Evaluation of William Lane
Craig’s Model Of Divine Eternity
In the essay “Timelessness and Omnitemporality,” William Lane Craig argues God’s relation to time
is best understood as “timeless” sans creation and “temporal” subsequent to
creation. God exists without time, but chooses to create time, space, and
matter; and at that moment, he exists in time. Thus we can summarize Craig’s
thesis in the form of two propositions: (1) God is timeless without creation;
(2) God is temporal with creation. What follows from these propositions is that
God is not essentially timeless, but is contingently timeless. Hence, for
Craig, timelessness is not an essential property of God qua God. Craig admits
he espouses an A-theory[1]
of time that the past, present, and future are metaphysically distinct. The
past goes out of existence, the present exists, and the future yet exists.
Craig is happy to affirm presentism. He believes the only events of time that
metaphysically exist, are those in the present. So there can be no parts or
events of time, except those in the present. Craig develops his thesis by
surveying many arguments. I want to note only a few of his main arguments for
(2), and argue they are inconclusive.
Craig’s strongest argument in favor of (2) is from
“divine relations with the world;” it is one that many can understand without
an extensive background in philosophy. Craig thinks God must be affected by the
temporal world in which he creates. God cannot create a changing world without
also exhibiting changes[2]
himself and thereby being temporal. Craig argues if God creates a temporal
world, he gains a new relation with it. An example would be helpful at this
point. Imagine a person in an empty room. Suppose the person is alone but
brings a plant into the room. The person gains a new relation with the plant.
The person changes from a state of solitude to a state of relationship with the
plant. As the plant changes so does the person’s relation. If the plant is two
inches one week, and grows an inch the next week, the person’s relation to the
plant changes (i.e. a relation with a two-inch plant becomes a relation with a
three-inch plant). This example highlights an extrinsic change. At minimum,
Craig argues, God undergoes an extrinsic change from a state of existing alone
to co-existing with creation. Craig sees this as a change of real relations.
God chooses to possess a real relation with the world he did not have sans
creation. Craig takes this as evidence that God is temporal subsequent to creation.
Craig writes, “ Thus even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to
his creation of the world, he undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of
creation which draws him into time in virtue of his real relation to the
world.”[3]
Craig summarizes his argument as follows:
1. God is creatively active in the temporal world.
2. If God is creatively active in the temporal world,
God is really related to the temporal world.
3. If God is really related to the temporal world,
God is temporal.
4. Therefore, God is temporal.[4]
Craig’s argument looks promising, but is it
implausible to think that a timeless God can create a temporal world without
extrinsic change? Given Craig’s commitment to an A-theory of time, I think
Craig should make the stronger claim that it is logically impossible. Since in all possible worlds [5]
in which God creates W, God gains a new relation to W.[6]
But if this is true, then any possible world God creates, an extrinsic change
obtains. In effect, God cannot create any state of affairs without ceasing to
be timeless. But cannot W be substituted for contingent things that are not
temporal? Craig grants this possibility but finds it implausible. Creation
would not be a temporal event but eternal. Such a view assumes the B-theory of
time that the passage of time—things going in and out of existence—is
exclusively a feature of the human mind. The events of the past, present, and
future equally exist, and the division of time as past, present, and future is
merely an epistemic than ontic distinction. Thus creation would only exist if
and only if God eternally creates it. But Craig dispels this view on the
grounds it denies a robust doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Furthermore, Craig deduces if such a view were
true, then there would be no possible world in which God could exist without
creation. But such a modal notion is unacceptable for robust doctrines, of God
and creation, faithful to the Biblical data.[7]
Therefore, Craig concludes, we have good reason to believe the event of
creation was temporal. God, by virtue of creation, gains a new relation that
entails entrance into time.
