Philosophy from a Christian Worldview

Some introductory lectures on Metaphysics and Epistemology 

https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLeyAlQUS0aJZHjL8vY-nh7K7y5Q5n1cR2

God and Time

I did a short response to Dr. William Lane Craig's model of divine eternity:

Providentially this reply is fitting for WLC's newest podcast on God and time.  

God is Triune!

Does the God of Christian Theism Exist? Justin Schieber v. Ignacio Reyes

A lot can be said of this debate but I will keep my comments brief. 


Summary

Ignacio Reyes starts the debate with an admission, he doesn't know everything. I take it Reyes's point is that the intelligence of a given debater does not validate his/her position. There is a difference between knowing and showing the Christian worldview is true. Christians can have the former and yet lack the ability to do the latter, for various reasons. Christians can know God exists (independent of arguments or evidences), but face unbelief, without knowing precisely how to show God exists. (Note this is one reason why Christians ought to value biblical apologetics). So, if Reyes doesn't have an answer to a particular argument in the debate, it does not disprove the Christian worldview.

Reyes presents three traditional arguments for God's existence, viz, (1) the cosmological argument, (2) the teleological argument and (3) the argument from the resurrection of Christ. By (1) and (2) he seeks to prove God's existence. With the historical reliability of the New Testament, he argues for (3).  

Justin Schieber frames the debate in terms of two different hypotheses, theism and naturalism, with probability and parsimony as the tools to help support and select between the two rival hypotheses. Schieber argues religious disagreement ( religious diversity?), and gratuitous suffering are probable evidence against theism generally and Christian theism particularly.        

 Reyes takes Schieber's arguments to be predicated upon faulty premises. Reyes argues, contrary to Schieber, religious disagreement (and religious diversity) help support Christian theism. Since Christian theism explains that religious disagreement (and religious diversity) stems from self-deception, rebellion and willful ignorance (e.g. Romans 1:16-24; Acts 17:16-34). Reyes presses Schieber to tackle the cosmological argument, to defend either the universe is divine creation, illusory, or self-sufficient. It strikes me that Reyes argues that gratuitous suffering is question-begging until it's shown there cannot be, in any possible world, a sufficient reason for why God permits suffering. If God, indeed, has a sufficient reason for why He permits suffering, then suffering, qua suffering, cannot be gratuitous. Reyes further elaborates that God uses suffering for a greater good (e.g. Genesis 50:20) which has a butterfly effect.        

Schieber claims the self-existence of the universe is a brute fact. And asserts the body of Jesus was stolen by unknown tomb robbers.  

Evaluation

It is always easier to criticize a debate when you are not the participant in the debate. I applaud Reyes, as a brother in Christ, for his commitment to defend the faith! May my comments and criticisms be taken as constructive and not destructive.

Schieber's reliance on probability is self-destructive. First, probability is predicated on limited, background-relative, data. Such that new data can always skew the results of old data. Thus limited data can be contradicted by new data to show a conclusion true, when it was thought false. Second, probability assumes the regularity of nature. But naturalism cannot account for the regularity of nature (e.g. David Hume's discussion of induction). Since one cannot observe all atoms, at all times, in all places.      

Schieber's rejoinder to the cosmological argument was to opt that the universe is god (i.e. self-existent). Schieber takes the necessity of the universe to be a brute fact as Christian's take God's necessity to be a brute fact. Reyes as a passing remark appeals to the ontological argument. But I wonder what Schieber means by brute fact? Does he think it synonymous with inexplicable?  If so, the Scriptures teach there are no brute facts, only created facts that are all conserved, and connected (e.g. Genesis 1:1; Col 1:16-17 ), by divine decree. Reyes's cosmological argument hinted at this. Something is either contingent or necessary. Something has an explanation for its existence either in an external cause or the necessity of itself. Scripture tells us God is eternally perfect and lacks nothing (which would include necessary existence, e.g. Acts 17:25). His existence is explained by His nature; and He created the universe (Gen 1:1). So God's existence should not be thought of as an inexplicable fact. But can the same thing be said of the universe? Must the universe exist in all possible worlds? There is nothing in the nature of the universe to affirm it (e.g. Reyes makes this same point). It is coherent to imagine a possible world which there is no time, space or matter. So there is no reason to think the universe must exist like God must exist.

Schieber merely gave a naked assertion that Jesus' body was snatched by tomb robbers. There is no reason to think this. It is an example of a philosophical prejudice against miracles generally and the resurrection of Jesus particularly. 

