The incarnation is a great mystery. Let me admit that upfront that God has not revealed the precise mechanics of the incarnation. So Christians have proposed plausible coherent and consistent models or theories of the incarnation—how the mechanics of the incarnation may be—not definitely is. Admittedly these can be quite sophisticated models or theories.
The classical/conciliar incarnation model says the divine Son assumes a human nature. One divine person, namely the divine Son, second person of the Trinity, unites a complete human nature to the divine nature. The Son is the owner of both natures united together, neither divided, mixed nor confused. One person who owns two distinct, conjoined, natures/substances/essences(these terms are typically used synonymously). Each substance has its own distinct essential (or accidental) attributes/properties. I will address whether the divine substance can acquire accidental attributes/properties. But it should be emphasized here in the incarnation the divine substance is united to a district human substance. This union sometimes is loosely understood as an addition but technically the human substance is assumed, conjoined or united to the divine substance. This may sound like splitting hairs but the term ‘added’ or ‘addition’ is only useful provided the terms are understood that one substance is united to another substance. The two substances are not added or mixed together to make a new single substance. There is no substantial change in the union of the two substances.
However, because the terms can be misunderstood to imply a change in God’s essential nature. The terms assumption, union, conjoined or united are preferred. These terms can also be used to further clarify the asymmetrical relation between the divine substance and the human substance of the incarnation. In the incarnation, the human substance depends upon the divine substance for its identity and existence. The divine substance does not depend upon the human substance for its identity and existence. Still it seems in the incarnation a contingent constitutive dependence obtains whereby the divine Son’s identity as the God-man depends on the contingent union of the divine and human natures. Without the human nature the divine Son would remain truly divine but not truly man.
The divine substance and divine attributes are properly understood as essential and necessary—that which God can never be without. It is impossible for God to be without God’s nature and attributes. While the incarnation itself is contingent. The divine Son assumed a human substance (a human physical body and human rational soul). It was possible for our great triune God to not create anything. Yet our great triune God freely created the world from nothing. In Adam, humanity became fallen and ruined in sin. Our great triune God freely chose our redemption in the incarnation of the Son.
Now to the crux of the worry. Can God can become incarnate without any alteration or modification of the divine substance? There are two competing models to make sense of this. The classical/conciliar model says this is possible because God timelessly and immutably intends to be incarnate at specific moments in time. Paul Helm uses an analogy of a timer. Imagine a timer that is eternally and immutably set in advance to produce a specific effect (e.g., turn on a water heater, Christmas lights, heater etc.) at a specific time. If such an analogy is coherent it shows the possibility of an eternal and immutable cause producing a temporal effect. God’s intention is understood as eternal, immutable and contingent to produce the temporal effect of being incarnate at a specific time. This is analogous to the timer. On such a view any changes that occur only apply to the created temporal order. God changeless transcends the created temporal order while timelessly producing temporal effects. There is division on the classical view if God’s external actions are grounded in God’s internal intentions or not. This matters for if God’s contingent intentions were different, then God’s contingent actions would be different. Consequently, there is an explanatory relation between extrinsic change and intrinsic change. If, however, God’s contingent actions could be different, but His intrinsic intentions must remain the same then God’s intentions play not explanatory role in grounding God’s contingent actions. This is quite a strange view that most who affirm divine immutability are not willing to affirm since it makes God’s intentions the same regardless of His actions. God’s intentions become explanatorily vacuous. Others may advocate both God’s intentions and actions must always be the same necessarily. God’s intentions and actions are necessary not contingent. This is the most radical view. It means God must create in order to be God.
If you want to research the classical/conciliar view further I would recommend the work of Paul Helm, Timothy Pawl, Richard Cross and James Dolezal.
Alternatively, to the classical/conciliar view, is a neoclassical view. This is not conciliar so I say that upfront. But I would say it is not necessarily innovative. It seeks to inherit the heart of the Protestant Reformation and Christian tradition but it does not have the same historical heritage as the classical view. Yet it has seeds of it in church history (e.g., John Duns Scotus). The neoclassical view agrees God can become incarnate without any alteration or modification of the divine substance. The neoclassical view sees the classical view as making creation contingent but eternal. This would imply God is coeternal with creation and the incarnation itself is eternal. The divine Son was always incarnate on such a view. God timelessness produces the temporal effect of the Son being incarnate. The neoclassical view may modify simplicity, timelessness, and immutability to avoid these intractable problems. They may take divine simplicity as God is not composed of essential separable or divisible parts or properties. Timelessness may still be affirmed or replaced with divine everlastingness. God is forever. God always exists with no temporal beginning or end. God does not essentially have temporal succession and/or temporal location. Immutability is defined as God does not change in God’s essential nature and character. Notice this definition does not say God cannot change in any way, shape or form. So nothing precludes God from existing eternally and solitarily as triune (without creation) but then freely choosing to create. God exists without creation then freely creates whereby God exists with creation. These type of changes do not affect God’s immutability. What about the incarnation? The neoclassical view may say the divine Son of the Holy Trinity genuinely exists without a human nature logically or temporally prior to creation. The Holy Trinity eternally (logically or temporally) intends the Son to be united to a human nature at a specific moment in time with no ending duration subsequent
to creation. So there really is a pre-incarnate Son on this view. Whereas it is not easy on the classical view to talk of a pre-incarnate Son without qualifications. The divine Son is personally and contingently the subject and property bearer of his human nature while remaining truly God (all views agree to this). But a major difference is the neoclassical view will concede in the incarnation the divine Son undergoes an extrinsic change (e.g., Cambridge change) personally assuming and becoming the subject and bearer of a human nature. This extrinsic change is grounded by an intrinsic change: the Son contingently intends and becomes the subject and bearer of a human nature, which he was neither logically or temporally prior. This can be further clarified: in the incarnation, the Son knows he is incarnate. This contingent knowledge is grounded in God’s work, namely the divine Son’s assumption of a human nature. Prior to the incarnation: the divine Son knows, “I will become incarnate.” In the incarnation the Son knows, “I am incarnate.” The truthmaker of the Son’s mental token of the indexical “I am incarnate” is the fact of being incarnate. Moreover, the Son’s experiential knowledge through his assumed human nature of being incarnate is grounded in his actual experience as incarnate.
The neoclassical view uses the distinction between essential and accidental attributes or properties. God’s essential nature and essential attributes can never change. Yet this does not preclude God from acquiring accidental, non-essential attributes. For example, God can become the Creator and Redeemer. God can stand in the contingent relation of being the Creator or Redeemer of creation which does not fundamentally change God’s essential nature and essential attributes. Thus, it is a contingent and accidental (i.e. non-essential) fact about God that he is both Creator and Redeemer.
How does this apply to the incarnation? Well, it may help clarify that when the divine Son is united to a human nature, this union is contingent and non-essential. It does not fundamentally change the Son’s divine nature or essential attributes. Yet it does count as a genuine change in the Son whereby he becomes the God-man (personally assumes a human nature as its subject and bearer) he was not prior to the incarnation.
If you want to research the neoclassical view further I would recommend reading Thomas Morris, Andrew Loke, Oliver Crisp, Ronald H. Nash, John S. Feinberg, John M. Frame and Robert L. Reymond.
I discuss the incarnation further here:
No comments:
Post a Comment