Creatio Ex Nihilo: Reply to Felipe Leon

 Here are some initial thoughts

Felipe Leon formulates this argument against creation ex nihilo:

1. All concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining efficient cause have an originating or sustaining material cause, respectively.

2. If classical theism is true, then the universe is a concrete object that has an originating or sustaining efficient cause with neither an originating nor a sustaining material cause.

3. Therefore, classical theism is false.

Leon takes Classical theism of any sort that has a sharp creator and creature distinction. His target is to show classical theists (anyone who embraces creatio ex nihilo) must embrace creatio ex materia, pantheism or panentheism. 

Premise (1) is controversial. Leon goes through anticipated objections to (1). To me this reminds me of the mind / body problem. The premise presupposes some sort of physicalism or materialism. Perhaps it assumes philosophical naturalism. So the only possible world which is actual is for material causes; this taken as categorical or modal begs the question. Why think this? This is less plausable than not. The problem of induction could be raised as well to cast doubt on (1). But it seems neither logically nor metaphysically impossible for:

(1)* an incorporeal omnipotent God as efficient cause to bring about the existence of a material universe from no other thing. 

Leon says if such a state of affairs is conceivable to render possible then so is the possibility of an uncreated universe popping into existence from nothing. This strikes me as metaphysically impossible for such a state of affairs to obtain for something contingent to have no fundemental cause or explanation for its existence. In such a senerio there is no fundamental necesary existent cause or ground for contingent reality which (1) assumes. But why not (1)*?

Holy Trinity: Reply to Sean Luke

 I read ​Sean Luke’s paper a year ago, in this latest volume of the Theologica Journal, on the Holy Trinity. My initial thoughts were on my YouTube community post. I will also posted them here. There is an unargued philosophical bias against those like myself who deny simplicity as numerical identity. I see relations/modes can individuate but very thinly given simplicity as numerical identity. In fact, Trinitarian divine cognition and knowledge seems to contradict divine simplicity as numerical identity. The divine persons of the Trinity seem to have distinct self-knowledge, de re beliefs or mental tokens, perhaps better characterized as a first-person perspective, that is unaccounted for by Thomistic simplicity. Baddorf is footnoted but very little engagement with him, Gregory Fowler or Paul M Gould. Substantial priority (e.g. Fowler, Inman, Gould) would have overcome objections against taking the whole substance as the fundamental ground of its parts, properties or powers. As for what makes a property divine, it is the relation it has to the property bearer that gives the property its existence and identity. John Duns Scotus would identify the mode of infinity as the defining feature of divinity for the numerically distinct divine properties (e.g. Smith, Williams). Just some quick thoughts. But a great paper in the right direction 😎

Reply to Drew Sparks

I did an informal book review of Jeffrey Johnson’s (of Free Grace, Grace Bible Theological Seminary) book “The Revealed God” posted on YouTube. 

https://youtu.be/YrajHBFhLIg?si=MNsKZ8dH67fpy1SH

I just skimmed Drew Sparks (of Ivy Tech Community College and IRBS) review of the same book. 

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fbbe68e004e8f7a2365ec17/t/67a6374633b61b095673455d/1738946374950/2024.JIRBS.review.article.In+Defense+of+Classical+Theism.final.pdf

Sparks raises some issues worth exploring more. He believes necessitarianism in the form of a modal collapse does not logically follow from a robust doctrine of divine simplicity (construed as numerical identity) with the proper metaphysical distinction of hypothetical necessity. He thinks nothing about creation is essential to God to be God. This is a great opportunity for further analysis. Sparks assumes all change is necessarily extrinsic to God such that it could never be intrinsic to God. This is under the assumption of absolute immutability. So if God goes from a state of eternally existing solitarily as triune without creation to a state of creating existing with creation. But this is in question—what is the nature of change in creating. Generally, extrinsic change is explained by intrinsic change. A specific effect is explained by the properties and powers of its cause. If the properties or powers were different of a cause then the effect could be different. But to posit a cause that could never change that can produce different effects is explanatorily vacuous. Moreover, if divine cognition affirms both necessary and contingent knowledge. The contingent knowledge God possesses of the actual world would be different if God created a different world. If such a state of affairs is logically possible then there must be a tight relation between intrinsic and extrinsic change. Demonstrating change must be intrinsic to ground extrinsic change. But if God is necessarily and absolutely the immutable eternal creator then God modally cannot do other than God does as God. There is no possible world in which God eternally refrains from creation nor is there a possible world in which God creates a different world than the actual world least God cease to be necessarily and absolutely the immutable eternal creator. Ah but God can produce different effects while remaining necessarily and absolutely the immutable eternal creator. Well this seems to beg the question on the nature of change. It assumes change is extrinsic. But even if change is extrinsic there is no possible world in which God does not create in order for God to be the immutable and eternal creator. God must create to be the eternal creator. Creation as contingent does not logically preclude eternal co-existence with God which is problematic. Sparks says it’s an asymmetrical dependence relation between God the creator and creation. Creation depends on God for its existence while God does not depend upon creation for God’s existence. This is true if God is not necessarily and essentially the immutable creator. But if God is necessarily (logically/metaphysically) and essentially the immutable eternal creator then there is a mutual dependence of some sort (with intrinsic/extrinsic change?) that explains precisely how God is necessarily and essentially the immutable eternal creator. Perhaps the diffusion principle in Plato and Jonathan Edwards would apply here. 