I thought Reyes's opening statement sounded a lot like RC Sproul, Norman Geisler and Frank Turek [1]. He, perhaps, was inspired by them. The traditional arguments for God's existence were presented, as though RC Sproul himself was the one presenting them. It was quite refreshing to hear RC Sproul's formulations of the arguments. Often times one hears the same old formulations of arguments, but not in this debate. But I felt the premises of the arguments were not adequately defended. I am sure time constraints is mostly to be blamed. Yet I was mostly disappointed with Reyes's Classical approach. Since the traditional arguments for God's existence, isolated from the inerrant scriptural context, makes human reason and human experience the standard for truth. Man is placed as judge over God. When only the scriptures can rightly be the standard of truth. Only God has the right to be in the place of judge. Since God's Word is the foundation (norm) for human reason and human experience. However, if God's Word is not placed as ultimate, and is substituted for human reason or human experience, one is left with the intractable problems of rationalism and empiricism (e.g. arbitrary first principles). Only by starting from God's Word can these problems be solved. Therefore God's Word should be taken as the standard that justifies and unifies reason and experience. One should reason from the scriptures instead of reason to the scriptures. Reyes continued to do the latter with little of the former. I think this severely undermined his defense. First, it made him argue for theism generally. He argued for a generic god, a creator and designer, that utterly fails in comparison to the trinitarian God of Scripture. Second, it forced Reyes, in principle, to deny the authority, inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture. Third, it welcomed the unbeliever to judge God and His Word.  Fourth, Reyes assumed the same starting-point as Schieber, in an effort to neutrally defend the faith, leaving them both without a foundation for reason and experience. [2] 

Reyes might reply to my objections as follows: (1a) One cannot presuppose the Trinitarian God of Scripture defending the faith without circular-reasoning, (2a) Christian ontology must be kept distinct from Christian epistemology, and (3a) the principles of reason are undeniable whereas the propositions of Scripture are deniable. In reply to (1a), I'd argue all world views at their basic foundation must argue in a circle. They presuppose an ultimate authority, a self-justifying starting point, that is the final court of appeal. If this is not granted one has an infinite regress. [3] Now (2a) fails to see Christian ontology and Christian epistemology are interdependent. Such that the subject/object distinction or the knower/known distinction can have no (ontic or epistemic) foundation without presupposing the truthfulness of the Christian worldview. I have addressed (3a) already. The laws of logic or reason, is not undeniable, this is why there is irrationality. But if you take the laws as merely undeniable one makes the same mistake as Descartes. One arbitrarily asserts that "logic aims at truth." But this claim cannot be meaningful isolated from the Christian worldview that can account for it.[4]           

Schieber's vain non-christian presuppositions were never directly challenged by Christian presuppositions, thus he continued to reinterpret Reyes's arguments. By not primarily attacking presuppositions, nothing prevented Schieber from arbitrarily asserting his position as superior (i.e. naturalism), selecting evidence in favor of it (theory-ladeness); and renders it immune to contrary evidences (tenacity, confirmation bias). No traditional argument isolated from the Biblical presupposition of Scripture can stop Schieber from making himself (human reason) the final standard/arbiter of truth. Therefore as Christians we should reason from the scriptures to argue without, in principle, putting the Bible aside, or denying the Lord that bought them. We must show existence, truth, goodness, justice, and beauty, can only be made sense of in terms of the Christian worldview. This can take effect in various ways (See me spell it out here). But it always involves comparing worldviews. We show the Christian worldview to be true by demonstrating its logical opposite, the non Christian worldview, is false. Two principles must be followed in this process, (1) no one can be religiously neutral in their beliefs, and (2) no one, except God, can claim the rights of power and authority over all things, especially in intellectual or moral judgements. (3)

 Overall, I am thankful Reyes, defended the Christian faith and, was a witness for Christ to all atheists, especially the San Jose Atheists Society.



[1] Norman Geisler and Frank Turek. I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist (Wheaton: Crossway, 2004) p.75.




[2] Greg Bahnsen. Westminster Lectures.

A Critique of "Classical Apologetics"

John Frame. Van Til and the Ligoner Apologetic 

Gordon Clark. Classical Apologetics 

George J. Zemek, Jr. Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense


[3] Scott K. Oliphint. Answering Objections to Presuppositionalism.

James Anderson. Does Presuppositionalism Engage in Question-Begging?



Christian Apologetics Journal V11 

[4] Faith Before Reason 

Son Eternally Begotten?

Many contemporary theologians I respect (e.g. Dr. Bruce Ware) do not see the eternal generation of the Son in Scripture nor do they see it necessary to preserve Trinitarian theology. This does not prove the eternal begetting of the Son false, but it should give us pause to think through the doctrine carefully. If one wishes to defend the eternal generation of the Son, I think one must clarify the eternal begetting of the Son from the Father. The begetting cannot be contingent on the Father, or else, I fear, we are left with some form of Arianism. Even if we construe it as contingent necessity, it is not necessity. The Father and Son must possess the same essential properties as God. So how, then, should we consider the eternal begetting? We have a choice: either discard the doctrine or revise the doctrine. If we revise the doctrine, I think, the eternal begetting can be understood as necessary. In other words, there can be no possible world which the Father does not beget the Son.

