Trinitarianism, Unitarianism and Processions

If unitarianism and trinitarianism both affirm divine simplicity does it not minimize the differences. How so? If one concentrates on any given Trinitarian person—given simplicity—each person wholly and entirely exhausts God. So any epistemic ignorance of ad intra divine relations of origin distinctions within God will make no difference if at least one divine person is known—since each divine person is wholly and entirely God. It seems divine simplicity undermines the necessary and essential property of Triunity that belongs to the divine substance and not the divine persons

As I see it the traditional Trinitarian model affirms the Monarchy of the Father (MOF). The Father as fundamental, asymmetrically grounds the Son and Spirit (through the Son). Typically strong aseity is somehow salvaged by emphasizing the general essence is a se while the individual essence of the Son and Spirit depends upon the Father. This move weakens aseity. People like Mark Makin following Calvin make this move (e.g. essential dependence model). Tim Pawl does something similar (perhaps ad hoc) by restricting aseity’s necessary and sufficient conditions to simply be any given general essence that is neither caused nor depends on another general essence. Such a definition of aseity allows individual essences to be dependent. The worry (or counterexample) is unitarians have a more robust aseity given such a definition.  

 It seems if the processions are denied a mutual dependence relation obtains between the persons and if the processions are affirmed an asymmetrical dependence relation obtains given the MOF. Unless of course the Trinitarian individual essences each ground the shared general essence. There would be a trivial asymmetrical dependence relation between the individual essences to ground the single concrete general essence yet all individual essences of the single concrete general essence would be fundamental. But such a solution would be counter to a mereological model of the Trinity (e.g. Chad McIntosh’s model with Strong PSR).

Or perhaps a robust aseity cannot be salvaged but ontological subordination (e.g. Mullins Reply to Mark Edwards) can be avoided by denying the processions. On such a view the principle of individuation between the persons will be de re beliefs or mental tokens rather than relations of origin.

To preserve aseity and mereology model perhaps the persons ground the conjunction or unity of the parts but do not ground each other’s part. 

Even if most Trinitarian models on offer today precludes robust aseity it is better to have a weaker aseity in which there is intrinsic dependence ad intra between the divine persons than mutual dependence ad extra on creation (e.g. in order for God to be God He must create to be actually loving). 

If God is the truthmaker of all propositions either intrinsically or extrinsically to God then the relation between truthmaker and truth bearer is grounded by God. Does this entail some truths are univocal? E.g. the laws of logic are divine thoughts

What is the relevant difference between unitarianism with concurrent modal distinctions and Trinitarianism with modal distinctions.  Both may affirm an unbegotten mode that eternally generates the begotten mode through which spirates the binding mode that conjoins the unbegotten mode with the begotten mode. Both affirm God is one self in three modes with one will. If relations of origin is the sole relevant difference between Unitarianism and Trinitarianism and Unitarianism can accommodate such modal distinctions it seems relations of origin is too thin to define a relevant difference.