Sparks says the Trinity is consistent with divine simplicity. He does not provide a coherent and consistent model of the Trinity.  I could not help but think what he says would make the Trinity logically impossible. How would Sparks deal with the logical problem of the Trinity with divine simplicity? Often this is simply sidestepped by appeals to mysterianism with the analogia entis—God being beyond being. But this welcomes paradox without any solution to the logical problem. At least Johnson, following Scotus, gives us tools such as the formal distinction to overcome the logical problem. Sparks explains the divine persons are conceptually distinct of the divine substance. Anselm says this is impossible for divine simplicity because conceptual distinctions must be grounded in extramental distinctions. Are the divine persons extramentally distinct of the divine substance? If not, then the processional relations (generation and spiration) are not ontologically distinct. In which case, there are no ontic grounds for individuation.  I see relations/modes can individuate very thinly, if any, given simplicity as numerical identity. In fact, Trinitarian divine cognition and knowledge seems to contradict divine simplicity as numerical identity. The divine persons of the Trinity seem to have distinct self-knowledge, de re beliefs or mental tokens, perhaps better characterized as a first-person perspective, that is unaccounted for by Thomistic simplicity. Scott Williams single mental token shared by the persons doesn’t seem enough. 

Is God the divine persons or the divine substance? Is God properly numerically identical to the divine substance of the three divine persons or is God numerically identical to the three divine persons of the divine substance? Often the latter is specified as God is the Father eternally begetting the Son and through the Son, spirating the Spirit. All three divine persons are essential to the definition of God as a concrete divine substance. If this is the case, then the logical problem of the Trinity must be solved with divine simplicity. But divine simplicity compounds the logical problem of the Trinity not solve it. If the divine substance is both concrete and numerically identical to the three divine subsistences/persons and the three divine subsistences/persons are numerically identical to the divine substance. But a divine subsistence/person is not numerically identical to the three divine subsistences/persons. If a divine subsistence/person is not numerically identical to the three divine subsistences/persons then a divine subsistence/person is not numerically identical to the divine substance. Perhaps this can be illustrated further. Is the Father all of who and what God is exhaustively? If you say yes then you deny the Trinity. If you say no, then you deny simplicity. The point is a concrete divine person/subsistence/mode is not the whole divine Trinity/three subsistences/persons.

Sparks thinks a denial of Thomas’s doctrine of divine simplicity undermines aseity. I show this is not necessarily the case in my YouTube video. 

https://www.youtube.com/live/2JG_Pm6nH9Q?si=lCeuYJp1BQ7jmN6m

Sparks thinks a denial of Thomas’s divine simplicity makes God’s attributes finite not infinite. How so? This reminds me of Spinoza’s  argument for pantheism. ‘Infinite’ must be clearly defined. If it is qualitative in intensity and extensively, e.g., maximal power, I see no problem. But perhaps Scotus’s concept of unitative containment can be adopted to remove this worry. Substantial priority (e.g. Fowler, Inman, Gould) would take the whole substance as the fundamental ground of its parts, properties or powers. As for what makes a property divine, it is the relation it has to the property bearer that gives the property its existence and identity. John Duns Scotus would identify the mode of infinity as the defining feature of divinity for the numerically distinct divine properties (e.g. Smith, Williams). 

Just some thoughts

Divine Simplicity, Flynn and Craig

 Catholic apologist Patrick Flynn offers this argument against William Lane Craig’s doctrine of God.

1. Whatever is composite depends on prior components.

2. Whatever depends on something prior is not ultimate.

3. God is ultimate.

4. So God is not composite.

Premise (1) and (2) are not obviously true. In fact, neo-Aristotelian metaphysics can reject both (1) and (2) with substantial priority. I would commend the work of Gregory Fowler, Matthew Baddorf and Paul M Gould. Substantial priority (e.g. Fowler, Inman, Gould) would take the whole substance as the fundamental ground of its parts, properties or powers.

The assumption that all forms of composition necessarily entail an external composer must be defended not merely presupposed. The greatest counterexample is the incarnation itself which RT Mullins brings up in one of his papers. 

I posted this argument three years ago on X. I reformulted it slightly from Ross Inman’s tweet. 

Assume God is identical to all that God is intrinsically.

(1) God is a se

(2) Whatever is a se cannot be dependent in anyway

(3) Whatever exhibits C-structure is dependent

(4) Whatever exhibits C- structure cannot be a se.

(5) God cannot exhibit C-structure of any kind.

