does as God. There is no possible world in which God eternally refrains from creation nor is there a possible world in which God creates a different world than the actual world least God cease to be necessarily and absolutely the immutable eternal creator. Ah but God can produce different effects while remaining necessarily and absolutely the immutable eternal creator. Well this seems to beg the question on the nature of change. It assumes change is extrinsic. But even if change is extrinsic there is no possible world in which God does not create in order for God to be the immutable and eternal creator. God must create to be the eternal creator. Creation as contingent does not logically preclude eternal co-existence with God which is problematic. Sparks says it’s an asymmetrical dependence relation between God the creator and creation. Creation depends on God for its existence while God does not depend upon creation for God’s existence. This is true if God is not necessarily and essentially the immutable creator. But if God is necessarily (logically/metaphysically) and essentially the immutable eternal creator then there is a mutual dependence of some sort (with intrinsic/extrinsic change?) that explains precisely how God is necessarily and essentially the immutable eternal creator. Perhaps the diffusion principle in Plato and Jonathan Edwards would apply here. 

Sparks says the Trinity is consistent with divine simplicity. He does not provide a coherent and consistent model of the Trinity.  I could not help but think what he says would make the Trinity logically impossible. How would Sparks deal with the logical problem of the Trinity with divine simplicity? Often this is simply sidestepped by appeals to mysterianism with the analogia entis—God being beyond being. But this welcomes paradox without any solution to the logical problem. At least Johnson, following Scotus, gives us tools such as the formal distinction to overcome the logical problem. Sparks explains the divine persons are conceptually distinct of the divine substance. Anselm says this is impossible for divine simplicity because conceptual distinctions must be grounded in extramental distinctions. Are the divine persons extramentally distinct of the divine substance? If not, then the processional relations (generation and spiration) are not ontologically distinct. In which case, there are no ontic grounds for individuation.  I see relations/modes can individuate very thinly, if any, given simplicity as numerical identity. In fact, Trinitarian divine cognition and knowledge seems to contradict divine simplicity as numerical identity. The divine persons of the Trinity seem to have distinct self-knowledge, de re beliefs or mental tokens, perhaps better characterized as a first-person perspective, that is unaccounted for by Thomistic simplicity. Scott Williams single mental token shared by the persons doesn’t seem enough. 

Is God the divine persons or the divine substance? Is God properly numerically identical to the divine substance of the three divine persons or is God numerically identical to the three divine persons of the divine substance? Often the latter is specified as God is the Father eternally begetting the Son and through the Son, spirating the Spirit. All three divine persons are essential to the definition of God as a concrete divine substance. If this is the case, then the logical problem of the Trinity must be solved with divine simplicity. But divine simplicity compounds the logical problem of the Trinity not solve it. If the divine substance is both concrete and numerically identical to the three divine subsistences/persons and the three divine subsistences/persons are numerically identical to the divine substance. But a divine subsistence/person is not numerically identical to the three divine subsistences/persons. If a divine subsistence/person is not numerically identical to the three divine subsistences/persons then a divine subsistence/person is not numerically identical to the divine substance. Perhaps this can be illustrated further. Is the Father all of who and what God is exhaustively? If you say yes then you deny the Trinity. If you say no, then you deny simplicity. The point is a concrete divine person/subsistence/mode is not the whole divine Trinity/three subsistences/persons.

Sparks thinks a denial of Thomas’s doctrine of divine simplicity undermines aseity. I show this is not necessarily the case in my YouTube video. 

https://www.youtube.com/live/2JG_Pm6nH9Q?si=lCeuYJp1BQ7jmN6m

Sparks thinks a denial of Thomas’s divine simplicity makes God’s attributes finite not infinite. How so? This reminds me of Spinoza’s  argument for pantheism. ‘Infinite’ must be clearly defined. If it is qualitative in intensity and extensively, e.g., maximal power, I see no problem. But perhaps Scotus’s concept of unitative containment can be adopted to remove this worry. Substantial priority (e.g. Fowler, Inman, Gould) would take the whole substance as the fundamental ground of its parts, properties or powers. As for what makes a property divine, it is the relation it has to the property bearer that gives the property its existence and identity. John Duns Scotus would identify the mode of infinity as the defining feature of divinity for the numerically distinct divine properties (e.g. Smith, Williams). 

Just some thoughts

Divine Simplicity, Flynn and Craig

 Catholic apologist Patrick Flynn offers this argument against William Lane Craig’s doctrine of God.

1. Whatever is composite depends on prior components.

2. Whatever depends on something prior is not ultimate.

3. God is ultimate.

4. So God is not composite.

Premise (1) and (2) are not obviously true. In fact, neo-Aristotelian metaphysics can reject both (1) and (2) with substantial priority. I would commend the work of Gregory Fowler, Matthew Baddorf and Paul M Gould. Substantial priority (e.g. Fowler, Inman, Gould) would take the whole substance as the fundamental ground of its parts, properties or powers.

The assumption that all forms of composition necessarily entail an external composer must be defended not merely presupposed. The greatest counterexample is the incarnation itself which RT Mullins brings up in one of his papers. 

I posted this argument three years ago on X. I reformulted it slightly from Ross Inman’s tweet. 

Assume God is identical to all that God is intrinsically.