What are your thoughts?             

Dr. Anderson v. Dr. Craig

I recently listened to Dr. William Lane Craig's Reasonable Faith Podcast, in which, he criticized Dr. James Anderson's recent post on middle knowledge. I wanted to direct my readers to Dr. Anderson's reply to Dr. Craig here. Make sure to read Dr. Anderson's interaction with Dr. Greg Welty in the comments.

After thinking through Dr. Craig's criticisms and Dr. Anderson's counter arguments, I wonder what would Dr. Craig say to fictional middle knowledge? Why not consider middle knowledge the same as Dr. Craig's fictionalism? Wouldn't such a view withstand Dr. Travis Campbell's criticisms? It plausibly  would give Calvinists a way of speaking about God's providence, much like possible world semantics, without the metaphysical baggage of excluding counterfactals from God's natural knowledge. Just some thoughts!

      

William Lane Craig and Paul Helm

On the Unbelievable Radio Show, in the UK, Justin Brierly had Dr. William Lane Craig and Paul Helm debate Calvinism and Middle Knowledge. The discussion can be heard here. I just want to make a few points after hearing the debate. First, Dr. Craig does not explain precisely how God can know what free  creatures (i.e. with the ability to will a decision ex nihilo to act or refrain) would do in any given circumstances.   In fact, Dr. Craig merely asserts it is just so that God knows what free creatures (i.e. with the ability to will a decision ex nihilo to act or refrain) could, would, and will, do in any given circumstances. Helm candidly appeals to the mystery in which God determines all things and yet man is still in some sense free. Helm rightly pointed out that Calvinism has sufficient resources needed to account for divine determinism and human freedom in the mystery of God without having to appeal to another mystery, namely Middle knowledge. Helm hints at the analogical nature of determinism between the Creator and the creature as he discusses the wide distinction between the two. I do wish, however, Helm would have shown how causal determinism is not essential to Calvinism but it's consonant with it.


Here are some excellent criticisms of Middle Knowledge by Paul Kjoss Helseth taken from Four Views on Divine Providence:

Universals

If universals exist in God's mind---as conceptual realism maintains--then relations would exist in God's mind prior to Him instancing them. Would not the same be said of concrete things then? If so, then the force of Bill Craig's "real relations argument" against an Atemporal conception of Divine Eternity looses sway. 

Just a thought!      

Objections to the Kalam argument

What is the Kalam argument?

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.


What are some common objections to the Kalam argument?



Are these objections intractable? 

1. Something can come from nothing. 


Dr. Craig writes,

"Sometimes it is said that quantum physics furnishes an exception to premise (1), since on the sub-atomic level events are said to be uncaused. In the same way, certain theories of cosmic origins are interpreted as showing that the whole universe could have sprung into being out of the sub-atomic vacuum or even out of nothingness. Thus the universe is said to be the proverbial “free lunch.” This objection, however, is based on misunderstandings. In the first place, not all scientists agree that sub-atomic events are uncaused. A great many physicists today are quite dissatisfied with this view (the so-called Copenhagen Interpreta- tion) of quantum physics and are exploring deterministic theories like that of David Bohm. Thus, quantum physics is not a proven exception to premise (1).36 Second, even on the traditional, indeterministic interpretation, particles do not come into being out of nothing. They arise as spontaneous fluctuations of the energy contained in the sub-atomic vacuum, which constitutes an indeterministiccause of their origination. Third, the same point can be made about theories of the origin of the universe out of a primordial vacuum. Popular magazine articles tout- ing such theories as getting “something from nothing” simply do not understand that the vacuum is not nothing but is a sea of fluctuating energy endowed with a rich structure and subject to physical laws. Such models do not therefore involve a true origination ex nihilo. [1] 

"Sometimes skeptics will respond to this point [premise 1] by saying that in physics
subatomic particles (so-called “virtual particles”) come into being from
nothing. Or certain theories of the origin of the universe are sometimes
described in popular magazines as getting something from nothing, so that
the universe is the exception to the proverb “There ain’t no free lunch.” 

