Creatio Ex Nihilo: Reply to Felipe Leon

 Here are some initial thoughts

Felipe Leon formulates this argument against creation ex nihilo:

1. All concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining efficient cause have an originating or sustaining material cause, respectively.

2. If classical theism is true, then the universe is a concrete object that has an originating or sustaining efficient cause with neither an originating nor a sustaining material cause.

3. Therefore, classical theism is false.

Leon takes Classical theism of any sort that has a sharp creator and creature distinction. His target is to show classical theists (anyone who embraces creatio ex nihilo) must embrace creatio ex materia, pantheism or panentheism. 

Premise (1) is controversial. Leon goes through anticipated objections to (1). To me this reminds me of the mind / body problem. The premise presupposes some sort of physicalism or materialism. Perhaps it assumes philosophical naturalism. So the only possible world which is actual is for material causes; this taken as categorical or modal begs the question. Why think this? This is less plausable than not. The problem of induction could be raised as well to cast doubt on (1). But it seems neither logically nor metaphysically impossible for:

(1)* an incorporeal omnipotent God as efficient cause to bring about the existence of a material universe from no other thing. 

Leon says if such a state of affairs is conceivable to render possible then so is the possibility of an uncreated universe popping into existence from nothing. This strikes me as metaphysically impossible for such a state of affairs to obtain for something contingent to have no fundemental cause or explanation for its existence. In such a senerio there is no fundamental necesary existent cause or ground for contingent reality which (1) assumes. But why not (1)*?