(1) God is a se

(2) Whatever is a se cannot be dependent in anyway

(3) Whatever exhibits C-structure is dependent

(4) Whatever exhibits C- structure cannot be a se.

(5) God cannot exhibit C-structure of any kind.

C(composite)-structures

C1 Part-Whole structure

C2 Substance-accident

C3 Nature-supposition

C4 Mode-mode  

C5 Essence-existence 

Conciliar Trinitarians & Mereological Trinitarians are both invested to deny (2&4) given C1 & C4. But if premises are denied can simplicity be defended by aseity? I show one can have aseity without Thomistic simplicity perhaps not as well as Chad McIntosh and Paul Gould, but I try

https://www.youtube.com/live/2JG_Pm6nH9Q?si=3eB2d9TXu44r03Zd 

I reviewed Ryan Mullins and Gavin Ortlund’s debate on divine simplicity a while back. This was an argument I formulated feom that debate that may apply to Flynn. 

(1) If God lacks complexity then God lacks parts, properties, aspects, order or structure.

(2) God has order or structure (e.g. divine processions via taxis)

(3) Therefore, God is complex.

Rationalism and Mysterianism

 I am sympathetic to the mysterianism defended by James N Anderson. But I am also committed to constructing a coherent and consistent Christian worldview. So perhaps the latter can be labeled methodological rationalism. 

As Christians we may construct coherent and consistent models of Christian doctrines that may or may not be true. We may remain tentative or agnostic to their truthfulness per our epistemic stance of mysterianism with epistemic humility. Yet we may still construct coherent and consistent models to demonstrate Christian doctrines are not essentially incoherent nor inconsistent.ll

Simplicity and Aseity Revisted

James Dolezal thinks “if God were composed of internal parts, He would still require some external agent to supply unity to those parts, and thus the problem of external dependence would not be avoided ” (TableTalk, May 2022, p6). 

He says something similar, “Any entity composed of parts is dependent upon its parts as causal principles of it being. It is also causally dependent upon whatever agent or composer supplies unity to those parts(Trinity and Divine Simplicity in The Doctine of the Trinity ed. Matthew Barrett).”

But this begs the question. It assumes parts are prior to their whole.  I have encountered a similar argument:  

(1) If parts do not exist to ground/explain their wholes then wholes do not exist.

(2) Wholes do exist 

(3) Therefore, parts exist to ground/explain their wholes. 

But premise (1) has the conclusion of the argument built into the premise. To see this the argument may be reformulated to affirm the opposite conclusion: 

(1)* If wholes do not exist to ground/explain their parts then parts do not exist

(2)* parts do exist 

(3)* Therefore, the whole exist to ground/explain their parts. 

I will not merely asserted (1)* against (1) but offer two counterexamples to (1) to show (1) is false. The first counterexample comes from RT Mullins. He suggests we look to the incarnation. The eternal Son of God assumes a human body and human soul (on compositional accounts) yet remains God. The Son becomes part of the real definition of Jesus of Nazareth. And the real definition of Jesus of Nazareth is part of the real definition of the Son of God. One person in two district natures unified by God. This union of two natures is explained by God. If Dolezal was right then God alone cannot be the sole cause and explanation of God’s own unity in the incarnation. But God is the sole cause and explanation of the incarnation. Therefore, (1) may be rejected. Another counterexample is a perfect triangle. It is a necessary truth that a triangle is a three sided shape with three angles. A perfect triangle, following the Great Tradition of Augustine inspired by Plato, believed a perfect triangle is an uncreated eternal divine idea in the mind of God. A perfect triangle is both uncreated and necessary yet explained by God.  it may be argued the concept of a triangle was never created nor composed (with ontologically separable parts). It is an eternal divine idea. A divine idea that is not an instance of a composite of three (instances?) angles to make a triangle. The divine idea is to be understood properly as the universal that may be instantiated. Thus the very concept of a triangle does seem to possess ontological properties or parts (e.g. three angles, three sides) that avoids the threat of composition in virtue of the fact that the properties or parts are essential, ontologically (and logically?) necessary and inseparable. It is a shape or essence with distinct yet inseparable parts explained by God (as the truthmaker or thought-bearer?). This undermines the plausibility of (1) that assumes inseprable parts necessarily entails composition, any composition cannot compose itself and all composition requires a composer. All of these claims each need to be defended. 

Let’s discuss aseity. A substance is a se if and only if it is neither created, caused nor depends on an another substance for its existence. Parts or properties cannot be a se only substances that bear parts or properties can be a se. Lindsey Cleveland and others argues if God is a complex being then God’s being depends on divine properties to be God. Yet divine properties depend on God’s being to be divine properties. A serious bootstrapping problem ensues. Paul Gould has offered a metaphysical account with substantial priority and real essentialism which overcomes this bootstrapping problem. I will not rehearse all of his reply. But I will sketch some of it. Substances are prior to their parts or properties. Substances are the fundamental asymmetrical ground for their parts or properties. A substance explains the identity and existence of its properties. A substance has a real essential definition for what it is. God is by definition a personal being of a divine kind. I would add a tripersonal being of a divine kind. I take the divine kind essence to be a se (fundamental, self-existence, necessary, self-explanatory) and perfect. The modal status is fixed by the divine essence kind. The divine substance grounds God’s numerically distinct yet inseperable divine properties. God is the property-bearer so the properties are properly divine properties whether essential or accidental.