This skeptical response represents a deliberate abuse of science. The theories in question have to do with particles originating as a fluctuation of the energy contained in the vacuum. The vacuum in modern physics is not what the layman understands by “vacuum,” namely, nothing. Rather in physics the vacuum is a sea of fluctuating energy governed by physical laws and having a physical structure. To tell laymen that on such theories something comes from nothing is a distortion of those theories.                                                                                                                                        

Properly understood, “nothing” does not mean just empty space. Nothing is the absence of anything whatsoever, even space itself. As such, nothingness has literally no properties at all, since there isn’t anything to have any properties! How silly, then, when popularizers say things like “Nothingness is unstable” or “The universe tunneled into being out of nothing”![2]

2. The argument does not entail the cause must be omnipotent, omniscient, and good. 
This is true and that is why Craig doesn't conclude the cause must be omnipotent, omniscient and good. Craig would say this is why further arguments must be given, like the modal ontological argument,  moral argument, or the resurrection of Jesus, to show the cause must be omnipotent, omniscient, and good found in the person of Jesus Christ. Moreover, to argue some minds are dependent on brains to think does not entail all minds are dependent upon brains to think.  

3. If an actual infinite cannot exist then an infinite God cannot.

Dr. Craig writes,

"Rather the key to your question is to understand that the mathematical notion of an actual infinite is a quantitative concept. It concerns a collection of definite and discrete elements that are members of the collection. But when theologians speak of the infinity of God, they are not using the word in a mathematical sense to refer to an aggregate of an infinite number of elements. God's infinity is, as it were, qualitative, not quantitative. It means that God is metaphysically necessary, morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and so on.

Really "infinity" is just a sort of umbrella term used to cover all of God's superlative attributes. If you abstract away all of those attributes, there really isn't any distinct attribute called "infinity" left over. But none of those attributes need involve an infinite number of things. To take ...[an] example..., omniscience need not entail knowing an infinite number of, say, propositions, much less having an infinite number of thoughts; nor need we think of omnipotence as entailing the ability to do an infinite number of actions.1 When we define omniscience as knowledge of only and all true propositions, we are expressing the extent of God's knowledge, not its mode. The mode of God's knowledge has traditionally been taken to be non-propositional in nature. God has a single undivided intuition of reality, which we finite knowers break up into individual bits of information called propositions. Thus, the number of propositions is at best potentially infinite. Similarly, omnipotence is not defined in terms of quanta of power possessed by God or number of actions God can perform but in terms of His ability to actualize states of affairs. As such it involves no commitment to an actual infinity of things. Therefore, there's no reason to think that God is susceptible to the sort of quantitative analysis imagined by the objection.

Thus, denying that God is actually infinite in the quantitative sense in no way implies that God is finite. This inference does not follow, since the quantitative sense of infinity may be simply inapplicable to God."[3]

4. William Lane Craig is presupposing Christianity.

Of course Dr. Craig presupposes Christianity, just as much as naturalists presuppose naturalism. No one comes to the evidence in a neutral way. Neutrality is a myth, and this is why Craig must be more upfront to this fact. But to criticize Craig for doing the very thing the naturalist is doing is hypocritical. It is a double standard at its best!  




---------------------------------------------
[1] Dr. William Lane Craig. Reasonable Faith (Wheaton: Crossway, 2008).p.p.114-115
[2] Dr. William Lane Craig. On Gurad (Colorado Springs: David C Cook, 2010)p.76.
[3] Dr. William Lane Craig. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-god-actually-infinite#ixzz2oKhGKuOS 

Craig, Providence, and Calvinism

Dr. William Lane Craig lists five objections against a Calvinistic conception of providence in the book above. Craig's five objections can be summarized as follows:

1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures (indications of a robust doctrine of human freedom).
2. Calvinism is self-refuting.
3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin.
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience is illusory.

1. Calvinism is exegetically unfaithful to the Scriptures.

Craig merely asserts Calvinism is contrary to the plain teachings of Scripture. He does not exegete any text to argue the supposed exegetical shortcomings of Calvinism. Craig claims Calvinism undermines all scriptural texts that affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency."I fail to see how Calvinism cannot affirm "genuine indeterminacy and contingency," if God (analogically) determines them.

2. Calvinism is self-refuting.

Simply to say one believes Calvinism given the truth of Calvinism seems trivial. But Craig sees this as self-refuting. Since a person is determined to believe in determinism, (somehow) this determined belief is not acquired rationally, but why not? Craig is assuming latently by this objection Calvinism entails causal determinism. But there is no obvious reason why it must. In fact, many Calvinists would adopt an analogical understanding of determinism whereby God determines C by X and man determines C by Y. On such a view divine causation is not taken as univocal, but, rather analogical.

3. Calvinism makes God the author of sin. 

“…God is the first efficient cause of everything, but evil has come, not from His first act, but by a second act, an act of creatures.

God is the author of the author of sin, He cannot be the author of sin itself, for sin is the result of a rebellion against God. 