Craig argues, further, that God must undergo an
internal change whereby his knowledge of the temporal world changes. This is in
virtue of what Craig describes as “tensed facts.” Craig understands facts [8]
refer to all details or bits of information about the world that can be
expressed in a true declarative sentence.[9]
And tense, like in language, locates things in relation to the present. Craig
distinguishes between tense and tenseless facts expressed in sentences. For instance, “all bachelors are
unmarried males,” and “ In 2012 the United States reelects Barrack Obama
President.”[10] Both
sentences express tenseless truths. Dates can be included in sentences to
express and locate tenseless truths in time. The latter example with a year and
tenseless verb targets this fact (of Obama’s reelection) tenselessly in time.
Nevertheless, given this truth, we cannot know when Obama’s reelection as
President took place without knowledge of 2012 being past or future. Now
suppose we change the verb from tenseless to tensed by replacing the word
‘reelects’ with ‘reelected.’ By replacing the verb to ‘reelected’ we know the
event has occurred, but prior to 2012 the tensed fact of Obama’s reelection as
President is false. In order for the sentence to remain true, it must be
future-tensed such as “will reelect.” Craig concludes that tensed sentences,
unlike tenseless sentences with a fixed truth-value, change in truth-value relative
to the present. Now let us apply Craig’s thesis about tensed facts to God’s
knowledge. In order for God to know the changes of time God’s knowledge must
change. For example it was 11:22pm, but now it’s 11:23pm. Such tensed facts go
in and out of existence from true to false. God must know these facts with
omniscience. Yet facts cannot be both true and false at the same time and
sense. Logic prohibits this. So God being omniscient must know when tensed
facts change from true to false. However one must be in time to know when any
tensed fact is true or false. Therefore, God must be temporal. Craig formulates
this argument from tensed facts for divine temporality:
1. A temporal world exists.
2. God is omniscient.
3. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient,
God knows tensed facts.
4. If God is timeless, he does not know tensed facts.
5. Therefore, God is not timeless.
Evaluation
Craig is not forthcoming about the concept of a real
relation. Craig gets this concept from Thomas Aquinas[11]
without any alternatives to it. Craig’s argument from divine relations may be
sufficient in defense of (1) and (2) but not enough to ground them as
necessary. I can propose an alternative model that can account for Craig’s
argument without kenoticizing timelessness. This would make Craig’s argument
inconclusive. Suppose God is essentially timeless; and he eternally decrees his
essential timeless nature be united with a contingent temporal nature. With the
two natures, God would be both timeless in one sense and temporal in another.
God would take part in both a timeless and temporal existence. God would think
all truths at once timelessly; and he would also in his temporal existence
think all truths temporally in successive moments. If such a view is coherent, I
think it can account for Craig’s argument, and show it inconclusive.
Craig’s argument from tensed facts can be recast, if
we take time, as an experience. The argument is, roughly, if God does not have
experiences of time, and humans have experiences of time, then God cannot know
the experiences humans have of time. But God is omniscient, and thus knows the
experiences humans have of time; therefore, God knows experiences of time and
must be temporal. This, indeed, is an oversimplification, but it captures what
is prevalent in Craig’s argument. Only those in time can know things in time.
But this suffers the same problems as empiricism. The problem is aptly expressed by the saying, “a person can
know poison kills without swallowing it.” A person can know an item of
knowledge without acquiring it. It is plausible that God can know tensed facts
in virtue of divine omniscience and providence. This would require no
acquisition of knowledge on God’s part. Craig rightly states tensed facts can
change from being true to false or vice versa at any given moment. But it is
possible that God is the one directing these changes by a timeless decree.
Perhaps God is revealing and/or filling in the details of every event in time
by timeless providence. If this were the case, then God would know tensed
facts. Obviously this reply is unacceptable to Craig given his prior
commitments to the A-theory of time. But cannot the same thing be said with the
A-theory of time? In my judgment, it is possible.[12]
Suppose God by an eternal decree creates the world. Granted that creation is a
temporal event. Included in this decree are all the events that are to occur in
time and the duration of their existence. With the assumption of presentism,
it’s plausible to imagine God eternally sustains and directs only the present.
