Bignon vs. D’ Souza Calvinism Debate

 Dinish D Souza horribly misunderstands and/or misrepresents Augustinianism/Calvinism. First, there is some diversity of views among on the nature of human freedom and limited atonement. See Oliver Crisp’s book Deviant Calvinism (E.g., John L Girardeau vs. Jonathan Edwards or John Davenant vs. John Owen). There is even debate on precisely how God determines all things. Those inspired by Aquinas seem to take God as the primary cause moving all things meticulously through contingent secondary causes without violating their freedom. E.g. God offers a good to motivate a person to freely perform an action. Calvin and others see divine determinism and genuine human freedom as a paradox—not a logical contradiction—but an intractable tension that goes beyond human ability to resolve. But both truths are affirmed as faithful to Scripture. 

A contemporary promising view is Sean Luke’s synthesis of Calvinism, Molinism and Thomism. Yes, that’s right; it is an interesting proposal.  

All Augustinians/Calvinists take God to be the summum bonum—the highest good. So God as omnibenevolent neither authors, approves, nor appraises sin or evil. This is historic Calvinism (e.g., Westminster Confession of Faith or 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith).  So God qua God cannot deceive. 

God predestines some unto salvation by His grace for His glory—expressing God’s majestic attributes both dispositionally and accurrently. God’s saving grace is not conditional thus neither merited nor deserved. This does not deny a distinction can be made between irresistible (via effectual call) and resistible grace (via outward call) within Calvinism. 

I listen to the Guillaume Bignon and Dinesh D’Souza debate on Predestination and Freedom. D’Souza seemed to equate compatibilism with occassionalism. The former does not entail the latter. He also assumed God is obligated to bestow divine saving grace to his free creatures. This is conceptually incoherent. Saving grace by its very nature is neither earned, entitled nor deserved. 

Bignon ably showed the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is not necessary for freedom. Both compatibilists and sourcehood libertarians agree. His two counterexamples to PAP inspired by Jonathan Edwards and Martin Luther were very illustrative. D’ Souza conceded a lot. I could not believe he entertained and endorsed determinism for inspiration of Scripture but then tried to isolate or insulate it from divine providence altogether.  How does that work..

His shtick of God is the author of evil on Calvinism was overcome since he equivocated on the term ‘author.’ The Greater Good defense with the Felix Culpa and Skeptical theism made by Bignon immune to D’Souza’s changes. 

I am likely considered a deviant Calvinist (following Oliver Crisp’s characterization) because I do not easily fit into the traditional mold. But my views are still within the broad Reformed Tradition as it relates to soteriology.  Here are some ideas I plan to explore further in a forthcoming video.  Some of these ideas are from study (Luke, Mooney, Pruss Wolterstorf, etc.) or reflections from listening to recent Calvinism vs. Arminianism debates (White vs. Hanson or Bignon vs. D Souza) 

I take it God loves all humans as His divine image-bearers but hates them as sinners insofar as they are and remain sinners who continue to sin than become saints. God has the power to make all His free human creatures saints by bestowing saving faith, but God may have a greater desire to refrain from saving everyone, not due to a lack of love, but, because of a greater desire. I can imagine two competing pictures from Jonathan Edwards or Jordan Wessling prioritizing divine glory or divine love. I take it both views terminate the ultimate axiology in God. Both may affirm, in principle, God created humans with intrinsic value—not merely instrumental value—qua imago dei. 

We may stipulate here whatever intrinsic value (INV) is—it is the kind of value, worth or dignity that is worthy of honor, respect and love as it resembles or expresses God’s goodness in a finite degree. 

If a sinner is constituted as a sinner not merely for sinning but in terms of lacking original righteousness and lacking the prevailing desire for righteousness. Perhaps a privation of evil theory as misarrangement or disorder is sufficient to account for precisely why sinners can be hated by God for what they willfully lack or what they should have and do. Whereas God’s love for sinners is for what they have or are made in God’s image as rational souls. Does this mean God loves sinners because they are lovable? No, God loves sinners as they reflect God’s goodness. While divine hate is due to a disorder or privation in sinful humans while divine love for sinners is grounded in the divine image. I find it very hard to believe God does not love all His sinful human creatures, in any way, shape or form, who are made in His image.

Suppose some of the greatest goods are the incarnation of the divine Son and his substitutionary atonement for our sins (Felix Culpa assumption). Stipulate further God created the actual world to bring about those goods. And those goods have the unintended consequences of evil or sins. E.g., the substitutionary atonement for sins necessarily requires the existence of sins. God intends the former good without necessarily intending the latter evil despite the good requiring evil.

Let’s assume God creates the world with the stipulated intrinsic value (INV), especially humans made in God’s image. Suppose intrinsic value grounds some moral desires or obligations. In which case, God creating humans brings about moral obligations or desires between God and humans. For example, humans are obligated to obey God. God is morally obligated (or minimally desires) to promote and preserve the well-being of humans. Grant this entails God is morally obligated (or simply desires), in some sense, to save all humans. Nevertheless, God may have a greater moral obligation (or minimally a desire)—God has not revealed— to not save all people (Skeptical theism assumption). Perhaps the greater moral obligation (or desire) is to dispositionally and occurently be merciful to some (via irresistible grace) and just to others (via retributive justice) for God’s glory (Edwardsian assumption). Or perhaps it is to dispositionally and occurently express God’s justice and love ad extra uniquely or discriminately.

In any case, the intuition with a deontological account grants God may have greater and lesser moral obligations. But if this cannot be stomached then moral obligations may be replaced with desires. Such that it may be logically impossible for God to fulfill both greater and lesser moral obligations (or desires) at the same time.