If God is not the author of sin, at least He must be charged with being responsible for sin…A little reflection on the subject will show the contradiction involved in charging God with responsibility. Let us ask one question: Responsible to whom, or to what?...Obviously  if we are talking about the Almighty, He already is the highest power there is. Therefore, when God decreed this type of universe where Christ was to die for the sins of all who believe, God was responsible to none but Himself.” [1]

“God is neither responsible nor sinful, even though He is the only ultimate cause of everything. He is not sinful because in the first place whatever God does is just and right. It is just and right simply in virtue of the fact that He does it. Justice or righteousness is not a standard external to God to which God is obligated to submit. Righteousness is what God does…God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids Him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness. Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. But God is “Ex-lex.” [2]

“(1) Necessarily, if God exists he is all-good.

 (2) God exists and ordains whatsoever comes to pass.

 (3) Necessarily, if A is a human action then A is causally determined.

 (4) There are morally evil human actions.

 (5) Either God is the morally culpable author of the morally evil actions or human beings are   their sole morally culpable authors.

 (6) (1) and the first disjunct of (5) are formally inconsistent.

 (7)(1),(3) and the second disjunct of (5) are not formally inconsistent.

 (8)Any agent who freely and knowingly sets up a deterministic process with a certain outcome must be responsible for that outcome.

 (9) Wherever one person X causes another person Y to do moral evil X does moral evil.

 (10) Wherever one person X upholds another person Y and knowingly that Y will do evil does not prevent Y from doing evil, X does moral evil.

    

…moreover, it is by no means clear that even if X does moral evil he is doing the same moral evil as Y. Moreover, whether or not X is guilty of moral evil is presumably a matter of what rule or law X has broken or whether his upholding and permitting of X to act in an evil manner is in furtherance of some greater good for which X’s evil act is a logically necessary condition. It is not obvious that either a law has been broken in such a case, or that X’s evil act in not a logically necessary condition for the achieving of certain further goods.”[3]

“Since our moral duties are grounded in the divine commands, they are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since he does not issue commands to himself.

If God does not fulfill moral duties then what content can be given to the claim he is good? Here Kant’s distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule has proved helpful. God may act naturally in ways which for us would be rule following and so constitutive of goodness in the sense of fulfilling our moral duties, so that God can be said similarly to be good in an analogical way….God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of his own character.” [4]

             
4. Calvinism destroys human freedom.
Instead of rehearsing the, already mentioned, alternative to causal determinism in favor of compatibilism, I'd like to focus on Craig's offered alternative. He would say libertarian freedom is the only view that rightly upholds human freedom. On such view a subject is free if the subject makes a choice without any sufficient or necessary causal conditions. Any given person, with the options of X or Y, to be free should have the ability to choose between the two (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices). But how is such a view any more plausible? Given the fact that a person can choose between X or Y (independently of any other factors such as genes, dispositions, desires, customs, and practices) amounts to the person being indifferent. Why then should an indifferent person chose one thing over another? I think Craig wants to say, simply because the agent reasoned to will one choice over another. It seems to me, then, this freedom of indifference make a person's choice utterly arbitrary. Reason being that any given reason why a person should choose X, an identical reason can be given to choose Y. [5]

5. Calvinism entails human thought and experience are illusory. 

Quite the contrary, if analogical determinism is true. But for the sake of argument, even if causal determinism is true,  it would not entail human experience is illusory given the fact that on such a view there really is secondary causes. And therefore, people are not rightly construed as puppets in the hands of God; instead they're agents that possess knowledge, volition, purpose, and deliberation. 

[1] Edward John Carnell. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1981. pp.302-303.
[2]Gordon H. Clark. Christian Philosophy, vol 4. Unicoi: Trinity Foundation, 2004. p. 269.
[3]Paul Helm. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.pp.161-162.
[4]Morland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview.Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003.pp.531-532.
[5] I take this point from the insights of Bruce Ware, John Frame, and Ronald Nash. 

Evaluation of William Lane Craig's Model

              Evaluation of William Lane Craig’s Model Of Divine Eternity

In the essay “Timelessness and Omnitemporality,” William Lane Craig argues God’s relation to time is best understood as “timeless” sans creation and “temporal” subsequent to creation. God exists without time, but chooses to create time, space, and matter; and at that moment, he exists in time. Thus we can summarize Craig’s thesis in the form of two propositions: (1) God is timeless without creation; (2) God is temporal with creation. What follows from these propositions is that God is not essentially timeless, but is contingently timeless. Hence, for Craig, timelessness is not an essential property of God qua God. Craig admits he espouses an A-theory[1] of time that the past, present, and future are metaphysically distinct. The past goes out of existence, the present exists, and the future yet exists. Craig is happy to affirm presentism. He believes the only events of time that metaphysically exist, are those in the present. So there can be no parts or events of time, except those in the present. Craig develops his thesis by surveying many arguments. I want to note only a few of his main arguments for (2), and argue they are inconclusive.