God eternally creates and sustains a timeline of events, and the only events
that God continually sustains are those presently occurring. As God ceases to
sustain an event by eternal decree, it makes the event a past event. The
passage of time would be real since God by eternal decree makes past events
cease to exist. Such a model plausibly fits with the A-theory of time without
abdicating God of timelessness. But Craig’s argument by tensed facts becomes
inconsistent. He simply asserts[13]
God must know future contingent propositions[14]
in virtue of omniscience.[15]Yet
Craig will not apply the same reasoning to God knowing tensed facts. Craig
argues that, “As a perfect being, the greatest conceivable being, God simply possesses
essentially knowledge of only and all truths; future contingent propositions
[i.e. truths about the future] are among the truths that there are; therefore
God possesses essential knowledge of future contingents.”[16]
But why not understand this argument to include knowledge of tensed facts?
Craig’s argument here does not preclude God from having knowledge of tensed
facts by omniscience. Craig to be consistent must admit God knows both future
and tensed facts in virtue of omniscience or run the risk of a double standard.
Craig’s analysis of divine omniscience seems quite arbitrary, since he picks
and chooses what should be included within the scope of God’s knowledge. He
affirms God knows future facts without a metaphysical ground (of how precisely
God can know them);[17]
yet he denies God can know tensed facts without the metaphysical ground of
temporality.
Craig divides God’s knowledge into three logical
moments. God possess natural knowledge of all facts that could exist for any given possible world. Since God freely
created the actual world, he enjoys free-knowledge of all the facts that will obtain in the actual world. Craig contends God has
middle knowledge, and thus knows if the arrangement of facts that comprise any
given possible world were different, God would know what would be the arrangement or outcome of facts. Craig
believes God has knowledge of counterfactuals [18]
prior to creation; [19]
and God uses this knowledge to create the world. Craig asserts counterfactuals
gain their truth-values from the facts that make up a given possible world.[20]
If this is the case, I see no reason why temporal relation of facts should not
be included in the make up of a given possible world as one property that
determines the truth-value of counterfactuals. Craig’s argument, although long,
is as follows:
1.If there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom,
then God knows these truths.
2.There are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
3.If God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom,
God knows them either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only
logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
4.Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be known
only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
5. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom.
6. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically
posterior to the divine creative decree.
7. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom logically prior to the divine creative decree.[21]
Does this argument entail that God would know tensed facts
(about free creatures) in all possible temporal worlds[22]even
if such worlds were not actualized? It seems plausibly! If so, then Craig
admits a timeless God can know tensed facts since Craig believes God is
timeless prior to creation. On the other hand, if Craig says God does not know
all tensed facts of all possible temporal worlds then God does not know all
counterfactuals prior to the creative decree. If this is true, Craig’s argument
fails to prove God knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Likewise, if
Craig denies God knows tensed facts of all possible temporal worlds prior to
creation, he undercuts God’s omniscience.
Conclusion
Craig’s arguments from “divine relations of the
world” and tensed facts are inconclusive to demonstrate God is (1) timeless
without creation and (2) temporal subsequent to creation. Craig’s arguments for
(2) fail to meet both sufficient and necessary conditions to ground them true.
Craig is inconsistent to hold that God knows future contingent propositions
without a metaphysical ground of how precisely God can know them in virtue of
omniscience; and yet he argues, God cannot know tensed facts unless we
metaphysically ground this knowledge in God being temporal and omniscient.
Craig’s inconsistency reveals arbitrariness on how Craig chooses what should be
included in God’s knowledge. The most devastating critique, assuming Craig's
model, is if God must be temporal to know tensed facts, then God cannot know
tensed facts of any temporal possible world (logically) prior to creation given
(1). Craig’s argument from tensed facts in support of (2) undermines
omniscience and middle knowledge from (1). In effect, by Craig defending (2),
he must deny (1).
