Simplicity and Aseity Revisted

James Dolezal thinks “if God were composed of internal parts, He would still require some external agent to supply unity to those parts, and thus the problem of external dependence would not be avoided ” (TableTalk, May 2022, p6). 

He says something similar, “Any entity composed of parts is dependent upon its parts as causal principles of it being. It is also causally dependent upon whatever agent or composer supplies unity to those parts(Trinity and Divine Simplicity in The Doctine of the Trinity ed. Matthew Barrett).”

But this begs the question. It assumes parts are prior to their whole.  I have encountered a similar argument:  

(1) If parts do not exist to ground/explain their wholes then wholes do not exist.

(2) Wholes do exist 

(3) Therefore, parts exist to ground/explain their wholes. 

But premise (1) has the conclusion of the argument built into the premise. To see this the argument may be reformulated to affirm the opposite conclusion: 

(1)* If wholes do not exist to ground/explain their parts then parts do not exist

(2)* parts do exist 

(3)* Therefore, the whole exist to ground/explain their parts. 

I will not merely asserted (1)* against (1) but offer two counterexamples to (1) to show (1) is false. The first counterexample comes from RT Mullins. He suggests we look to the incarnation. The eternal Son of God assumes a human body and human soul (on compositional accounts) yet remains God. The Son becomes part of the real definition of Jesus of Nazareth. And the real definition of Jesus of Nazareth is part of the real definition of the Son of God. One person in two district natures unified by God. This union of two natures is explained by God. If Dolezal was right then God alone cannot be the sole cause and explanation of God’s own unity in the incarnation. But God is the sole cause and explanation of the incarnation. Therefore, (1) may be rejected. Another counterexample is a perfect triangle. It is a necessary truth that a triangle is a three sided shape with three angles. A perfect triangle, following the Great Tradition of Augustine inspired by Plato, believed a perfect triangle is an uncreated eternal divine idea in the mind of God. A perfect triangle is both uncreated and necessary yet explained by God.  it may be argued the concept of a triangle was never created nor composed (with ontologically separable parts). It is an eternal divine idea. A divine idea that is not an instance of a composite of three (instances?) angles to make a triangle. The divine idea is to be understood properly as the universal that may be instantiated. Thus the very concept of a triangle does seem to possess ontological properties or parts (e.g. three angles, three sides) that avoids the threat of composition in virtue of the fact that the properties or parts are essential, ontologically (and logically?) necessary and inseparable. It is a shape or essence with distinct yet inseparable parts explained by God (as the truthmaker or thought-bearer?). This undermines the plausibility of (1) that assumes inseprable parts necessarily entails composition, any composition cannot compose itself and all composition requires a composer. All of these claims each need to be defended. 

Let’s discuss aseity. A substance is a se if and only if it is neither created, caused nor depends on an another substance for its existence. Parts or properties cannot be a se only substances that bear parts or properties can be a se. Lindsey Cleveland and others argues if God is a complex being then God’s being depends on divine properties to be God. Yet divine properties depend on God’s being to be divine properties. A serious bootstrapping problem ensues. Paul Gould has offered a metaphysical account with substantial priority and real essentialism which overcomes this bootstrapping problem. I will not rehearse all of his reply. But I will sketch some of it. Substances are prior to their parts or properties. Substances are the fundamental asymmetrical ground for their parts or properties. A substance explains the identity and existence of its properties. A substance has a real essential definition for what it is. God is by definition a personal being of a divine kind. I would add a tripersonal being of a divine kind. I take the divine kind essence to be a se (fundamental, self-existence, necessary, self-explanatory) and perfect. The modal status is fixed by the divine essence kind. The divine substance grounds God’s numerically distinct yet inseperable divine properties. God is the property-bearer so the properties are properly divine properties whether essential or accidental.