Craig’s strongest argument in favor of (2) is from “divine relations with the world;” it is one that many can understand without an extensive background in philosophy. Craig thinks God must be affected by the temporal world in which he creates. God cannot create a changing world without also exhibiting changes[2] himself and thereby being temporal. Craig argues if God creates a temporal world, he gains a new relation with it. An example would be helpful at this point. Imagine a person in an empty room. Suppose the person is alone but brings a plant into the room. The person gains a new relation with the plant. The person changes from a state of solitude to a state of relationship with the plant. As the plant changes so does the person’s relation. If the plant is two inches one week, and grows an inch the next week, the person’s relation to the plant changes (i.e. a relation with a two-inch plant becomes a relation with a three-inch plant). This example highlights an extrinsic change. At minimum, Craig argues, God undergoes an extrinsic change from a state of existing alone to co-existing with creation. Craig sees this as a change of real relations. God chooses to possess a real relation with the world he did not have sans creation. Craig takes this as evidence that God is temporal subsequent to creation. Craig writes, “ Thus even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to his creation of the world, he undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws him into time in virtue of his real relation to the world.”[3] Craig summarizes his argument as follows:

1. God is creatively active in the temporal world.

2. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, God is really related to the temporal world.

3. If God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal.

4. Therefore, God is temporal.[4]

Craig’s argument looks promising, but is it implausible to think that a timeless God can create a temporal world without extrinsic change? Given Craig’s commitment to an A-theory of time, I think Craig should make the stronger claim that it is logically impossible.  Since in all possible worlds [5] in which God creates W, God gains a new relation to W.[6] But if this is true, then any possible world God creates, an extrinsic change obtains. In effect, God cannot create any state of affairs without ceasing to be timeless. But cannot W be substituted for contingent things that are not temporal? Craig grants this possibility but finds it implausible. Creation would not be a temporal event but eternal. Such a view assumes the B-theory of time that the passage of time—things going in and out of existence—is exclusively a feature of the human mind. The events of the past, present, and future equally exist, and the division of time as past, present, and future is merely an epistemic than ontic distinction. Thus creation would only exist if and only if God eternally creates it. But Craig dispels this view on the grounds it denies a robust doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Furthermore, Craig deduces if such a view were true, then there would be no possible world in which God could exist without creation. But such a modal notion is unacceptable for robust doctrines, of God and creation, faithful to the Biblical data.[7] Therefore, Craig concludes, we have good reason to believe the event of creation was temporal. God, by virtue of creation, gains a new relation that entails entrance into time.        

              

Craig argues, further, that God must undergo an internal change whereby his knowledge of the temporal world changes. This is in virtue of what Craig describes as “tensed facts.” Craig understands facts [8] refer to all details or bits of information about the world that can be expressed in a true declarative sentence.[9] And tense, like in language, locates things in relation to the present. Craig distinguishes between tense and tenseless facts expressed in sentences.  For instance, “all bachelors are unmarried males,” and “ In 2012 the United States reelects Barrack Obama President.”[10] Both sentences express tenseless truths. Dates can be included in sentences to express and locate tenseless truths in time. The latter example with a year and tenseless verb targets this fact (of Obama’s reelection) tenselessly in time. Nevertheless, given this truth, we cannot know when Obama’s reelection as President took place without knowledge of 2012 being past or future. Now suppose we change the verb from tenseless to tensed by replacing the word ‘reelects’ with ‘reelected.’ By replacing the verb to ‘reelected’ we know the event has occurred, but prior to 2012 the tensed fact of Obama’s reelection as President is false. In order for the sentence to remain true, it must be future-tensed such as “will reelect.” Craig concludes that tensed sentences, unlike tenseless sentences with a fixed truth-value, change in truth-value relative to the present. Now let us apply Craig’s thesis about tensed facts to God’s knowledge. In order for God to know the changes of time God’s knowledge must change. For example it was 11:22pm, but now it’s 11:23pm. Such tensed facts go in and out of existence from true to false. God must know these facts with omniscience. Yet facts cannot be both true and false at the same time and sense. Logic prohibits this. So God being omniscient must know when tensed facts change from true to false. However one must be in time to know when any tensed fact is true or false. Therefore, God must be temporal. Craig formulates this argument from tensed facts for divine temporality:

1. A temporal world exists.

2. God is omniscient.

3. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows tensed facts.

4. If God is timeless, he does not know tensed facts.

5. Therefore, God is not timeless.

Evaluation

Craig is not forthcoming about the concept of a real relation. Craig gets this concept from Thomas Aquinas[11] without any alternatives to it. Craig’s argument from divine relations may be sufficient in defense of (1) and (2) but not enough to ground them as necessary. I can propose an alternative model that can account for Craig’s argument without kenoticizing timelessness. This would make Craig’s argument inconclusive. Suppose God is essentially timeless; and he eternally decrees his essential timeless nature be united with a contingent temporal nature. With the two natures, God would be both timeless in one sense and temporal in another. God would take part in both a timeless and temporal existence. God would think all truths at once timelessly; and he would also in his temporal existence think all truths temporally in successive moments. If such a view is coherent, I think it can account for Craig’s argument, and show it inconclusive.             