Construction
If, as Craig argues, God is timeless sans creation
and temporal with creation how precisely can God be temporal? Did He already
possess the properties necessary to be temporal prior to creation? What are
those properties? How are we to understand God as temporal and yet immutable
(without falling into a minimalist position)? Did God in His essential nature
change with creation? Why not postulate a model similar to the incarnation with
Christ’s hypostatic union? Is it logically possible that God has two eternal
natures one essential the other contingent? If such a model were even logically
possible then wouldn’t it affirm both God is timeless (in one nature) and
temporal (in another)? What would such a model look like? God would have two
natures, much like the incarnation, in which God would exist qua God, with all
the properties of both natures attributed to the three persons without
confusing the two natures. But what would these natures and properties be? The first nature, that is
uncontroversial, would be the traditional understanding of God’s essence with
all the properties that should properly be attributed to God (which would include
timelessness). The second nature, somewhat controversial, would be in some
sense spatial and therefore temporal. The nature need not be thought of as
physical. It could be similar to that of angelic beings that are incorporeal,
spatial, and temporal.
[1] Craig uses the terms ‘dynamic’ theory or ‘A’ theory to
refer to his view of time.
[2] The change might be construed as a mere Cambridge
change. See Richard Swinburne. The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: U. P. Oxford, 1977), 212-213.
[3] William Lane Craig.“Timelessness and
Omnitemporality.” God and Time:
Four Views. Ed. Gregory E. Ganssle.
(Downers Grove: IV Press, 2001), 141.
[4] Ibid.,p.141.
[5] Possible worlds, for those not trained in Philosophy,
refer to the different ways God could have created the world.
[6] The same can be said of contingent things. If God
creates a contingent thing W in any possible world, then he gains a new
relation to W in any possible world; a relation he did not possess (logically)
prior to creation of W.
[7] Ibid.,pp. 65-66. I think Craig would also say such a
view is an attack on the self-sufficiency and aseity of God. See J.P. Moreland
and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003), 504-505.
[8] Craig explains factual content and propositional
content are identical. Ibid.,p.145.
[9] .” Ibid.,p. 145. Craig defines a fact as “the state
of affairs described by a true declarative sentence.” But in other writings
Craig defines a proposition in terms of information content expressed in a
declarative sentence. See William Lane Craig, What Does God Know?
Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002),19-20. See also J.P. Moreland
and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: Intervarsity P, 2003)136-137.
[10] My example of Obama is inspired by Craig’s example of
Kennedy; however, the examples are different in content. Craig’s example refers
to the pledge given by Kennedy; my example refers to the reelection of Obama.
Ibid.,p.145.
[11] Paul Helm. “Divine Timeless Eternity.” God and
Time: Four Views. Ed. Gregory E.
Ganssle. (Downers Grove: IV Press, 2001),47-48.
[12] Leibniz would be an interesting case example. I think
a person that espoused a process theory of time and accepted Leibniz’s
metaphysical doctrines--pre-established harmony and notions--could argue God
must know tensed facts without being temporal. It would be based on a strong
view of divine providence.
[13] See William Lane Craig. What Does God Know?
Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002),40-41. Also The Only Wise
God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 123.
[15] Paul Kjoss Helseth draws the same conclusion in his
response to Craig’s essay. In Four Views of Divine Providence. Ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Dennis W. Jowers. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011),104.
[16] Craig, William Lane. What Does God Know?
Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross: RZIM, 2002), 40.
[17] I assume here there are counterfactuals prevolitional
to God’s decree simply to make the argument against Craig. But I think
counterfactuals are grounded in God’s natural knowledge and therefore, do not
exist apart from God.
[18] Ibid.,p.41. Counterfactuals are conditional
statements in the subjective mood. For example, if Judas were offered 30 pieces
of silver then he would betray Jesus. They are “if-then” statements.
[19] Ibid., pp.43-45. This is called middle knowledge or
hypothetical knowledge. It is the idea that God not only knows what could happen or what will happen, but he also knows what would happen under any given circumstances.
[20] Ibid., p.56. Here Craig replies to the grounding objection
against middle knowledge. By Craig’s reply I cannot help but think how Craig
can consistently be a molinist and nominalist. Craig grants God universal
knowledge prior to creation without concrete objects. Given Craig’s molinism,
he ought to side with a version of theistic conceptual.
[21] Ibid.,p.51-52.
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