C(composite)-structures

C1 Part-Whole structure

C2 Substance-accident

C3 Nature-supposition

C4 Mode-mode  

C5 Essence-existence 

Conciliar Trinitarians & Mereological Trinitarians are both invested to deny (2&4) given C1 & C4. But if premises are denied can simplicity be defended by aseity? I show one can have aseity without Thomistic simplicity perhaps not as well as Chad McIntosh and Paul Gould, but I try

https://www.youtube.com/live/2JG_Pm6nH9Q?si=3eB2d9TXu44r03Zd 

I reviewed Ryan Mullins and Gavin Ortlund’s debate on divine simplicity a while back. This was an argument I formulated feom that debate that may apply to Flynn. 

(1) If God lacks complexity then God lacks parts, properties, aspects, order or structure.

(2) God has order or structure (e.g. divine processions via taxis)

(3) Therefore, God is complex.

Rationalism and Mysterianism

 I am sympathetic to the mysterianism defended by James N Anderson. But I am also committed to constructing a coherent and consistent Christian worldview. So perhaps the latter can be labeled methodological rationalism. 

As Christians we may construct coherent and consistent models of Christian doctrines that may or may not be true. We may remain tentative or agnostic to their truthfulness per our epistemic stance of mysterianism with epistemic humility. Yet we may still construct coherent and consistent models to demonstrate Christian doctrines are not essentially incoherent nor inconsistent.ll

Simplicity and Aseity Revisted

James Dolezal thinks “if God were composed of internal parts, He would still require some external agent to supply unity to those parts, and thus the problem of external dependence would not be avoided ” (TableTalk, May 2022, p6). 

He says something similar, “Any entity composed of parts is dependent upon its parts as causal principles of it being. It is also causally dependent upon whatever agent or composer supplies unity to those parts(Trinity and Divine Simplicity in The Doctine of the Trinity ed. Matthew Barrett).”

But this begs the question. It assumes parts are prior to their whole.  I have encountered a similar argument:  

(1) If parts do not exist to ground/explain their wholes then wholes do not exist.

(2) Wholes do exist 

(3) Therefore, parts exist to ground/explain their wholes. 

But premise (1) has the conclusion of the argument built into the premise. To see this the argument may be reformulated to affirm the opposite conclusion: 

(1)* If wholes do not exist to ground/explain their parts then parts do not exist

(2)* parts do exist 

(3)* Therefore, the whole exist to ground/explain their parts. 

I will not merely asserted (1)* against (1) but offer two counterexamples to (1) to show (1) is false. The first counterexample comes from RT Mullins. He suggests we look to the incarnation. The eternal Son of God assumes a human body and human soul (on compositional accounts) yet remains God. The Son becomes part of the real definition of Jesus of Nazareth. And the real definition of Jesus of Nazareth is part of the real definition of the Son of God. One person in two district natures unified by God. This union of two natures is explained by God. If Dolezal was right then God alone cannot be the sole cause and explanation of God’s own unity in the incarnation. But God is the sole cause and explanation of the incarnation. Therefore, (1) may be rejected. Another counterexample is a perfect triangle. It is a necessary truth that a triangle is a three sided shape with three angles. A perfect triangle, following the Great Tradition of Augustine inspired by Plato, believed a perfect triangle is an uncreated eternal divine idea in the mind of God. A perfect triangle is both uncreated and necessary yet explained by God.  it may be argued the concept of a triangle was never created nor composed (with ontologically separable parts). It is an eternal divine idea. A divine idea that is not an instance of a composite of three (instances?) angles to make a triangle. The divine idea is to be understood properly as the universal that may be instantiated. Thus the very concept of a triangle does seem to possess ontological properties or parts (e.g. three angles, three sides) that avoids the threat of composition in virtue of the fact that the properties or parts are essential, ontologically (and logically?) necessary and inseparable. It is a shape or essence with distinct yet inseparable parts explained by God (as the truthmaker or thought-bearer?). This undermines the plausibility of (1) that assumes inseprable parts necessarily entails composition, any composition cannot compose itself and all composition requires a composer. All of these claims each need to be defended. 

Let’s discuss aseity. A substance is a se if and only if it is neither created, caused nor depends on an another substance for its existence. Parts or properties cannot be a se only substances that bear parts or properties can be a se. Lindsey Cleveland and others argues if God is a complex being then God’s being depends on divine properties to be God. Yet divine properties depend on God’s being to be divine properties. A serious bootstrapping problem ensues. Paul Gould has offered a metaphysical account with substantial priority and real essentialism which overcomes this bootstrapping problem. I will not rehearse all of his reply. But I will sketch some of it. Substances are prior to their parts or properties. Substances are the fundamental asymmetrical ground for their parts or properties. A substance explains the identity and existence of its properties. A substance has a real essential definition for what it is. God is by definition a personal being of a divine kind. I would add a tripersonal being of a divine kind. I take the divine kind essence to be a se (fundamental, self-existence, necessary, self-explanatory) and perfect. The modal status is fixed by the divine essence kind. The divine substance grounds God’s numerically distinct yet inseperable divine properties. God is the property-bearer so the properties are properly divine properties whether essential or accidental.

Review: Systematic Theology: From Canon to Concept by Stephen J. Wellum

I did a book review of the newly published Systematic Theology: From Canon to Concept, Volume 1 by Dr.  Stephen J. Wellum. Thanks to B&H Academic for allowing me an advance copy of the book.