Craig’s argument from tensed facts can be recast, if we take time, as an experience. The argument is, roughly, if God does not have experiences of time, and humans have experiences of time, then God cannot know the experiences humans have of time. But God is omniscient, and thus knows the experiences humans have of time; therefore, God knows experiences of time and must be temporal. This, indeed, is an oversimplification, but it captures what is prevalent in Craig’s argument. Only those in time can know things in time. But this suffers the same problems as empiricism.  The problem is aptly expressed by the saying, “a person can know poison kills without swallowing it.” A person can know an item of knowledge without acquiring it. It is plausible that God can know tensed facts in virtue of divine omniscience and providence. This would require no acquisition of knowledge on God’s part. Craig rightly states tensed facts can change from being true to false or vice versa at any given moment. But it is possible that God is the one directing these changes by a timeless decree. Perhaps God is revealing and/or filling in the details of every event in time by timeless providence. If this were the case, then God would know tensed facts. Obviously this reply is unacceptable to Craig given his prior commitments to the A-theory of time. But cannot the same thing be said with the A-theory of time? In my judgment, it is possible.[12] Suppose God by an eternal decree creates the world. Granted that creation is a temporal event. Included in this decree are all the events that are to occur in time and the duration of their existence. With the assumption of presentism, it’s plausible to imagine God eternally sustains and directs only the present. God eternally creates and sustains a timeline of events, and the only events that God continually sustains are those presently occurring. As God ceases to sustain an event by eternal decree, it makes the event a past event. The passage of time would be real since God by eternal decree makes past events cease to exist. Such a model plausibly fits with the A-theory of time without abdicating God of timelessness. But Craig’s argument by tensed facts becomes inconsistent.  He simply asserts[13] God must know future contingent propositions[14] in virtue of omniscience.[15]Yet Craig will not apply the same reasoning to God knowing tensed facts. Craig argues that, “As a perfect being, the greatest conceivable being, God simply possesses essentially knowledge of only and all truths; future contingent propositions [i.e. truths about the future] are among the truths that there are; therefore God possesses essential knowledge of future contingents.”[16] But why not understand this argument to include knowledge of tensed facts? Craig’s argument here does not preclude God from having knowledge of tensed facts by omniscience. Craig to be consistent must admit God knows both future and tensed facts in virtue of omniscience or run the risk of a double standard. Craig’s analysis of divine omniscience seems quite arbitrary, since he picks and chooses what should be included within the scope of God’s knowledge. He affirms God knows future facts without a metaphysical ground (of how precisely God can know them);[17] yet he denies God can know tensed facts without the metaphysical ground of temporality.    

Craig divides God’s knowledge into three logical moments. God possess natural knowledge of all facts that could exist for any given possible world. Since God freely created the actual world, he enjoys free-knowledge of all the facts that will obtain in the actual world. Craig contends God has middle knowledge, and thus knows if the arrangement of facts that comprise any given possible world were different, God would know what would be the arrangement or outcome of facts. Craig believes God has knowledge of counterfactuals [18] prior to creation; [19] and God uses this knowledge to create the world. Craig asserts counterfactuals gain their truth-values from the facts that make up a given possible world.[20] If this is the case, I see no reason why temporal relation of facts should not be included in the make up of a given possible world as one property that determines the truth-value of counterfactuals. Craig’s argument, although long, is as follows:

1.If there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then God knows these truths.

2.There are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

3.If God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God knows them either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.

4.Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be known only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.

5. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

6. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.

7. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to the divine creative decree.[21]

Does this argument entail that God would know tensed facts (about free creatures) in all possible temporal worlds[22]even if such worlds were not actualized? It seems plausibly! If so, then Craig admits a timeless God can know tensed facts since Craig believes God is timeless prior to creation. On the other hand, if Craig says God does not know all tensed facts of all possible temporal worlds then God does not know all counterfactuals prior to the creative decree. If this is true, Craig’s argument fails to prove God knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Likewise, if Craig denies God knows tensed facts of all possible temporal worlds prior to creation, he undercuts God’s omniscience.

Conclusion

Craig’s arguments from “divine relations of the world” and tensed facts are inconclusive to demonstrate God is (1) timeless without creation and (2) temporal subsequent to creation. Craig’s arguments for (2) fail to meet both sufficient and necessary conditions to ground them true. Craig is inconsistent to hold that God knows future contingent propositions without a metaphysical ground of how precisely God can know them in virtue of omniscience; and yet he argues, God cannot know tensed facts unless we metaphysically ground this knowledge in God being temporal and omniscient. Craig’s inconsistency reveals arbitrariness on how Craig chooses what should be included in God’s knowledge. The most devastating critique, assuming Craig's model, is if God must be temporal to know tensed facts, then God cannot know tensed facts of any temporal possible world (logically) prior to creation given (1). Craig’s argument from tensed facts in support of (2) undermines omniscience and middle knowledge from (1). In effect, by Craig defending (2), he must deny (1).    

Construction

If, as Craig argues, God is timeless sans creation and temporal with creation how precisely can God be temporal? Did He already possess the properties necessary to be temporal prior to creation? What are those properties? How are we to understand God as temporal and yet immutable (without falling into a minimalist position)? Did God in His essential nature change with creation? Why not postulate a model similar to the incarnation with Christ’s hypostatic union? Is it logically possible that God has two eternal natures one essential the other contingent? If such a model were even logically possible then wouldn’t it affirm both God is timeless (in one nature) and temporal (in another)? What would such a model look like? God would have two natures, much like the incarnation, in which God would exist qua God, with all the properties of both natures attributed to the three persons without confusing the two natures. But what would these natures and properties be?  The first nature, that is uncontroversial, would be the traditional understanding of God’s essence with all the properties that should properly be attributed to God (which would include timelessness). The second nature, somewhat controversial, would be in some sense spatial and therefore temporal. The nature need not be thought of as physical. It could be similar to that of angelic beings that are incorporeal, spatial, and temporal.               

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[1] Craig uses the terms ‘dynamic’ theory or ‘A’ theory to refer to his view of time.    

[2] The change might be construed as a mere Cambridge change. See Richard Swinburne. The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: U. P. Oxford, 1977), 212-213. 

[3] William Lane Craig.“Timelessness and Omnitemporality.” God and Time: Four Views. Ed. Gregory E. Ganssle. (Downers Grove: IV Press, 2001), 141.

[4] Ibid.,p.141.

[5] Possible worlds, for those not trained in Philosophy, refer to the different ways God could have created the world.

[6] The same can be said of contingent things. If God creates a contingent thing W in any possible world, then he gains a new relation to W in any possible world; a relation he did not possess (logically) prior to creation of W.      

[7] Ibid.,pp. 65-66. I think Craig would also say such a view is an attack on the self-sufficiency and aseity of God. See J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003), 504-505. 

[8] Craig explains factual content and propositional content are identical. Ibid.,p.145.

[9] .” Ibid.,p. 145. Craig defines a fact as “the state of affairs described by a true declarative sentence.” But in other writings Craig defines a proposition in terms of information content expressed in a declarative sentence. See William Lane Craig, What Does God Know? Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002),19-20. See also J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003)136-137. 

[10] My example of Obama is inspired by Craig’s example of Kennedy; however, the examples are different in content. Craig’s example refers to the pledge given by Kennedy; my example refers to the reelection of Obama. Ibid.,p.145.

[11] Paul Helm. “Divine Timeless Eternity.” God and Time: Four Views. Ed. Gregory E. Ganssle. (Downers Grove: IV Press, 2001),47-48.

[12] Leibniz would be an interesting case example. I think a person that espoused a process theory of time and accepted Leibniz’s metaphysical doctrines--pre-established harmony and notions--could argue God must know tensed facts without being temporal. It would be based on a strong view of divine providence.   

[13] See William Lane Craig. What Does God Know? Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002),40-41. Also The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 123.

[14] Future contingent propositions are true facts about the future.

[15] Paul Kjoss Helseth draws the same conclusion in his response to Craig’s essay. In Four Views of Divine Providence. Ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Dennis W. Jowers. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011),104.

[16] Craig, William Lane. What Does God Know? Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002), 40.

[17] I assume here there are counterfactuals prevolitional to God’s decree simply to make the argument against Craig. But I think counterfactuals are grounded in God’s natural knowledge and therefore, do not exist apart from God.   

[18] Ibid.,p.41. Counterfactuals are conditional statements in the subjective mood. For example, if Judas were offered 30 pieces of silver then he would betray Jesus. They are “if-then” statements.

[19] Ibid., pp.43-45. This is called middle knowledge or hypothetical knowledge. It is the idea that God not only knows what could happen or what will happen, but he also knows what would happen under any given circumstances.

[20] Ibid., p.56. Here Craig replies to the grounding objection against middle knowledge. By Craig’s reply I cannot help but think how Craig can consistently be a molinist and nominalist. Craig grants God universal knowledge prior to creation without concrete objects. Given Craig’s molinism, he ought to side with a version of theistic conceptual.

[21] Ibid.,p.51-52.

[22] e.g. In W1, if Judas is offered 30 pieces of silver at T1, then he will betray Jesus.